Please make reference to the course material and include in-text citations

Question

This module first covered key theories related to the history of the rise and fall of global powers (such as imperial overstretch, hegemonic stability theory, and long cycle theory). Subsequently, it explored the three leading global powers (the US, China, and Europe) and how their relationship has evolved since the 19th century.

For this essay activity, consider the period from 1990 to 2015 (25 years), and answer the following question:

1) How have changes in the dynamics of globalisation over this period impacted the relative power of the US, Europe, and Asia in the global order?

When writing your essay, you are required to make reference to the course material. Your submission, excluding in-text citations and list of references, may not exceed 600 words.

Essay writing guidelines:

For guidance on referencing, planning and structuring your essay, be sure to consult the essay writing guidelines in the Orientation Module.

Rubric:

The following rubric will be used to grade your submission:

Limited

[0%-49%] Adequate

[50%-59%] Accomplished

[60%-79%] Exceptional

[80%-99%] Outstanding

[100%]

Adherence to the brief

The answer addresses the impact of globalisation on the relative strength of all three major powers (the US, Europe, and Asia). The answer contains at least one key theory related to the history of the rise and fall of global powers, and addresses the correct time frame (19902015).

The essay includes in-text citations and a reference list. The student has not exceeded the word count of 600 words. No submission

Answer fails to adhere to any of the elements contained in the brief

Answer shows limited adherence to the elements contained in the brief. Answer adheres to some elements contained in the brief, but most key elements are missed. Answer adheres to most but not all elements of the brief. Answer adheres to all elements of the brief.

Answer adheres to all elements of the brief and writing style is succinct.

Interpret the global shifts of power accurately

The answer makes accurate reference to key historical events between 1990 and 2015, and clearly articulates how these events relate to the shift of global powers between the US, Europe, and Asia, by applying at least one key theory related to the history of the rise and fall of global powers. No submission, or the answer

fails to show a firm understanding of how the global shifts in power have occurred relative to one another in the relevant time frame. There is some evidence that the student has identified key historical events caused by globalisation within the relevant timeframe. However, these events have not been used to illustrate the global shift of power between the US, Europe, and Asia. Answer offers a reasonable understanding of key historical events caused by globalisation within the relevant timeframe. The answer attempts to illustrate how these affected the global shift of power between the US, Europe, and Asia, by applying at least one key theory related to the history of the rise of global powers, but in a simplistic manner. Answer demonstrates a thorough understanding of the key historical events between 1990 and 2015 related to globalisation. The student articulates how these events affected the global shift of power between the US, Europe, and Asia, by applying at least one key theory related to the rise and fall of global powers. Answer demonstrates a thorough and nuanced understanding of the key historical events between 1990 and 2015 related to globalisation. The student clearly articulates how these events affected the global shift of power between the US, Europe, and Asia, by applying at least one key theory related to the rise and fall of global powers, in a sophisticated manner.

Evidence of critical thinking

The student can draw larger conclusions and links between distinct historical events, and situate them in the larger academic debates that surround the balance of global power. The student engaged critically with the content to draw meaningful conclusions about global power shifts.

There is no evidence that the student has engaged with the theories and academic debates discussed in the module. The student has not been able to illustrate the significance of the effects of globalisation on the big global powers by drawing links between them and the academic debates that surround global power shifts. There is evidence of a limited understanding of some of the key theories and debates discussed in the module. However, links have not been drawn between historical events and key debates to support the demonstrated understanding of the shifts of global power. There is little evidence of critical thinking and the submission leans towards a general description of historical events between 1990 and 2015. There is evidence that the student understands the key theories and debates discussed in the module, though there remains some room for improvement in this regard. There is evidence of critical engagement with the content through the drawing of links between the effects of globalisation and situating these within the global power shifts debate. However, this has been accomplished in a simplistic manner. Answer demonstrates an understanding of the key debates and theories discussed in the module. The student has drawn important links and conclusions between the academic debates that surround globalisation and the shift of global power. The students answer shows that they have engaged with the content to make conclusions about the balance of global power. Answer demonstrates a nuanced understanding of the key debates and theories discussed in the module. The student has drawn important links and conclusions between the academic debates that surround globalisation and the shift of global power in a sophisticated manner. The students answer shows that they have critically engaged with the content to make meaningful conclusions about the balance of global power.

Coherence and clarity

The answer is clearly and logically structured, written in a way that is comprehensible. Answer is incoherent or lacks clarity. Answer is not logically structured, or is incomprehensible. Answer shows limited coherency and clarity. The writing is comprehensible, but lacks logical structure. Answer is written clearly and coherently. The writing is logically structured but there is room for improvement. Answer is clearly structured and written with great clarity and coherence. Answer is extremely well- structured and written with exceptional clarity and is comprehensible. The application of module content is excellent.

MODULE 4 UNIT 2

The rise and fall of great powers

2021 LSE

789305104076500

Table of contents

Introduction3The rise and fall of great powers3Distributional coalitions3Military conflict and economic change4Imperial overstretch5The rise and fall of Western civilisation7The US and China: A Thucydides Trap?7Conclusion8Bibliography9Learning outcome:

LO2: Identify the principles and characteristics of five key theories related to the history of the rise and fall of global powers.

Learning outcome:

LO2: Identify the principles and characteristics of five key theories related to the history of the rise and fall of global powers.

Introduction

Throughout history, certain countries and nation states have grown faster than others, becoming forces of domination or political power over them in the process. The rise of these powers can be attributed to several factors, but what remains equally curious is that dominant powers and nations have always experienced a decline in power once they established themselves as the strongest nation. In some cases, nations became so strong that they were seen to have hegemony, or global dominance, over political and economic systems.

There have been a number of these hegemonic cycles. This pattern in history raises several important questions, with the most interesting being:

Why did empires or great powers become so prevalent?

What defined them as great?

What (if anything) did empires or great powers have in common other than being very powerful?

What impact did the rise and fall of these conglomerations have on the course of history?

What drove the intense competition between them?

Why are there so few examples of peaceful power transitions between empires?

What does any of this have to do with modern politics? A very great deal, because when looking at the United States (US)China relations in the 21st century, there appears to be a major power shift underway as China rises to challenge the hitherto dominant position of the US. While this may end peacefully, many believe that the two are now locked into a Thucydides Trap, which can only have one outcome: increased conflict or possibly even war.

The rise and fall of great powers

Distributional coalitions

Mancur Olsen, an American political scientist working in the second half of the 20th century, became increasingly interested in the relationship between how states were politically organised and their economic successes and failures. In his 1982 book, The Rise and

Decline of Nations, he looks back at the rise to wealth and power of nations that were previously considered as peripheral, or obscure and the collapse, or decline of great civilisations and empires being equally mysterious (Olson, 1982:1). He also refers to China, pointing out that the imposing of their empires, which has lasted several thousand years, finally decayed during the 19th century, making them susceptible to a point where they could easily be preyed on by far less sophisticated nations like the Mongols, or to uprisings by poor peasants in remote provinces (Olson, 1982:1). Chinas decline left it susceptible to pressure from the more economically developed West and its ambitious neighbour Japan, who together carved up the country just a few years before it finally collapsed in 1911.

However, Olsens main focus was on modern nations, and why some economies prosper and others do not. Focusing on the post-World War II (WWII) period, Olsen compared the apparent failure of the British economy and miraculous growth of Japan and Germany, stressing how distributional coalitions affect economic growth. Simply put, post-war Germany and Japan were able to develop quickly because multiple interest groups or distributional coalitions had effectively been destroyed by the war. They were replaced by new coalitions that spurred growth without aggregating the wealth of the nation to a single group at the expense of others. Britain, on the other hand, did not go through the same process. This was less costly in the short term, but as a result, certain powerful interest groups continued to shape the decision-making process, embedded themselves in the system, and caused Britain to stagnate.

Not everybody agreed with Olsens thesis. Two authors, Unger and Van Waarden took him to task for suggesting that stability produces selfish interest groups that are detrimental to economic performance and growth. They also did not agree with his argument that wars removed barriers to growth while peace and stabile coalitions diminished economic performance. Rather, they argued that associations that are well-established can make a positive contribution to economic performance (Unger & Van Waarden, 1994: 425).

Military conflict and economic change

One of the most influential books on the subject of great powers The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers was written by British historian Paul Kennedy. While Kennedy started off with a focus on 19th century international history, he later turned his attention to a much bigger subject, namely how to explain the rise and fall of great powers over a four hundred year period. To sum up his basic argument:

The triumph of any one Great Poweror the collapse of another, has usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces; but it has also been the consequences of the more or less efficient utilization of the state's productive economic resources in wartime, and, further in the background, of the way in which that state's economy had been rising or falling, relative to the other leading nations, in the decades preceding the actual conflict. For that reason, how a Great Power's position steadily alters in peacetime, is as importantas how it fights in wartime.

(Kennedy, 1987:xv)

Kennedy examined several great powers, from Portugal to the Great Britain. Although he accepted that there were differences across time, he concluded that ultimately what drove

history and the relationship between great powers were the various advantages one nation had over another due to their technological and organisational breakthroughs. This resulted in the relative strengths and leadership of these great powers in world affairs seldom remaining constant. However, one thing all the great powers reviewed by Kennedy had in common were that they all strived to become greater still (Kennedy, 1987:xv-xvi).

Imperial overstretch

Kennedy used the term imperial overstretch to describe the unsustainably expensive global commitments of great powers. When The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers was first published in 1987, Kennedy warned that the US could be at risk of imperial overstretch due to the rise in defence spending under Ronald Reagan (Fox, 2016). He also predicted that the US defence budget could become a burden, and wrote that Great Powers who experience decline tend to increase their spending on security, diverting potential resources from investment, compounding their long-term dilemma. (Kennedy, 1987:xxiii).

Nonetheless, this has not happened to the US. In the 1960s, amidst the Cold War and conflict in Vietnam, US defence spending was more than 9% of the countrys GDP in some years. Since 1987, however, the share of GDP spent on defence decreased from around 6% to just over 3% in 2019 (Statista, 2020). This percentage has not changed much since. Regardless, this still meant that by 20182019 US spending stood at US$732 billion; and is estimated to rise to US$934 billion by 20202021 (Amadeo, 2020). This figure may sound enormous, however, as a percentage of the US GDP this could hardly be regarded as a major burden, given that the size of the US economy was estimated at US$22.32 trillion in 2020 (NDTV, 2020). On the other hand, this relatively small percentage still translated into the United States spending more on defence than seven countries combined (Blume, 2019). This can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 1: US military spending as a share of GDP (19402019). (Adapted from: Bloomberg View).

1342973229898

Figure 2: US military spending compared with other countries. (Adapted from: Peter G. Peterson Foundation).

The rise and fall of Western civilisation

In 2011, Niall Ferguson, a prolific historian who had written on a whole range of topics, from financial history to the rise of the United States, published his book Civilization: The six ways that the West beat the rest. In it, he set himself the task of asking the question: why has Western Europe forged ahead of the rest? Moreover, moving into the 21st century, would the West be able to maintain its lead?

According to Ferguson (2011), the West rose above other nations through the development of six key factors, which he referred to as killer apps:

A divided political setting encouraging innovation and competition among, and within states;

A preference for inquiry and scientific approach towards nature;

Elected assemblies representing property-owners and property rights;

Modern medicine;

An industrial revolution focused on the supply of sustained innovations and the demand for mass produced consumer goods; and

A work ethic inclusive of more productive labour, higher savings and the accumulation of capital.

(Berg-Cross, 2012)

Ferguson, however, did not think the West could retain all these advantages going forward. The West faced various challenges. This was mostly linked to a loss of self-confidence in the West rather than the rise of China, which he believed had a fatal defect (Ferguson 2011). Moreover, the consequences thereof could prove to be fatal. As he argued in an interview in 2011:

When you look at complex organisations, whether it be empires or corporations, they are much more likely to collapse very suddenly [and] as we look at our own civilisation, we should steer clear of the assumption that a gentile decline is all we have to worry about. We should be much more worried about collapse, than decline.

(Wbur, 2011)

The US and China: A Thucydides Trap?

In recent years, the idea of global power transition has enjoyed a renaissance. This is largely connected to the fact that after a period of relative stability in the great power system, the world was turned upside down. Firstly due to the Soviet Union collapse in 1991, and secondly by the rise of China as a potentially serious rival to the US since the beginning of the 20th century.

Consequently, some writers and policymakers alike have tried to make sense of global changes by tapping into history. The classical Greek writer Thucydides has proved popular in some circles. His History of the Peloponnesian War examined the long conflict between the Delian League (led by Athens) and Sparta and its allies between 431 BCE and 404 BCE. Thucydides history can be read at several different levels. However, for scholars of international relations today it contains many significant ideas about the nature of power that are of lasting value. But perhaps the most significant is his analysis of what caused the war to break out in the first place. Thucydides bears down on one reason in particular: the changing balance of power between Athens and Sparta. To quote Thucydides:

It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.

(Allison, 2017)

Well over two thousand years later this idea is seen as relevant to understanding the growing tensions between the United States and China, with China being cast as the new Athens and America (as Sparta) increasingly concerned about its rising power. Today China and the United States seek war no more than Athens and Sparta did in ancient times. However, when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, war (or at least more intense competition) is the most likely outcome.

The idea that there was or is an unavoidable Thucydides Trap has generated a great deal of debate, with China insisting that it is merely an intellectual construct, and others that it at least points to the very real danger inherent in the current relationship between the two powers. Either way, it has been the subject of a great deal of research, with one analyst concluding that if history is any guide, the future looks anything but bright. As Harvard academic Graham Allison put it in his book on US-Chinese relations titled Destined for War (2017), it was not just Athens and Sparta that went to war, but most great powers in periods of power transition thereafter. Though criticized by many for being too pessimistic, Allisons study reminds us that modern power struggles is something we ignore at our peril, and that sometimes thinking the worse may be one way of making sure the worse never happens.

Conclusion

When a nation state becomes so powerful that it can impose the rules of interaction between the most important members of the global economic and political system, this nation is said to impose hegemony or global dominance. However, distributional coalitions, military conflict, and economic change are some of the most important factors in both the rise and decline of great nations.

Imperial overstretch, where a country overspends on its military endeavours to protect its position of control, has been a key factor in the decline of nations. Nonetheless, even though the US has the biggest military spend in the world, this has not caused a decline in the countrys current hegemonic power.

789305104076500

Bibliography

Allison, G. 2017. Destined for war: can America and China escape Thucydides's Trap?

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Amadeo, K. 2020. The balance. US military budget, its components, challenges, and growth: why military spending is more than you think it is. Available: https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth- 3306320 [2020, December 7].

Berg-Cross, G. 2012. Killer Historical Stories. Secular Humanist. Available: http://secularhumanist.blogspot.com/2012/05/killer-historical-stories.html?m=0 [2021, March 12]

Blume, S. 2019. Dear Pentagon: its not how big your budget is. Its how you use it.

Available: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/10/pentagon-defense-budget-trump/ [2021, January 20].

Ferguson, N. 2011. Civilization: the six ways the West beat the rest. London: Allen Lane. Fox, J. 2016. Americas in danger of imperial overstretch. Available:

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-13/america-s-in-danger-of- imperial-overstretch [2017, July 20].

Imperial overstretch? 2002. The Economist. 27 June. Available: http://www.economist.com/node/1188741 [2017, July 20].

Kennedy, P. 1987. The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000. London: Unwin Hyman.

NDTV Profit. 2020. How Indian economy fares globally ahead of union budget 2020. P. Noronha, Ed. Available: https://www.ndtv.com/business/budget-2020-21-how- indian-economy-fares-globally-ahead-of-union-budget-2020-2165582# [2021,

January 20].

Olson, M. 1982. The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. Yale: Yale University Press.

Statista. 2020. Military expenditure as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in highest spending countries. Available: https://www.statista.com/statistics/266892/military-expenditure-as-percentage-of- gdp-in-highest-spending-countries/# [2021, January 20].

Statista. 2020. The 15 countries with the highest military spending worldwide in 2019. Available: https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest- military-spending/ [2021, January 20].

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2020. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Available: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex [2021, January 20].

789305104076500

Unger, B. & Van Waarden, F. 1999. Interest associations and economic growth: a critique of Mancur Olson's Rise and Decline of Nations. Review of International Political Economy. 6(4):425467.

Wbur. 2011. The West in decline? Available: https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2011/12/05/the-west-in-decline [2021, February

20].

MODULE 4 UNIT 3

Global power shifts

2021 LSE

789305104076500

Table of contents

Introduction3The rise of US hegemony3America and the Cold War3The unipolar moment and globalisation5US hegemony challenged6Bush and Iraq7The 2008 global financial crisis7America after the crash8China syndrome: US decline?9Towards an Asian Century?123.1. Regional peace and economic reform13The Asian financial crisis13Asia recovers14The Asian Century?15The European project: from success to crisis17The European project17The rise and further rise of the EU17The European moment18Is Europe in crisis?19Conclusion20Bibliography21Learning outcomes:

LO3: Interpret the evolution of the United States through the Cold War and beyond and assess its position in the world system today.

LO4: Interpret the shift from political instability in Asia to economic reform and critically assess the idea of an Asian Century.

LO5: Identify the origins of the European Union and identify the main sources of strengths and weaknesses in the EU today.

Learning outcomes:

LO3: Interpret the evolution of the United States through the Cold War and beyond and assess its position in the world system today.

LO4: Interpret the shift from political instability in Asia to economic reform and critically assess the idea of an Asian Century.

LO5: Identify the origins of the European Union and identify the main sources of strengths and weaknesses in the EU today.

Introduction

Throughout history, great powers have declined and fallen even those who thought they would remain great forever. However, many would argue that the United States (US) remains exempted from the great power rule of decline and fall (McNeil, 2019). Having the advantage of favourable geography, invulnerability from being attacked by the outside world until the nuclear age, and a massive and dynamic economy that continues to be attractive to millions outside its shores, the US is believed to be a special nation (Zhou, 2019). As a result, it has not only enjoyed a remarkably long period of dominance, but many think that it will continue to remain dominant well into the 21st century (McNeil, 2019).

However, the world has changed dramatically in the age of globalisation. Many observers have concluded that Chinas rise in particular is bound to lead to a major shift in the balance of power to US disadvantage (Zhou, 2019). They also point out that there has been a major regional shift from Europe to Asia, and some are now predicting (even assuming) that the 21st century will become an Asian Century (McKinsey & Company, 2019). But are any of these claims true? Are the West and the US in decline? Does the future belong to Asia, or even China? What evidence can be drawn upon to evaluate the different claims about power shifts?

This set of notes attempts to explore some of these key questions by examining the power of the US, the concept of an Asian Century, and the current state of the European Union (EU).

The rise of US hegemony

The following sections will examine the history of US hegemony.

America and the Cold War

Today, any discussion about power must begin, necessarily, with the US. Born out of a war against the British Empire, and having achieved great power status by the end of the 19th century and superpower status by 1945, the 20th century was almost bound to become what writer Henry Luce termed in 1941 an American Century (Boucher, 2015).

Many scholars would also argue that without the power of the US, some kind of order would have been impossible after World War II (WWII). Using its formidable assets, the US was first instrumental in laying the foundations for a more open-world economy. It then went on to rebuild Western Europe and reintegrate former enemies (Germany and Japan) into the new world order. Lastly, by containing opposing powers, most obviously the Soviet Union and communist China, it secured market capitalism against its ideological enemies in a long, drawn-out conflict that came to be known as the Cold War, which lasted roughly from 1947 to 1991.

Despite the intense ideological rivalry between East and West, there was no direct military action or physical fighting during the Cold War, hence the name. This signified the struggle and rivalry between the East and the West. However, the absence of physical conflict during the Cold War did not prevent the conflict from spilling over into what came to be called the Third World. In fact, millions of people died in various conflicts, coups, interventions, and civil wars, including 2 million Vietnamese soldiers and civilians (Spector, 2020), 2.5 million Koreans (Millet, 2020), and nearly 1 million Chinese soldiers (Chen,

2020).

Considering these numbers, the Cold War was not as cold or peaceful as many have argued. Nonetheless, it developed a set of informal, unspoken rules and beliefs that the US and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the two main global superpowers at the time, generally abided by:

The global influence (economic, cultural, and military) held between the US and Soviet, i.e. a bipolar system, was relatively stable.

Both sides had a major interest in preventing escalations that would lead to nuclear war.

Neither would intervene in the others sphere of influence in Europe.

Even when the more conservative Ronald Reagan took over as US President in 1980, and reformer Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader five years later, few thought this would lead to major change. In fact, very few analysts or policymakers really foresaw or predicted what finally came to pass when the whole system fell apart between 1989 and 1991. In a speech made by Reagan on March 8 1983, he referred to the Soviet Union as being an evil empire (Glass, 2018). He also predicted the fall of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev might have discussed establishing a new relationship with the West. However, few experts thought that something as dramatic as the end of the Cold War would happen.

There were many reasons why most Western analysts got the end of the Cold War wrong (Cox, 2009:161176). One of the most obvious was a belief that the Soviet Union, with its vast military resources, ubiquitous system of controls, and resilient (though inefficient) planned economy, would endure. Another was the equally widespread belief that the USSR could and would not withdraw from Eastern Europe or allow Germany to unite. Additionally, most policymakers in the West or USSR did not want to upset the Cold War order.

Definition:

Pax Americana (Latin for American Peace) refers to the international order established by American power after WWII.

Definition:

Pax Americana (Latin for American Peace) refers to the international order established by American power after WWII.

The unipolar moment and globalisation

The complete collapse of the Soviet system of power between 1989 and 1991 had massive long-term consequences. In simple terms it saw:

The end of the USSR as a superpower;

The creation of a new, united Germany;

A completely new political landscape in Europe (the European Community became the EU in 1992); and

The end of the long-held idea that socialism or socialist planning represented the wave of the future.

The collapse also altered the balance of power, taking the world from a bipolar system, in which two blocs balanced one another, to a unipolar world, where there was no balance at all. The US had become the only superpower in an international system where its ideas and ways of organising the world had come to prevail.

In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically altered the geographical shape of the world economy. Before 1989 there were three economic spaces: the first definably capitalist and open, the second clearly socialist and closed, and the third a Third-World economic order situated somewhere between the former two. Now, with the passing of the socialist camp, capitalism went truly global for the first time since the beginning of the 20th century. This not only led to former planned economies (including that of China and Russia) adopting market-inspired economic reforms, but also joining the world market economy.

This big economic shift also changed the direction of US foreign policy. Hitherto, the US had focused almost entirely on containing communism. Now, it began to concentrate on economics and how it might reshape the world economy. It was at this point that the idea of globalisation rose in popularity, climbing to the top of the US foreign policy agenda. This can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the increase in references to globalisation in book titles between the 1980s and 2000s.

Figure 1: References to globalisation in book titles between the1980s and 2000s.

The idea of globalisation increased in popularity especially during the Clinton presidency (19932001). Clinton was nothing if not enthusiastic, and saw globalisation as a general force for good that would increase world trade, generate more foreign direct investment (FDI), encourage economic reform in countries transitioning away from planning, and transform China and Russia into responsible stakeholders.

Clinton also saw a connection between the spread of the market and the realisation of a key US foreign policy objective: democracy promotion. Indeed, many around Clinton insisted that globalisation and global economic integration would or might make the material case for democracy better than mere exhortation. In fact, according to the theory made popular by liberals like Clinton, the more democracies there were in the world, the more peaceful the world was bound to become. Globalisation, therefore, would not only make the world more prosperous; it would also make it more stable, free, and liberal (Cox, Ikenberry & Inoguchi, 2000).

US hegemony challenged

When Clinton left office in 2001 the US was in a remarkably strong position. In terms of the balance of power, the US faced no great rival worthy of mentioning. It was still by far and away the most formidable military power in the world. In soft power terms, the US brand was becoming ever more attractive, and in economic terms, the US model appeared to have no peer.

The US seemed so powerful that some pundits predicted yet another American Century. Liberals did not think this was a bad thing, as in their eyes the US was a liberal power and, therefore, bound to rule in a benign fashion. Others, however, believed that such an unequal system could not endure and sought to balance US power. While realists, like Christopher Layne (2010), were adamant that unipolarity was only temporary, many Americans thought the US was different exceptional even. As he put it, the foundational American myth of empire is exceptionalism, the belief, dating back to the Puritans, that the US is different, better, and morally superior to the rest of the world (Layne, 2010). But history, he insisted, would prove otherwise.

Bush and Iraq

The first major challenge to the USs new-found confidence came with the attack of 9/11. While the attack itself was bound to have a traumatic impact on ordinary Americans, trauma turned into crisis because of the reaction of George W. Bushs administration. Few disputed Washingtons right to respond against al-Qaeda and its supporters in Afghanistan, however, President Bushs decision to launch an ill-defined war on terror in 2001 was highly controversial.

This not only targeted well-defined and well-known terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, it also identified at least three rogue states namely Iraq, Iran, and North Korea who formed part of what Bush called a larger axis of evil, the existence of which threatened global stability. Little could be done to change either Iran or North Korea, but something could be done against Iraq: In March 2003, the US launched a war to liberate Iraq from Saddam Husseins dictatorship.

Fought in the name of democracy, with the goal of eliminating weapons of mass destruction (which Iraq did not in fact possess), the war turned from immediate military triumph into a quagmire-like disaster that destroyed any semblance of order in Iraq itself, caused a major crisis in the Western alliance, led to a wave of anti-Americanism around the world, and opened the door for the emergence of an even more ruthless terrorist organisation than al- Qaeda in the shape of ISIS (the so-called Islamic State). Moreover, removing Saddam from power in Iraq left the region susceptible to increased Iranian influence.

The 2008 global financial crisis

If Iraq was considered a strategic disaster, the financial crisis of 2008 delivered yet another blow to US prestige. The deeper causes of the crisis have been much debated by economists, with some arguing that it was caused by excessive risk-taking by US banks, the extension of home ownership to millions who could not afford to pay, and a lack of proactive measures by responsible regulatory authorities. One argument even held the efficient market theory responsible, which took as its intellectual starting point the idea that the market could never fail. This is despite the fact that there had been various warning signs in the global financial system in the years prior to the crash.

What began in the US spread to the rest of the world for one simple reason: the rest of the world had become intimately connected and dependent on the US as a result of globalisation, which had made the world highly sensitive to changes in US markets. Furthermore, because US consumption (spurred on by low interest rates, easy credit, and cheap Chinese imports) had been a key driver in world economic growth since 2000, global growth declined dramatically when US consumers started to spend less and save more (Baily & Elliott, 2009).

The consequences were dire. Economic activity declined dramatically in major developed economies including Japan, the UK, and eurozone. Even China was hit badly, with over 20 million workers being laid off (United Nations [UN], 2011). Russia did not escape the downturn either. Meanwhile, the world economy, which had been moving inexorably upwards for the past 20 years, witnessed the first synchronised world recession since 1974.

America after the crash

While the world economy reeled, millions of ordinary Americans suffered as the stock market and housing market fell dramatically. As 2008 came to a close, the S&P Index dropped by 40% while the Case-Shiller Home Price Index dropped by 20% (The National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017). Unsurprisingly, Americans became increasingly more pessimistic, as a 2013 YouGov survey showed. Prior to the economic crash, Americans were typically optimistic about their own circumstances. By 2013, however, only 26% of Americans believed that the US was heading in the right direction. (YouGov, 2013:1). The crash also impacted US citizens views about Americas nearest economic rival, China. Whereas most Americans seemed relaxed about the rise of China before 2008, they began to see China as a significant economic power thereafter.

Consequently, the world economy staged a rather anaemic comeback, as did the US. As a result of some fairly radical economic measures taken under President Barack Obama, Wall Street and the job market started to recover, and overall business confidence started to return. Regardless, many Americans still felt that their own situation had not improved much. Moreover, the statistics seemed to suggest that there were solid reasons for feeling pessimistic. After all, in 1970, 90% of 30-year-olds in the US had a higher quality of life than their parents when they were the same age. In contrast, by 2010 this figure had dramatically declined to 50%. This stagnation seemed to affect blue-collar workers, as well as a significant proportion of the middle class (Illing, 2017).

While the US economy started to recover, there remained a gap between where the economy might have been had it continued to grow in the way it had before 2008 and how it was developing after the crisis. Figure 2 shows the impact of the 2008 recession and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic on US GDP.

2047455132405

Figure 2: US gross domestic product (GDP) change after the 2008 recession and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. (Source: US Bureau of economic analysis).

While the US regained some economic composure by 2016 the year in which Donald Trump won the race for the White House the overall economic situation not only remained uncertain, but many Americans felt they had lost out badly. A less certain future beckoned.

China syndrome: US decline?

Pessimism about Americas future was not merely a reaction to what was happening in the US economy. The downbeat mood was also fed by the constant repetition of the increasingly influential idea that the worlds economic future belonged to China. In fact, even before the crisis hit, many viewed the rapid rise of China as the beginning of the end of US primacy. No less, organisations in the financial sector, for example, pointed to a new world economic order going forward (See Figure 3.).

As the finance house noted in a much-publicised report, even though the US (and the Western economies more generally) were dominant in 2007, they would no longer possess this degree of dominance by the middle of the 21st century (Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). Others proceeded to draw what they saw as the obvious long-term conclusions. In a popular study, British author Martin Jacques (2008:26) declared that China would one day rule the world. This was no doubt an exaggeration. However, Chinas role in the world continued to grow. The 2013 launch of the Belt and Road Initiative; the 2015 publication of Made in China 2025, which talked of China becoming a major technological power; and Chinas increasingly confident diplomatic role in Africa, Latin America, and Europe all seemed to point to a major global shift in power.

2551356219531

Figure 3: World growth predictions from 2016 to 2050. (Source: Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003).

This view inevitably changed the way the US related to China, and by the time former President Donald Trump entered the White House, the country which many had once hoped might become a stakeholder in a western-led liberal order was regarded as Americas most serious rival. Rejecting the standard liberal view that the more China traded with the West, the more likely it would become like the West, the Trump administration significantly shifted the debate about China.

The perception was now that China was not only taking away American jobs and failing to abide by the economic rules laid down by the World Trade Organization, but under President Xi Jinping also engaging in various nefarious adverse military and spying activities directed against the West in general and United States in particular. Therefore something had to be done to combat what then Vice-President Pence defined as the new China threat turning plowshares into swords on a massive scale, and masterminding the wholesale theft of American technology, including cutting-edge military blueprints (Greber, 2018).

There is no doubting Chinas transformation and the impact this has already had on the world. However, it is important to consider if this transformational impact adds up to a major power shift or even the beginning of the end of the American era. This view has become increasingly popular as Americas soft power slumped abroad during Trumps presidency. However, there are several reasons to be cautious about this claim:

In nominal gross domestic product (GDP), the US is still the world's largest economy. This stood at just under US$20 trillion in 2019, and increased to US$21.16 trillion in 2020 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, n.d.).

Even though the US represented only 4.33% of the worlds population, it accounted for nearly a quarter of the worlds GDP in 2016 (Worldometer, 2020; Patton, 2016). By 2018 that figure had fallen as other economies grew, but still hovered around 20%.

In 2020, seven of the top ten corporations in the world by market capitalisation (Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Facebook, Berkshire Hathaway, Johnson & Johnson, and VISA) were American (Statista, 2020).

Despite many predictions that the US dollar would diminish in significance after the 2008 crisis, this has not happened. It remains the worlds major reserve currency, accounting for over 60% of all international transactions (Amadeo, 2020). This dominant position has not changed since (Ahmed, 2019).

The US wins more Nobel Prizes in science, economics, and medical research than any other country in the world (Kirk, 2015). Of the ten universities with the most Nobel Prize-winning work since 2000, seven have been in the US (Best Masters Programmes, n.d.).

There are 16 US universities in the top 25 ranked universities in the world, and 40 in the top 100 (Times Higher Education, n.d.).

US universities are highly attractive to Chinese students. By 2016, over 300,000 students from China chose to study in the US (Wertime, 2016). By September 2019

that figure increased to 363,000, representing over 30% of all foreign students studying in the US (Shand, 2019).

The US remains an attractive country for those seeking work. Roughly 14 million immigrants (both legal and illegal) relocated to the US between 2000 and 2010 (Camarota, 2011). By 2017, just under 14% of the US population was foreign born (Connor & Budiman, 2019).

China is a major player in the United Nations (UN). The country also plays a big role in the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and is a key member of BRIC alongside Russia, India, Brazil, and South Africa. The US, however, has been involved in such institutions for much longer and therefore has more institutional leverage both through its formal alliances, like NATO, and in key economic bodies like the World Bank (of which it is always Chair), as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to which it contributes significantly. Even in the UN, the US can count on the votes of two of its closest allies (the UK and France) whereas China can only rely on Russia.

The power of any country can be measured by the range and depth of its alliances. While former president Trump may not have adequately reassured allies of his commitment to them, the US could still count on many formal allies around the world after he left office. And while China may have important relations with other countries, it has not accumulated very many allies.

An equally telling measure of US power is how much the country spends on defence every year. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2020), the US exceeds all other nations in terms of military spending, as illustrated in Figure 4.

1342973110303

Figure 4: US military spending compared with other countries. (Adapted from: Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 2020).

Explore further:

The sheer power of the US can also be illustrated by looking at a map of it, and renaming the various states to countries with similar GDPs. This is illustrated in an article by AEI, which compares country GDPs with the GDP of American counties. According to data from 2019, New York had a larger GDP than that of Canada, Texas had a larger GDP than Brazil, and California had a larger GDP than India (Perry, 2020).

Explore further:

Towards an Asian Century?

Chinas increasingly important role in the world is mirrored by the recognition that the region where it is located has become more and more significant over the past 25 years. This was not always the case. Over the past two centuries, the general direction of travel for Asia was more downwards than upwards. This began in the 19th century when a huge economic gap opened up between Asia and the West (Morris, 2010). It continued during a good part of the 20th century when Asia was going through various wars, revolutions, and western interventions. Inevitably this impacted Asias economic development.

Today, Asia is regarded one of the more dynamic regions in the world economy (Chin, 2004). However, in 1950, Asia accounted for only 15% of world GDP and remained extraordinarily poor, even by the early 1970s. As a result, China could hardly be defined as emerging. In 1978, before Chinese economic reforms were fully developed, 45% of Chinas urban population and 94% of its rural population earned below US$1.25 a day (Nio-Zaraza & Addison, 2012).

1449209194660

Figure 5: Asias GDP growth and projected forecast from 20142024.

3.1. Regional peace and economic reform

Asias economic transition over the last 30 years has been remarkable. Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War helped, as well as the collapse of the socialist model of economics and introduction of market-style reforms. Chinas economic rise from a US$200 billion economy in 1990 to a US$14.3 trillion economy in 2019 (Silver, 2020) was also crucial in pulling the wider Asian region along behind it.

However, Chinas rise (and Asia in general) also owes a great deal to its closer association with the global economy. A large part of their success did not just depend on continuing with important economic reforms at home (Hu & Khan, 1997). It also depended on attracting foreign capital while exporting increasing amounts of goods to the huge western markets. Globalisation, therefore, plays a central part in Asias and particular Chinas success.

While China was suspicious of joining the global economy at first (even when undertaking reforms at home), by the 1990s it had become clear to Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping that unless China went truly global, it would remain poor. Integration into the world economy was the only road forward.

According to a report titled The East Asian Miracle, published by the World Bank in a famous 1993 study, Asia also began to look outwards with considerable economic success. (World Bank, 1993). The report endeavoured to illustrate how many countries within East Asia had already experienced rapid growth. It not only included the larger Asian economies, like Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, but also focused on other smaller economies in Southeast Asia, most notably Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, all of which experienced high GDP growth rates of between 812% during the late 1980s and early 1990s (World Bank, 1993).

The Asian financial crisis

However, not everybody was convinced of Asias economic potential. For example, in a 1994 article titled The Myth of Asias Miracle, Paul Krugman, an influential US economist, argued that the regions economic success was merely short term and would not last (Krugman, 1994:6278). As he pithily put it, the Asian economic model reminded him of the old Soviet-style system, in that it could be characterised as having all perspiration, little inspiration, and not much efficiency (Krugman, 1994:6278). Among those who agreed was Aaron Friedberg, who insisted that Asia and East Asia particularly was set for rivalry and where there was such rivalry, there was little chance for long-term prosperity (Friedberg, 1994).

The so-called Asian financial crisis of 19971998 seemed to prove the pessimists right. Beginning in Thailand, the crisis quickly spread and foreign debt-to-GDP ratios climbed from 100% to 167% in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, reaching a plateau of 180% during the height of the crisis (Asian Development Bank, 2003). In 1998 the crisis also hit Indonesia, where President Suharto had to step down due to riots precipitated by price increases and the devaluation of the currency. The IMF tried to intervene with limited results (International Monetary Fund, 2000). Countries outside of Asia that were also hit by the crisis included Russia. As shown in Figure 6, this was no mere economic blip, but rather a major downturn.

Figure 6: The 19971998 East Asian crash. (Source: Garay, n.d.).

Asia recovers

The financial crisis did not last and Asia staged a remarkable economic recovery. Many concluded that this was a result of the positive economic role played by China, others attributed the recovery to the large IMF loans, and some to a series of banking reforms that made the financial system of South East Asia less prone to financial attack by speculators. However, the most likely reason was that the regions economies remained fundamentally healthy so much so that in 2011, the Asian Development Bank predicted that if Asian economies could keep up their growth for another 40 years, adapt to the global economic and technological landscape, and keep on recreating comparative advantages, Asia would not only assume a greater role in the wider world economy, but would also no longer be home to any poor countries (Asian Development Bank, 2011).

In 2019, the World Bank was equally upbeat, forecasting that it expected extreme poverty to dip below 3% by 2021 (World Bank, 2019). However, these figures were impacted by the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, which lead to a rise in extreme poverty for the first time in twenty years (Lee, 2020). Furthermore, if Asia continued to grow, it would see a vast expansion in the regions increasingly cash-rich middle class, which is one of the biggest factors driving Asian growth. This new prosperous class tripled in number from 500 million in 2014 to 2 billion in 2020, and is forecasted to grow to 3.5 billion by 2030 (Buchholz, 2020).

Asias impressive economic achievements in the first part of the 21st century lent credibility to the increasingly popular view that power was shifting away from the West, and towards the East. Danny Quah, former economist at the London School of Economics and Political Science, expressed this view most graphically. In a 2011 article titled The global economys shifting centre of gravity, Quah illustrated that the axis around which the world economy was rotating was moving inexorably away from the middle of the Atlantic (where it had been in 1980) to a point somewhere between Delhi and Beijing in 2008 (Quah, 2011). This is illustrated in Figure 7.

1518173207091

Figure 7: The shift in the global economys centre of gravity. (Source: Quah, 2011).

Many other writers appeared to agree with this optimistic forecast, including Financial Times journalist Gideon Rachman. While the West shaped and dominated the world for centuries, Rachman was adamant that this was no longer the case. Power was at last moving elsewhere. A process that he called Easternization was underway (Rachman, 2017). Another influential writer on the subject argued that an irresistible power shift was taking place, and there was little that the established Western powers could do about it (Mahbubani, 2008). Over a decade later, Parag Khanna (2019) was even more certain about Asias place in the world, as is clear from the title of his bestselling book The future is Asian.

The Asian Century?

Not everyone was as convinced as Quah, Rachman, Mahbubani, or Khanna that the Asian Century had arrived. The region might have been generating around 30% of global economic output and contributing to global growth in a serious way, but as Pei (2009) argued, the average living standard in Asia remained low, with GDP per capita a mere US$5,800, compared to US$48,000 for the US. Furthermore, even with overall improvements in living standards, for the average Asian to match the average American income, it would take on average 77 years (Pei, 2009). Ten years later, the World Bank (2019) warns that despite material improvements in the lives of millions of Asians, half a billion people in the region remain economically insecure, [and always] at risk of falling back into poverty.

Asias economic rise has been and remains very uneven. Thus, while some countries like Japan and Singapore might have become wealthy, many others like Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Philippines remain decidedly poor. It is also worth noting that wealth is not evenly distributed within Asian counties. For example, approximately 60 per cent of Indians continue to live on less than US$2 a day, with an estimated 600 million people not having access to proper sanitation (Lehmann, 2015). Nor, it seems, would it be easy for Asian countries to escape the so-called middle-income trap. Only five Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have so far done so (Lehmann, 2015).

3244850138049000It is important to put Asias economic rise into context. Asia as a whole may be developing fast, but it is doing so from a relatively low base. Asias economic rise should not lead us to ignore the Wests many economic strengths. Quah (2011) might argue that economic power is shifting away from the Atlantic area, but that same Atlantic area of roughly 800 million people still accounted for about 40% of global GDP, 57% of inward stock of FDI, and 66% of outward stock of FDI in 2008 (Meyer, 2008). Ten years later those figures had declined somewhat. Nevertheless, in 2019, the Transatlantic Economy still accounted for half of total personal consumption, making up a third of GDP globally. (Hamilton & Quinlan, 2019). Furthermore, as an interactive map developed by Fortune indicates, North America and the EU continue to be home to the majority of the worlds companies. Asia might be catching up, but it still has a long way to go.

It is also worth remembering that Asia does not constitute an integrated region in any meaningful sense. It has few regional institutions, and the one that it does have Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) is still a work in progress. Its two biggest powers India and China are as much rivals as they are partners. Moreover, Asia is generally a highly complex area consisting of many different cultures, several different political systems, and a large number of unresolved conflicts between states. Each of the Asian states have very strong identities (often bound up with ethnicity), which also makes cooperation between them difficult.

Finally, Asia still confronts a number of outstanding issues. First, there is the so-called history problem the legacy of WWII and continuing suspicions that Japan never accepted full responsibility for what it did before its defeat in 1945. Secondly, there is the problem of a divided Korea, and the very real threat to the regions stability posed by North Korean nuclear weapons. Finally, there is China, whose rise was welcomed economically but caused great uncertainty among its neighbours with increasingly assertive behaviour. None of this may lead to war, but it does suggest that there are many problems still outstanding. One of the more sceptical writers on the Asian Century observed that:

Asian history is replete with examples of competition for power and even military conflict among its big players. China and Japan have fought repeatedly over Korea; the Soviet Union teamed up with India and Vietnam to check China, while China supported Pakistan to counterbalance India. Already, China's recent rise has pushed Japan and India closer together. If Asia is becoming the world's center of geopolitical gravity, it's a murky middle indeed.

(Pei, 2009)

As another, much later, study concluded, Asias achievements are real. However, the region as a whole faces significant, potentially insurmountable challenges in the year ahead (Auslin, 2017).

The European project: from success to crisis

The following sections will examine the trajectory of European growth in greater detail.

The European project

The idea of a new Europe (or more precisely, Western Europe) grew out of the terrible experiences that had befallen the old Europe in the 30-year period following the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. The lessons that were to be drawn were clear. First, Western Europe would have to be recast in such a way that aggressive nationalism could no longer determine the fate of the continent. Second, some solution would have to be found for the long-standing German question. Third, Europe would have to build a new set of cross- border institutional structures upon which healthy economic growth and democratic politics could be built.

Sustained economic growth supported by policies that would deliver a new social contract between the citizens of Western Europe and the state was key to the success of the European project. The policy mix that delivered this became known as Keynesianism a range of interventions that helped sustain full employment, underwritten by market-oriented policies designed to foster competition. Underpinned by large doses of US economic aid and propelled forward by a post-war consumer boom, which saw a speedy improvement in living standards, post-war Western Europe experienced something close to a boom. Indeed, as early as the 1950s, GDP per capita in West Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain already exceeded the best economic performance in the interwar period. By 1960, all European countries GDPs were higher than they had been in the interwar period.

These early economic successes were unmatched in the years that followed. Through the 1970s and 1980s, some even began to talk of eurosclerosis, a condition in Western Europe marked by high inflation, economic stagnation, and political instability. But despite all this, Europe and the European project continued to move forward with greater economic integration, policy coordination, and judicial activism. In 1979, a European Parliament came into being. Several states also successfully applied to join the European Community. This started in 1973 when the UK, Ireland, and Denmark became members, and continued in 1981 with Greece, and 1986 when Spain and Portugal joined. In 1987, the Single European Act was passed. The core purpose of the Act was to create a single market within the European Community by 1992.

The rise and further rise of the EU

The transition from Community to Union was in large part the consequence of the collapse of the Cold War order in Europe. On the one hand, the demise of the Soviet bloc opened immense possibilities for the Community. On the other hand, it posed several great challenges, including how to manage Germanys evolution from division to unity while facilitating the transition from planned to market economies in Eastern and Central Europe.

Moreover, all this had to be done in the shadow of a brutal civil war in Yugoslavia, which left the countrys divided into six separate states.

Yet the project, once again, continued to move forward. East Germany merged with West Germany in 1990 to create a new German state within the framework of Europe. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty, calling for an ever closer union, was signed. Sweden, Finland, and Austria joined the Union three years later. In 1998, the European Central Bank was established, and a year later, the European Monetary Union created the Euro.

Change did not end there, however. In 1999, the Union appointed a single foreign policy spokesperson in the form of a High Representative. Four years later the EU also put together its first official foreign policy strategy document: A secure Europe in a better world. In 2004, the EU admitted ten new member states from the old East, and another three a few years later. In 2009, it signed the Treaty of Lisbon (also referred to as the Lisbon Treaty) with the ostensible purpose of reforming an expanded Union by streamlining its decision-making processes. The Treaty also argued for an extension of the principle of qualified majority voting and extended this principle into potentially controversial areas such as asylum, immigration, criminal law, border controls, and police cooperation.

In the space of a few short years, the European project had developed considerably. Europe now had many more competences, much greater power over the 28 sovereign states that comprised the Union, and, of course, a much bigger voice in international affairs. Inevitably, this generated heated debate in many countries about the proper balance to be struck between the power of individual sovereign states and the growing power of the European Union itself.

Moreover, the EU did not always speak with a single voice on a number of issues. For example, as Yugoslavia imploded in the 1990s, Germany appeared to side with Croatia while the UK and France tilted somewhat towards Serbia. Then, during the Iraq War of 2003, ten European countries supported the US action, but France and Germany did not. Finally, when the EU decided to allow ten new countries into the Union in 2004, it provoked debate within and between countries about the benefits (or otherwise) of the free movement of peoples within the Union.

The European moment

Despite these many issues, new Europe remained decidedly upbeat at the start of the new century. There was much to be upbeat about. After all, the Union had managed to navigate its way through some difficult times and enlarge without too much resistance. It was fast developing what some analysts later came to term a normative power (Manners, 2001). Furthermore, the EU had become a serious policy leader on some key international issues

most notably climate change and had begun to develop a reasonably coherent view on other questions, including the vexed topic of nuclear proliferation.

Several writers reflected on Europes long-term future, with a spate of books celebrating the project appearing from 2000 onwards. Kupchan (2002), for instance, claimed that the next superpower would be Europe. Leonard (2005) argued that Europe would be running the 21st century. Finally, Zielonka (2007) went so far as to suggest that Europe was not just an emerging superpower, but had become an empire in its own right.

Is Europe in crisis?

Although the achievements were real, many in Europe began to ask some uncomfortable questions about the direction in which the Union was moving: firstly about some of the new members who had been allowed into the Union (most notably Romania and Bulgaria), then about the project in general and whether or not the Union was becoming too powerful, and finally, whether the whole project was becoming far too elitist and distant.

However, it was the sharp downturn in the European economy in the wake of the US crash of 2008 that turned a discussion about European problems into a fevered debate about whether or not the EU could even survive. The impact of the crisis was felt almost immediately as sovereign debt levels rose and unemployment increased. By 2013, the unemployment rate had gone up to 28% in Greece, 16% in Portugal, 12% in Italy, and 10% in France (Eurostat, 2017b).

As the figures indicate, the crisis was experienced in an especially acute way in Southern Europe. However, while southern Europe was badly hit (Greece most dramatically), many countries further north were not impacted to the same degree. In fact, countries like Germany and the Netherlands not to mention Austria and the two EU countries in Scandinavia managed to maintain unemployment figures of well below 6% (Eurostat, 2017b). On the one hand, this was welcome news in those countries that were doing relatively well. On the other hand, the gap between the two parts of Europe fostered a feeling that there was now a two-speed EU, one mired in stagnation and debt and another moving ahead without a backward glance. An existential crisis seemed to be looming (Soros, 2014).

What appeared to be a growing EastWest gap between countries like Hungary and Poland, whose increasingly illiberal policies at home seemed to challenge the liberal consensus that had hitherto defined the EU, added to this sense of division. This not only caused concern in Brussels, but EU leaders were also worried that this emerging divide could be exploited by powers like China, and possibly even Russia.

The EUs many problems did not stop there. As right-wing populists gained ground across Europe (at the European Parliamentary elections in May 2019 the populists did especially well in a number of countries like the UK and France), EU leaders became increasingly concerned. Indeed, the situation had become serious. One seasoned observer of the EU concluded that the EU was now facing a counter revolution directed against all the symbols of liberalism in Europe (Zielonka, 2018).

Other changes in the wider international landscape also fostered a deep, almost profound, sense of unease. One of these changes was the effective collapse of diplomatic relations between Russia and the EU following the crisis in Crimea and Ukraine in 2013 and 2014. Another was the series of events in Turkey after 2015, where a country that had once sought EU membership turned against the whole European idea. A third problem was the increase in terrorist activity.

Finally, to add to this near-perfect storm of problems, there was the failure of three states in Europes neighbourhood: Syria, Libya, and Lebanon. Not only did this exacerbate fears about the potential for terrorism across the continent, but it also led to an enormous surge in refugees and migrants, all desperately seeking to get into Europe, as indicated in a mapproduced by Business Insider. Coming at a time when much of Europe was already suffering economically, the impact could have been nothing but disturbing. It was no coincidence that one of the key images that the UK Leave campaign exploited in the Brexit referendum of 2016 were that of refugees strung out right across Europe all presumably heading for the UK. There is no doubt either that Angela Merkels generous offer to allow over a million refugees into Germany in 2015 fuelled the kind of resentment that helped the far right in Germany do so well in the parliamentary elections two years later.

Its wise to beware bold headlines predicting Europes imminent demise. It may have become fashionable to write obituaries for the European Union (Gillingham, 2018), but it was not about to collapse. Its institutions remained strong as support continued to run high in the vast majority of countries. Even if some citizens had become sceptical about the project, its elites had not. Moreover, Europe has many strengths most obviously economic.

The EU today remains home to some of the most competitive economies in the world (2 of the worlds top 10) (Global Peo Services, 2020), several world-class companies (17 out of the top 100) (Ireland, 2020), and a well-educated and increasingly mobile workforce. The US might be the largest single economy in the world, but the EU is almost its economic equal in terms of GDP. It also happens to be a place where international investors want to put their money, and a major source of foreign direct investment itself outside the EU (CEIC, n.d.). Lastly, it is not a mere bystander in international affairs, having a growing external service and ambassadorial representation in some 50 capitals outside the EU. If this is a project in decline, then it is one that still retains some formidable assets.

Conclusion

This set of notes examined the seriousness of the now widespread view that global power has shifted or is fast shifting from the United States to China, from Europe to Asia, and more broadly from the West to the East. While the material evidence supporting such claims is strong, it remains an open question as to whether all this amounts to an irreversible power shift.

Although some of Trumps populist policies damaged the US image (Macgregor, 2018; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), it did not significantly affect the USs formidable position in the world. In the same way, it should not be assumed that because Asia has been making important and impressive economical strides forward, the 21st century is going to be Asian

no more than it is likely to witness the inevitable long-term secular decline of Europe. We can, however, be sure of one thing: the West as we know it is no longer as dominant as it once was.

Regardless, the West still retains massive assets (Wade, 2013). This brings us back to the biggest issue of all when thinking about power shifts: the relationship between China and the US. The notes highlighted that Chinas rise has changed both China and the world beyond recognition. Yet, if it is to become the superpower of the new century it has to present itself as a model that others would like to copy, and this takes time.

In Asia, Chinas power to attract remains relatively weak. Despite the significant economic relations China has with other Asian countries, the majority (nearly all of them democratic) still look to the West for political leadership and the US for protection (Cox, 2012). Analysts have called time on the American empire before, and seem to be doing so again (Bulmer- Thomas, 2018). But given its formidable power and global reach which also extends towards Asia there is good reason to think it will still play a major role in the region, and world at large, for years to come (Kagan, 2018).

Bibliography

Advameg, Inc. n.d. Globalisation American-led globalisation: 19902001. Available: http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Globalisation-American-led- globalisation-1990-2001.html [2017, July 20].

Ahmed, S.I. 2019. U.S. dollar share of global currency reserves fell in the fourth quarter of 2018. Available: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-forex-reserves/us-dollar- share-of-global-currency-reserves-fell-in-the-fourth-quarter-of-2018- idUSKCN1RA1WH [2019, July 18].

Amadeo. K. 2020. Why the US dollar is the global currency. Available: https://www.thebalance.com/world-currency-3305931 [2021, January 22].

Asian Development Bank. 2003. Key indicators of developing Asian and Pacific countries 2003. Available: https://www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-developing-asian-and-pacific-countries-2003 [2017, August 17].

Asian Development Bank. 2011. Asia 2050 Realizing the Asian Century: Executive summary. Available: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28608/asia2050-executive- summary.pdf [2017, August 17].

Auslin, M.R. 2017. The end of the Asian Century: War, stagnation, and the risks to the worlds most dynamic region. Yale: Yale University Press.

Baily, M.N. & Elliott, D.J. 2009. The US financial and economic crisis: Where does it stand and where do we go from here? Available: https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2016/06/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf [2017, July 20].

Best Masters Programmes. n.d. 50 Universities with the most novel prize winners.

Available: https://www.bestmastersprograms.org/50-universities-with-the-most- nobel-prize-winners/ [2017, November 1].

Boucher, J. 2015. Henry Luce, the American Century (1941). Available: https://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2015/09/the-american-century-luce.html [2020, December 7].

Bryan, B. 2015. Europe is bigger than the US. Available: http://www.businessinsider.com/charts-eu-economy-is-bigger-than-the-us-2015-6 [2017, August 17].

Buchholz, K. 2020. The biggest economies in the world. Available: https://www.statista.com/chart/19489/biggest-economies-in-the-world/ [2021,

January 21].

Buchholz, K. 2020. The rise of the Asian middle class. Available: https://www.statista.com/chart/8402/asian-middle-class-on-the-rise/ [2021,

January 22].

Bulmer-Thomas, V. 2018. Empire in retreat: the past, present, and future of the United States. Yale: Yale University Press.

Bureau of Economic Analysis. n.d. Regional data. Available: https://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=10&isuri=1&7003=200&7 035=-1&7004=sic&7005=1&7006=xx&7036=-

1&7001=1200&7002=1&7090=70&7007=-

1&7093=levels#reqid=70&step=10&isuri=1&7003=200&7004=naics&7035=- 1&7005=1&7006=xx&7001=1200&7036=-1&7002=1&7090=70&7007=-

1&7093=levels [2017, November 1].

Camarota, S.A. 2011. A record-setting decade of immigration: 20002010. Available: https://cis.org/Report/RecordSetting-Decade-Immigration-20002010 [2017,

November 1].

CEIC Data. n.d. European Union Eurostat: Foreign direct investment: Outward: By country: BPM6. Available: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/european-union/eurostat- foreign-direct-investment-outward-by-country-bpm6 [2019, July 18].

Chen, Q. 2020. Inkstone index: How many Chinese soldiers died in the Korean War? Available: https://www.inkstonenews.com/politics/inkstone-index-how-many- chinese-soldiers-died-korean-war/article/3106193 [2021, January 21].

Chin, W. 2004. The Factors Determining Office Investment Markets in South-East Asian Cities: With Reference to Hong Kong, Singapore, Taipei, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. Available: https://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/file/5843972d-7640-4ca2- 8fd5-fdff40f5d92e/1/chin2004factors_RADAR.pdf [2021, March 12]

Clad, J. & Manning, R.A. 2014. The Pacific century myth? Available: https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-pacific-century-myth/ [2017, October 26].

Connor, P. & Budiman, A. 2019. Immigrant share in U.S. nears record high but remains below that of many other countries. Available: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact- tank/2019/01/30/immigrant-share-in-u-s-nears-record-high-but-remains-below- that-of-many-other-countries/ [2019, July 18].

Cox, M. 2009. Why did we get the end of the Cold War wrong? British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 11(2):161176.

Cox, M. 2012. Power shifts, economic change and the decline of the West? International Relations. 26(4):369388.

Cox, M. 2017. Europe still between the superpowers. Global Policy Journal. 8:917.

Cox, M., Ikenberry, G.J. & Inoguchi, T. Eds. 2000. American democracy promotion: Impulses, strategies, and impacts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

DeLong, J.B. 1997. Post-WWII Western European exceptionalism: The economic dimension. Available: http://www.j-bradford- delong.net/Econ_Articles/ucla/ucla_marshall2.html [2017, July 20].

Dodwell, A. 2016. Corporations running the world used to be science fiction now its a reality [Blog, 12 September]. Available: http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/blog/2016/sep/12/corporations-running-world- used-be-science-fiction-now-its-reality [2017, July 20].

Eloranta, J. & Harrison, M. 2010. War and disintegration, 19141950. In Unifying the European experience: an economic history of modern Europe. S. Broadberry &

K. ORourke, Eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

European Commission. 2013. Report on public finances in EMU. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ ee-2013-4.pdf [2017, August 2017].

European Commission. 2017. 10 Years since the start of the crisis: back to recovery thanks to decisive EU action. Available: https://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/sites/unitedkingdom/files/factsheet_-

_in_numbers_-_10_years_since_the_crisis.pdf [2017, August 23].

European Commission. n.d. Investment. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/investment/ [2017, November

1].

European Union. n.d. A Europe without frontiers. Available: https://europa.eu/european- union/about-eu/history/1990-1999_en [2017, July 20].

Eurostat. 2017a. Extra-euro area trade in goods. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Extra- euro_area_trade_in_goods [2017, August 17].

Eurostat. 2017b. Unemployment statistics. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics [2017, August 17].

Friedberg, A.L. 1994. Ripe for rivalry: prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia.

International Security. 18(3):533.

FXCM. 2020. 10 Largest companies in the US by market capitalisation. Available: https://www.fxcm.com/za/insights/10-largest-companies-in-the-us-by-market- capitalisation/ [2021, January 21].

Garay, U. n.d. The Asian financial crisis of 19971998 and the behavior of Asian stock markets. Available: http://www.westga.edu/~bquest/2003/asian.htm [2017, October 19].

Gillingham, J.R. 2018. The EU: An obituary. London: Verso Books.

Gingrich, N. 2019.Trump vs China: Americas greatest challenge. New York: Center Street. Glass, A. 2018. Reagan brands Soviet Union evil empire, March 8, 1983. Available:

https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/08/this-day-in-politics-march-8-1983- 440258 [2020, December 8].

Global PEO Services. 2020. Top 15 countries by GDP in 2020. Available: https://globalpeoservices.com/top-15-countries-by-gdp-in-2020/ [2021, January

22].

Google. 2013. Google Books Ngram Viewer. Available: https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=globalization&year_start=1980& year_end=2016&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2Cglobali zation%3B%2Cc0 [2017, October 26].

Gorman, S. 2014. Webb says U.S. has 5 percent of world's population, 25 percent of its "known" prisoners. Available: http://www.politifact.com/virginia/statements/2014/dec/15/jim-webb/webb-says- us-has-5-percent-worlds-population-25-pe/ [2017, November 1].

Gray, A. 2017. These are the worlds 10 biggest corporate giants. Available: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/worlds-biggest-corporate-giants/ [2017,

November 3].

Greber, J. 2018. China is weaponising on a massive scale, says Mike Pence. Available: https://www.afr.com/world/china-is-weaponising-on-a-massive-scale-says-mike- pence-20181005-h1694g [2021, March 12].

Greshko, M. 2018. What is the Nobel Prize? Available: https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/10/nobel-prize-winners-laureates- charts-graphics-science/ [2019, July 18].

Hamilton, D.S. & Quinlan, J.P. 2019. Transatlantic Economy 2019 Key findings.

Available: https://transatlanticrelations.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/03/TE2019_KeyFindings.pdf [2019, July 18].

Hirst, T. 2015. A brief history of Chinas economic growth. Available: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/brief-history-of-china-economic- growth/ [2017, July 20].

Hu, Z. & Khan, M.S. 1997. Why is China growing so fast? Available: https://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/ISSUES8/INDEX.HTM [2017, July 20].

Illing, S. 2017. 20 of America's top political scientists gathered to discuss our democracy. They're scared. Available: https://www.vox.com/2017/10/13/16431502/america- democracy-decline-liberalism [2017, November 1].

International Monetary Fund. 2000. Recovery from the Asian crisis and the role of the IMF. Available: https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm [2017, August 17].

Ireland, S. 2020. The worlds 100 best-performing companies, 2020. Available: https://ceoworld.biz/2020/05/16/the-worlds-100-best-performing-companies-2020/ [2021, January 22].

Jacques, M. 2008. When China rules the world: the end of the Western world and the birth of a new global order. London: Allen Lane.

Kagan, R. 2013. The world America made. New York: Vintage.

Khanna, P. 2019. The future is Asian: global order in the twenty-first century. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Kharas, H. 2017. The unprecedented expansion of the global middle class: an update.

Available: https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2017/02/global_20170228_global-middle-class.pdf [2017, July

20].

Kirk, A. 2015. Nobel Prize winners: Which country has the most Nobel laureates?

Available: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11926364/Nobel- Prize-winners-Which-country-has-the-most-Nobel-laureates.html [2019, July 18].

Kolakowski, M. 2020. At $1.3 trillion, Apple is bigger than these things. Available: https://www.investopedia.com/news/apple-now-bigger-these-5-things/ [2021,

January 21].

Krauthammer, C. 2002. The unipolar moment revisited. Available: http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-unipolar-moment-revisited-391 [2017,

October 26].

Krugman, P. 1994. The myth of Asias miracle. Foreign Affairs. 73(6):6278.

Kupchan, C.A. 2002. The end of the American era: US foreign policy and the geopolitics of the twenty-first century. New York: Knopf.

Layne, C. 2010. Graceful decline. Available: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/graceful-decline/ [2017, July

20].

Lee, Y.N. 2020. East Asia poverty could rise for first time in 20 years due to the pandemic, World Bank says. Available: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/29/poverty-to-rise-in-east-asia-for-first-time-in-20- years-due-to-covid-world-bank.html [2021, January 21].

Lehmann, J. 2015. The myth of Asia: Now perpetrated by Asians themselves. Available: https://www.theglobalist.com/the-myth-of-asia-now-perpetrated-by-asians- themselves/ [2017, July 20].

Leonard, M. 2005. Why Europe will run the 21st century. London: Fourth Estate.

Luce, E. 2012. Time to start thinking: America and the spectre of decline. London: Little, Brown and Company.

Luko, J. 2015. Is America in decline? Twenty signs America is not in decline. Available: https://www.nolanchart.com/america-decline-twenty-signs-america-not-decline [2017, July 20].

Mahbubani, K. 2008. The new Asian hemisphere: the irresistible shift of global power to the East. New York: Public Affairs.

Manners, I. 2001. Normative power Europe: The international role of the EU. Proceedings of the 7th biennial conference of the European Union Studies Association. 31 May2 June. Madison, Wisconsin.

McGregor, R. 2018. Asias reckoning: The struggle for global dominance. London: Penguin Books.

McKinsey & Company. 2019. The Asian Century has arrived. Available: https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/asia-pacific/the-asian-century-has- arrived [2021, January 21].

McNeil, T. 2019. Why the United States is the only superpower. Available: https://now.tufts.edu/articles/why-united-states-only-superpower [2021, January

21].

Meyer, H. 2008. The framework for advancing transatlantic economic integration: structural shortcomings in an experimental form of international governance. Available: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46016033_The_framework_for_advanci ng_transatlantic_economic_integration_structural_shortcomings_in_an_experime ntal_form_of_international_governance [2017, August 1].

Millet, A.R. 2020. Korean War: 19501953. Available: https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War [2021, January 21].

Monaghan, A. 2014. China surpasses US as worlds largest trading nation. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/10/china-surpasses-us-world- largest-trading-nation [2017, July 20].

Morris, I. 2010. Why the West rules for now. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Myers, J. 2016. How do the worlds biggest companies compare to the biggest economies? Available: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/10/corporations- not-countries-dominate-the-list-of-the-world-s-biggest-economic-entities/ [2017,

November 3].

National Priorities Project. n.d. U.S. military spending vs. the world. Available: https://www.nationalpriorities.org/campaigns/us-military-spending-vs-world/ [2017, October 26].

Nio-Zaraza, M. & Addison, T. 2012. Redefining poverty in China and India. Available: https://unu.edu/publications/articles/redefining-poverty-in-china-and-india.html [2017, August 1].

Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. 2019. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Patton, M. 2016. U.S. Role in global economy declines nearly 50%. Available: https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2016/02/29/u-s-role-in-global-economy- declines-nearly-50/#58db22b15e9e [2017, November 1].

Pei, M. 2009. Think again: Asias rise. Available: http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/think-again-asias-rise/ [2017, August 1].

Perry, M.J. 2015. If New York is Spain and California Brazil, what is Texas? Available: http://www.newsweek.com/if-new-york-spain-and-california-brazil-what-texas- 344702 [2017, October 19].

Pew Research Center. 2013. Public sees U.S. power declining as support for global engagement slips. Available: http://www.people-press.org/2013/12/03/public- sees-u-s-power-declining-as-support-for-global-engagement-slips/ [2017, August

1].

Quah, D. 2011. The global economys shifting centre of gravity. Available: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00066.x/pdf [2017,

August 17].

Quinlan, J. 2016. The case for investing in Europe 2016: why U.S. firms should stay the course. Available: http://www.amchameu.eu/sites/default/files/publications/files/the_case_for_investi ng_in_europe_2016_report.pdf [2017, July 20].

Rachman, G. 2017. Easternization: Asia's rise and America's decline from Obama to Trump and beyond. Penguin: Random House.

Rapp, N. n.d. Visualize the global 500. Available: http://fortune.com/global500/visualizations/?id=recirc_g500landing-zone1 [2017,

October 19].

Roberts, J.M. 2007. The new Penguin history of the world. London: Penguin Books Limited.

Schwab, K. 2014. The global competitiveness report 20142015. Available: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf [2017, August 17].

Shand, S. 2019. US Universities Report Drop in Students from China. Available: https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/us-universities-report-drop-in-students- from-china/5098204.html [2020, December 8].

Silver, C. 2020. The top 25 economies in the world. Available: https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/#2-china [2021,

January 21].

Sorman, G. 2010. Its a global century, not an Asian one. Available: http://www.realclearworld.com/2010/04/08/its_a_global_century_not_an_asian_o ne_110478.html [2017, August 17].

Soros, G. 2014. The tragedy of the European Union: disintegration or revival? New York: Public Affairs Books.

Spector, R.H. 2020. Vietnam War: 19541975. Available: https://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War [2021, January 21].

Statista. 2020. The 100 largest companies in the world by market capitalization in 2020. Available: https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-in-the-world- by-market-capitalization/ [2021, March 12]

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2020. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Available: https://sipri.org/databases/milex [2021, January 21].

Tasch, B. & Nudelman, M. 2015. This map shows the routes of Europes refugee nightmare and how its getting worse. Available: http://www.businessinsider.com/map-of-europe-refugee-crisis-2015-9 [2017,

October 26].

The Guardian. 2015. Air pollution in China is killing 4,000 people every day, a new study finds. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/14/air-pollution-in- china-is-killing-4000-people-every-day-a-new-study-finds [2017, November 1].

The National Bureau of Economic Research. 2017. The effect of the economic crisis on American households. Available: http://www.nber.org/aginghealth/2010no3/w16407.html [2017, November 1].

Times Higher Education. n.d. World university rankings 20162017. Available: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2017/world- ranking#!/page/0/length/25/locations/US/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats [2017, November 1].

Trading Economics. 2019. United States GDP. Available: https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp [2019, July 18].

U.S. Department of Defense. n.d. FY 2019 Defense Budget. Available: https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/Budget2019.aspx [2019, July 18].

United Nations Development Programme. n.d. Human development index (HDI).

Available: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi [2017,

October 26].

United Nations. 2011. The global social crisis report on the world social situation 2011. Available: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/docs/2011/rwss2011.pdf [2017,

November 1].

Wade, R. 2013. The art of power maintenance: How Western states keep the lead in global institutions. Challenge. 56(1):539.Wertime, D. 2016. 300,000 Chinese students attend U.S. colleges. What will they learn about American life? Available: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/07/300000- chinese-students-attend-u-s-colleges-what-will-they-learn-about-american-life- china-u-survey-backstory/ [2017, November 1].

Wilson, D. & Purushothaman, R. 2003. Dreaming with BRICs: the path to 2050.

Available: http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics- dream.pdf [2017, October 26].

World Bank. 1993. The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public policy. Available: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/322361469672160172/pdf/123510v20 PUB0r00Box371943B00PUBLIC0.pdf [2017, October 26].

World Bank. 2019. East Asia and Pacific growth expected to moderate as global headwinds persist, World Bank says. Available: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/24/east-asia-and- pacific-growth-expected-to-moderate-as-global-headwinds-persist-world-bank- says [2019, July 18].

Worldometer. 2020. United States Population. Available: https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/us-population/ [2020, December

8].

Yahuda, M. 2003. Chinas win-win globalisation. Available: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-win-win-globalisation [2017, August 1].

Yendamuri, P. & Ingilizian, Z. 2019. In 2020 Asia will have the worlds largest GDP. Heres what that means. Available: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/asia-economic-growth/ [2021, January

21].

Yetiv, S. 2012. 8 Reasons America is not in decline. Available: https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0306/8-reasons-America- is-not-in-decline/US-still-has-most-competitive-major-economy-in-the-world [2017, July 20].

YouGov. 2013. The Economist/YouGov Poll. Available: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/oq5m2zeqyt/e conToplines.pdf [2017, August 1].

Zhou, C. 2019. Is America still the worlds only superpower or is China a real rival?

Experts arent so sure anymore. Available: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06- 23/united-states-still-the-worlds-only-superpower/11195636 [2021, January 21].

Zhou, Y. 2018. The impact of Chinese students in the US, charted and mapped.

Available: https://qz.com/1410768/the-number-of-chinese-students-in-the-us- charted-and-mapped/ [2019, July 18].

Zielonka, J. 2007. Europe as empire: the nature of the enlarged European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zielonka, J. 2018. Counter-revolution: Liberal Europe in retreat. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Essay writing guidelines

This course requires you to write short essays for every weekly module. These essays, or mini written responses, are designed to test your understanding of the course content and your ability to critically engage with the material by considering real-world scenarios and problems. They are also designed to test your ability to write clearly about the themes, issues, and theories covered in the modules.

These essays form a large portion of your overall grade, and your writing will need to adhere to the minimum and maximum length requirements. It is therefore important that you write clearly and succinctly. This guidebook will show you how to:

Plan your written response;

Structure your essay effectively;

Consult rubrics for guidance; and

Reference sources correctly.

Planning your written response

In planning your essay its important to first analyse the question, then outline your response by means of a mind map, and finally create a thesis statement, as explained in the sections to follow.

Analyse the question

Before writing your response, it is important to consider the question being asked, as you need to ensure your answer reflects what is being asked of you. One way to do this is to find the task word being used. For example, you may be asked the following question:

Applying the information covered in this module, compare the difference between China and Americas responses to trade liberalisation in the 21st century.

In this example, the task word is compare. As a result, your answer requires you to examine the differences between America and Chinas response to trade liberalisation in the 21st century and compare their responses with examples.

Other task words that may be used include discuss, examine, identify, contrast, analyse, evaluate, propose, assess, articulate, and investigate.

Outline your response

Once you have established what is being asked of you, the next step is to plan your written response. One method of approaching this is to sketch out a quick mind map of your ideas. This mind map should also include evidence that you will use to support your claims.

2239277129285

Figure 1: Creating a mind map or rough outline is a good way to plan your essay before you begin to write.

Create a thesis statement

Having created an outline or mind map, you should now have an idea of your thesis statement. A thesis statement is a sentence (or two) that summarises the main point you will be making throughout your written response. It should directly address the question and show your marker that you have a clear argument or point. For example, based on the previous example question, the thesis statement may be as follows:

While China and America have both embraced trade liberalisation in the 21st century, China is adopting policies that encourage greater trade liberalisation, and America, under Donald Trump, is considering adopting protectionist policies.

The above thesis statement clearly addresses the question by comparing China and Americas trade policies in the 21st century. It also expresses the writers argument, which will be expanded upon in the body of the essay.

Structure your essay

Once youve planned your essay, you are ready to begin writing. A well-crafted essay should always be broken down into an introduction, a body, and a conclusion.

Introduction

Your introduction sets the stage for the rest of your essay and should be written in an interesting and appealing way that will encourage your reader to engage with your written assignment. The introduction should:

Briefly introduce the context of the essay;

Redefine the problem being addressed; and

Include your thesis statement.

Body

The body of your essay will explore your argument in greater detail by providing sub-points that support your argument as well as evidence to back up your claims. You should also logically break up the body of your essay into well-defined paragraphs. Each paragraph should include the following:

A topic sentence that summarises the main point of the paragraph. This sentence should support or contribute to your main thesis statement.

The topic sentence should then be followed by supporting evidence from your own research that backs up your claims.

The paragraph should end with an explanatory sentence that shows your reader how the paragraph links to your main argument.

Conclusion

Every written assignment should finish with a clearly written conclusion. The conclusion should summarise your main argument and illustrate how you have proven your thesis statement.

Download Solution Now

Uploaded By : Pooja Dhaka
Posted on : November 22nd, 2024
Downloads : 0
Views : 202

Please make reference to the course material and include in-text citations

Download Solution Now

Download Solution Now

Choose a Plan

Premium

Gold

Silver

Please make reference to the course material and include in-text citations

Download Solution Now

Download Solution Now

Choose a Plan

Premium

Gold

Silver

Request a Call Back