Worksheet for Assessment 2 - Raw intelligence

Worksheet for Assessment 2 - Raw intelligence

This worksheet should comprise about 400 words (+/- 10%) of your own writing (i.e. excluding the instructions and statements provided)

Instructions

Assign a numerical probability to each of the nine statements on your list of raw intelligence. Each probability is to indicate the level of confidence a statement gives you that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD program. For example, if Statement 1 on the list makes you believe with absolute certainty that Iraq has some form of WMD (nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapon) or WMD program, then you should assign a probability of 100% to that statement. When reading the statements, ask your self, How confident does this statement make me feel that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD program? Or, On the basis of this single statement, how certain am I that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD program?

Each statement has been produced by intelligence officers working in various intelligence agencies. All agencies are collaborating, to help assess whether Iraq has WMD. You should treat these statements as though they have been produced by colleagues with whom you are collaborating to the best of their ability you may assume that you are all working together to try to establish the truth. These officers have gathered data in the field; this is how they are presenting the upshot of their efforts to you, for you to evaluate. Based on each statement, you need to assess how probable it is that Iraq has some form of WMD. Pay attention to the language choices used by the intelligence officers to convey their findings. Do you have questions you would ideally like to ask these officers, about how they arrived at their finding? Do you have qualms about their findings? Why? Do you feel there are significant gaps in the information which makes you uncertain and which sways your opinion? Include your thoughts in your rationale.

Statement to assess

Probability (%) that Iraq has some form of WMD, or WMD program, based only on the single statement under consideration

Your rationale for your probability. (Why have you rated the statement, thus? What details in the statement have influenced your judgment?)

We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of United Nations (UN) resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) as well as missiles with ranges in excess of 600km; it may have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (INR, the State Departments intelligence office, does not concur with this assessment).

We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraqs WMD efforts, owing to its Baghdads vigorous denial and deception efforts.

In the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program (INR, the State Departments intelligence office, does not concur with this assessment).

Most analysts believe that Saddams personal interest in and Iraqs aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminium tubes for centrifuge rotors provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdads nuclear weapons program. (The Department of Energys intelligence office assesses that the tubes are not part of the program).

We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GG (cyclosarin), and VX (all types of chemical weapons).

We have little specific information on Iraqs chemical weapon stockpile. Saddam possibly has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapon agents much of it added in the last year.

We judge that all key aspects research and development (R&D), production, and weaponization of Iraqs offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were a decade ago.

We judge that Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating biological weapon agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.

Iraq maintains a small missile force and several developmental programs, including for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) possible intended to deliver biological warfare agents. The United States Air Force (USAF) Intelligence believes the UAVs primary role is reconnaissance.

Single probability that summarizes your personal assessment that Iraq has some form of WMD or WMD program:

*Note: Do NOT simply average your nine probabilities to determine your single overall probability. Rather, you should consider the relative weights you attach to each of the nine pieces of raw intelligence. For example, you might assign low probabilities to seven of the nine pieces of intelligence and very high probabilities to the remaining two pieces. If you feel that the two items with high probabilities are particularly important indicators that Iraq has WMDs, then it is appropriate to assign an overall probability that is quite high.

Rationale for overall probability; discuss which evidence you gave greater weight, and why.

ORGANISATIONS ASSESSMENT 2 CASE STUDY

Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Making responsible knowledge claims

CONTEXT

On September 11, 2001, members of the al Qaeda transnational terrorist group hijacked four commercial airliners and perpetrated an attack on US soil later described by the Chair and Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission as, a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. xv). American Airlines Flight 11 was flown by the hijackers into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre at 8.46 on a busy workday morning. United Airlines Flight 175 was flown into the South Tower seventeen minutes later. American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon about half an hour later. The fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, about a half hour later, after passengers realised what was happening and rebelled, on board. The attacks killed 2,977 people (this figure excludes the hijackers).

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by members of the al Qaeda transnational terrorist group placed the performance of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) and the topic of intelligence in general under the spotlight of public scrutiny. This attention intensified even further when, less than a year and a half later, the IC failed to estimate correctly Iraqs weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs Iraqs WMD programs were a vital U.S. national security concern in late 2002 [because the US believed that Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President at the time, was supporting al Qaeda]. The prospect of war literally hung in the balance depending on the status of these programs (Lahneman & Keesing, 2011, p. 804). Ultimately, the IC painted an inaccurate picture of the situation by providing a strong assessment that Iraq was pursuing WMD programs.

This erroneous assessment was used as a basis by the US Government to lead an invasion of, and war against, Iraq. The UK and Australia, as allies of the US (the coalition of the willing), also became involved in this war, which a peer-reviewed Lancet Survey (a respected medical journal) estimates resulted in 601, 027 Iraqi violent deaths and 654, 965 Iraqi excess deaths, from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 through to occupation until June, 2006.

After the invasion of Iraq, it became apparent that the NIE was inaccurate and had overstated Iraqs WMD programs; the US government had made even stronger statements to the public than were supported by the (then classified) NIE. WMD were not being produced or stockpiled by Iraq, and the war was effectively conducted based on false premises. Although the intensity of this spotlight has now dimmed, the U.S. IC will never be the same, for this scrutiny ignited a wave of ongoing intelligence reforms that have encompassed all aspects of the intelligence enterprise. (Lahneman & Keesing, 2011, p. 804).

Why did the IC fail to detect al Qaedas plans for the 9/11 attacks? Anyone who has studied the matter will tell you that the ICs failure to share informationto connect the dotsamong its many parts was a principal contributor to the intelligence failure. Analysis is the part of the intelligence process that connects the dots. As the 9/11 Commission stated in its report investigating the causes of the attack, The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to connect the dots (9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 408). Analytic problems also played a significant role in the Iraqi WMD intelligence failure. However, in this case it was poor analytic tradecraft rather than a failure to connect the dots that was largely to blame. Given these facts, a large share of intelligence reforms has directly targeted analysts and the analytic process.

One of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms that has been of particular significance for universities and colleges is the decision to increase dramatically the size of the ICs analytic workforce. Universities have responded to the increased demand for intelligence analysts by designing a wide array of new courses and programs at both the undergraduate and graduate levels to help prepare students for employment as analysts.

At its core, intelligence analysis involves trying to make sense of incomplete information. Intelligence analysts try to solve complex puzzles that are missing a number of pieces. The resulting intelligence products must state several things in addition to offering analysts best estimate of the picture the incomplete puzzle represents. Analysts must:

1. Assess what the puzzle represents based on the pieces they have collected through various secret and open sources (allowing for the possibility of denial and deception);

2. Estimate the things that they do not know, that is, what pieces are they missing; and

3. Judge the importance of the missing pieces, that is, to what degree might missing pieces contain information that would invalidate their analysis.

A good analytic product, thus, clearly states the ICs best estimate of the status of an issue (Step 1) and quantifies in some way the substantive uncertainty of the analysis (Steps 2 and 3).

Although this description is straightforward, teaching the basic principles of intelligence analysis is challenging. John Gannon, former Deputy Director of Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, states that most intelligence community (IC) analysts do not learn their trade primarily from books, training manuals, or courses, but rather in the heat of the shop floor, under the supervision of experienced managers and mentors (George & Bruce, 2008, p. 213). Gannon, like many other intelligence professionals, does not oppose formal education for analysts. In fact, he is a leading advocate of formal programs. Rather, he recognizes the difficulty of teaching the analytic process through lectures alone.

Lahneman & Keesing, 2011, pp. 804 - 805

ASSESSMENT INSTRUCTIONS

The case above is an excellent example of why care must be taken when making knowledge claims. It is also an excellent example of why cultivating epistemic virtue is so important. Further, it provides a salutary opportunity to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of functionalist and interpretivist perspectives.

For this assessment, you will be taking on the role of a senior intelligence analyst who is responsible for producing a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the likelihood that Iraq possesses Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). NIEs are the ICs most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues. NIEs contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community regarding the likely course of future events. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence leads the ICs effort to produce NIEs. The goal is to provide policymakers with the best, unvarnished, and unbiased informationregardless of whether analytic judgments conform to US policy (Lahneman & Keesing, 2011, p. 805).

You need to set aside the historical facts and treat the evidence on its merits, as though this is an urgent, contemporary concern.

You will submit two documents:

A worksheet (400 words (+/- 10%) that contains:

Probability ratings that you have personally assigned to each piece of evidence, within, and a brief rationale for each probability

An overall calculation of the probability that Iraq possesses WMD and a brief rationale for your overall calculation

There is no correct probability. We are interested in your thought processes, your rationale, and how you justify your position. Further guidance is provided in the worksheet.

You must submit the actual worksheet, which should contain your ratings and rationale.

A report of 1,600 words (+/- 10%) that is informed by: a) your completed worksheet; b) what you have learned about functionalism, interpretivism, and epistemology; and c) your personal experiences of making decision/s with incomplete information and/or in uncertain circumstances (it is recommended, but not essential, that you draw on your classroom experiences). This report must contain:

Your ultimate position and advice on the probability that Iraq possesses WMD

A description of the methodology you used to arrive at this position and a reflection on the nature of the tool you used (the tool is the worksheet) and its utility

The limitations of your advice

Additional evidence that would have helped you better triangulate your position

A reflection on the tenuousness of knowledge claims

You must draw on and liberally infuse your report with the following SIX texts, which we expect to be perfectly referenced:

Burrell & Morgan

Hirschheim & Klein

Four additional scholarly articles drawn from the Reading List

Please note that you do not need knowledge about the Iraq war or WMD in order to perform extremely well in this assessment. We are not looking for historical knowledge about what has occurred in the past. You do, however, need an in depth understanding of the paradigms of functionalism and interpretivism (and how these paradigms inform analysis), and epistemology. We are looking for your understanding of how these paradigms shape the way people collect and work with evidence, and what this means for making knowledge claims. Please also see Canvas for further advice regarding the successful completion of this assessment.

This assignment will be workshopped in the Module 6 tutorial via a simulation.