Can an individual claim for psychiatric injury caused by witnessing the death or other horrifying event of a close relative because of earlier clini
Can an individual claim for psychiatric injury caused by witnessing the death or other horrifying event of a close relative because of earlier clinical negligence?
(Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust)Chapter 1 Introduction
In 2024, the long-awaited case Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust led to a judgment restricting the secondary victims claim for psychiatric injury in clinical negligence. Although the judgment examines and improves more general components of the control systems that oversee aim to address why I think it is a bad judgment in my view and contribute original research on this topic by evaluating judment, and also tackling the dissenting judgment. In undertaking an analysis of this judgment and commentary, this dissertation will focus on the issues arising and will examine the decision-making in responding to this issue. This project seeks to determine how the case reflects differing interpretations of how the law should treat claims for psychiatric injury by secondary victims. The majority opinion emphasizes that psychiatric harm must be reasonably foreseeable to establish liability, potentially limiting the scope of such claims. The dissenting opinion, however, argues for a broader interpretation, allowing claims to proceed based on the relational proximity to the primary victim and the traumatic event. This case positions the law at a critical juncture in defining the boundaries of secondary victim claims.
The critical question on it has been criticized that there is a gap between the negligent act, which will lead most cases likely to be unsuccessful. Judicial dissent often captivates the legal community, raising questions about why judges sometimes choose to disagree publicly. In the context of Paul the dissenting judgment reveals deeper disagreements about the application of legal principles governing claims for psychiatric injury by secondary victims. Lord Burrows' dissenting judgment focused on challenging the majority's approach to the foreseeability of psychiatric harm in secondary victim claims and the application of established legal tests The dissenting judge believed that the majority's approach unduly limited the scope of claims for psychiatric injury, arguing for a broader interpretation based on relational and physical proximity to the traumatic event.
The reasons for such dissent can often be traced back to the use of different interpretative methods or the weighting of legal principles. In this case, the dissent may have applied a more expansive view of the legal tests, emphasizing the importance of the relationship between the claimant, the victim, and the traumatic impact of witnessing a loved one's death. By examining these interpretative disagreements, we gain insight into the broader legal debates about the boundaries of liability for psychiatric harm, which are likely to influence future case law. The dissenting opinion serves as a crucial counterpoint to the majority judgment, highlighting the complexities of legal reasoning in this area.
It has been long an area of contention since the establishment of the common law with the law relating to secondary victims who suffer psychiatric injuries because of witnessing shocking events. Medical professionals are responsible for providing care to a patient using reasonable skill and care to protect the patients life and health. They are liable for compensating the patient for any physical or psychiatric harm that could have been avoided in the exercise of care.
Recovery by Secondary victims has long been a problem for the courts. The House of Lords suggested that the only sensible strategy is to say thus far and no further of the law. Although Alcock imposed a strict mechanism for secondary victims, it created confusion, and subsequent decisions have inconsistent. Therefore, the impact of the House of Lords Alcock judgment has led the Court of Appeal in Alcock in Chief Constable of South Yorkshire to explore the limits of the events and their immediate aftermath. Inevitably, Ward LJ did assert that it is a matter of judgment from case to case depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. In what follows, the judgment delivered by Lord Leggat and Lady Rose in Paul needs more clarity in this area of the law.
Chapter 2 Case Study Analysis An Analysis of the Secondary Victim Claims
The scope of the category of these cases was circulated to the leading authority on psychiatric harm for secondary victims, which had largely set the requirements. In Alcock v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police. It is crucial to establish these "control mechanisms" at the beginning of this paper, as their strict interpretation, which serves as a test for determining proximity and is, therefore, a significant factor in establishing a duty to secondary victims, has shaped the framework within which Paul and subsequent cases after Alcock have been decided. It requires five control mechanisms: (1) there must be close ties relationship between the primary and secondary victim; (2) injury from damage must arise from a sudden and unexpected shock to the victim (3) THE VICTIM must be personally present (physical proximity) AT THE EVENT OR COME UPON THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH; (4) injury TO THE secondary victim must be from witnessing death, extreme danger or discomfort suffered by the primary victim and lastly (5) There must be close temporal connection between the accident or event that combines with a close relationship affection between the primary and secondary victim.
The so-called "control mechanisms" for restricting liability to secondary victims have been a focal point of criticism, and justifiably so. GIVE AN INDICATION AS TO WHAT THE CRITICISMS ARE. WHAT DOES THE LAW COMMISSION REPORT THAT YOU CITE SAY? However, the discrepancy has given rise to much discussion, the House of Lords in Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police held that none of the claimants had a close tie of love affection as set out in Alcock control mechanisms. Lord HOFFMANN said that there WAS no reason why they should be given special treatment as primary victims when they were not within the range of foreseeable physical injury and their psychiatric injury was caused by witnessing or participating in THE aftermath of an accident. It is plainly foreseeable that even a person of normal fortitude may suffer more than grief and distress if they see their family members in a gruesome accident. In Mc Loughlin v OBrian, ", it was held that the claimant is entitled to recover damages for both physical and psychological injuries." In Lord Wilberforces view the claim was upon the margin of what the process of logical progression would allow, it was essential to consider policy arguments, as the potential for shock to impact numerous individuals created "a genuine need for the law to impose certain limitations on the scope of admissible claims. PAUL is not strictly governed by Alcock or its precursor McLoughlin v OBrian, resulting in a thorough and authoritative examination of the law regarding secondary victims." . The reasoning for Paul is that those earlier cases involved injuries to the primary victim resulting from an accidentan unexpected and unintended event causing injury through violent external means. In contrast, in the current cases, the event (or its aftermath) witnessed by the secondary victim was a medical crisis experienced by a relative. These consolidated cases highlight many of the fundamental issues within this area of law, this is because it ends debate for secondary victim claims since Alcock as the conjoined cases in Paul all consist of non-accident cases instead of accident because accidents can only be a qualifying event capable of giving rise to a claim for damages by a secondary victim.
The three conjoined cases in Paul, Polmear and Purchase involved negligence caused by the medical crisis to the primary victim because of illness witnessed by the secondary victim. The key issue raised in the appeal was whether liability could be extended but this was rejected by majority.
Chapter 3 Discussion on the Supreme Court Judgment
3.1 Evaluate the current legal framework : Incident and Accidents
3.2 Dissenting judgment
3.3 Impact on Patients and Families
3.4 Should secondary victims of medical negligence be compensated?
Chapter 4 - Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources THESE SHOULD APPEAR IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER AND NOT UNDERLINED
Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] A.C. 455
Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1; [2024]Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1792;Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 A.C. 310; [1991] 11 WLUK 392 (HL)Taylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 194;Tredget and Tredget v Bexley Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 178
McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410Galli-Atkinson v Seghal [2003] EWCA Civ 697
http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2009-1863/DEP2009-1863.pdfTHE LAW COMMISSION LIABILITY FOR PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS
Secondary Sources AGAIN, YOU MUST FOLLOW OSCOLA FOR YOUR REFERENCING
Journal article
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0115D3A43D612B819DB51E019F3C90F9/S0008197322000721a.pdf/limping-into-the-future-negligence-liability-for-mental-injury-to-secondary-victims.pdfImogen Goold and Catherine Kelly
Time to start de Novo: the Paul, Purchase and Polmear litigation and the temporal gap problem in secondary victim claims for psychiatric injury
https://uk.westlaw.com/Document/IE785B2B0BC8311ED94ADE4741A69E266/View/FullText.htmlEleanor J. Russell. Psychiatric injury claims by secondary victims: clarification and correcting wrong turnings https://uk.westlaw.com/Document/I3750C5A02D6211EFB3359281518EA62A/View/FullText.html
Handford, Peter. (2007). Psychiatric injury in breach of relationship. Legal Studies, 27(1), 26-50
James Lee: Incidents & Accidents : The Supreme Court on Psychiatric Harm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4t_W3LCWzHM
Clayton, Benjamin (4 June 2020). Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2020] EWHC 1415 (QB): A Glimmer of Hope for Secondary Victims?LinkedIn, www.linkedin.com/pulse/paul-v-royal-wolverhampton-nhs-trust-2020-ewhc-1415-qb-clayton/.
https://www.pumpcourtchambers.com/2024/03/04/secondary-victim-claims-following-paul-v-royal-wolverhampton-nhs-trust/#_ftnref10https://www.dekachambers.com/2024/01/11/paul-v-royal-wolverhampton-nhs-trust-2024/https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/embarrassed-by-the-law-claimant-lawyers-gutted-by-supreme-court-ruling/5118408.articlehttps://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/7812/7892/7069/dp120_psychiatric_injury.pdfHYPERLINK "https://www.dekachambers.com/2024/01/31/secondary-victim-claims-where-are-we-now/" l "_ftnref2"https://www.dekachambers.com/2024/01/31/secondary-victim-claims-where-are-we-now/#_ftnref2
Things to take note on dissertation:
*write why you think Paul is a bad/good judgment; are there bad/good aspects?
*Focus, addressing the dissenting judgment
*in addition to making more secondary sources need to consider what arguments they are making and say whether or not agree with them, and incorporate what they saying and comment on it
* Need to integrate those articles found and discuss them in the project
*Need one more published resource which is not a blog; and express own opinion
*Find academic commentary which comes from a good law journal
* OSCOLA referencing
