Semester 2, 2022
LLB303 Evidence
Semester 2, 2022
Task Written Advocacy (20% of total grade)
Course and Unit Learning Outcomes Addressed On completion of this assessment you should be able to:
Apply the rules of evidence that operate in Queensland to real world fact scenarios (CLOs 1.1, 2.1)
Utilise the rules of evidence to advocate for a client and address their needs (CLOs 1.1, 2.2)
Apply ethical standards and professional responsibility within the law and legal profession in the context of trial advocacy (CLO 5.1)
Effectively construct and communicate oral and written arguments (CLOs 4.1, 4.2)
Specifications 1500 words and no longer than 6 pages, Size 11 Arial font, 1.5 line spacing, Microsoft Word format.
Footnotes are not included in the word limit provided they do not contain substantive content. Matters of substance included in footnotes should not be taken into account when marking.
Overview
You will prepare an advice on evidence related to court advocacy.
What you will do
Read the fact scenario and instructions
Draft a written advice as requested in the instructions
Submit the written advice online
What you will submit
Your Written Advocacy must be submitted via Turnitin by 11:59pm on Thursday 6th October 2022.
It is YOUR responsibility to ensure you do not leave completion of this assessment to the last minute when technical issues may complicate your submission. Please make sure you have access to a reliable internet connection.
Further Information
FACTS AND INSTRUCTIONS
Jack has been charged with one count of trafficking in dangerous drugs pursuant to s 5(1) of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld). The indictment also includes a circumstance of aggravation pursuant to s 5(2) of that Act.
Jack had been acquainted for over 12 months with a group of three men who he knew to be involved in the distribution of methamphetamine in Brisbane. The Crown case is that these men constituted a criminal organsiation within the meaning of s 161O of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1997 (Qld). Jack has always maintained, however, that up until the events giving rise to the current charge, he had never been involved in any of the criminal activities of this group, but that he merely mixed with them on a social level, drinking and partying.
On the material day, one member of this group (Simon), told Jack that the men needed Jack to take a package to a local pub at noon and to hand it to a man named Carl. Jack was surprised by this request as he had never been involved in any such dealings before and had never expressed an interest in the criminal activities of the group. He initially refused to make the delivery. Simon replied that Jack would regret it if he refused to take part. When Jack asked what Simon meant by that, Simon said nothing but formed his fingers into the shape of a gun and held the fingers to Jacks head. The defence does not dispute that the relevant package contained a quantity of methamphetamine.
Jack subsequently decided to deliver the package as requested by Simon. Unfortunately for Jack, Carl was an undercover police officer (Detective Constable Smith). When Jack handed the package over, Smith then arrested him. Jack pleaded with Smith not to charge him because the deal was really the work of three other men.
Smith conducted a body search of Jack during the arrest and found a small 2022 diary in Jacks shirt pocket. In that diary were the names and phone numbers of the men who police later asserted constitute the criminal organisation. The diary also contained an entry that Jack had written which read I am sure these blokes have murdered people, they are always bragging about it. They are scary dudes.
During the Crown case, the prosecutor asks Constable Smith if he can recall the names of the men whose names Jack said had organised this drug delivery. Smith said he wasnt certain of their full names. When asked if there was anything that might help his memory, Smith referred to the diary he had taken from Jack and leave was granted for him to refresh his memory from that diary. When the diary was produced, the prosecutor asked the judge, in the absence of the jury, that the entry which read I am sure these blokes have murdered people, they are always bragging about it. They are scary dudes, be ruled inadmissible if the Defence sought to have the diary tendered into evidence.
The Crown also sought to tender an audio recording made by Constable Smith on his smartphone immediately prior to the arrest. On that recording a man can be heard saying Here is the stuff, take it quickly because I want to get out of here fast. During his oral testimony, Smith identified the recording as being the one he made at the material time. The man in the recording can also be heard saying Come on Carl, I need to get home to check on my hydroponic weed crop. Defence counsel objects to this recording being admitted into evidence.
At trial, Jack has chosen to give evidence in his defence. Defence counsel asks Jack during his evidence-in-chief, why he decided to deliver the package. Jack described what Simon had done with his fingers and said that he interpreted that as a threat that he would be killed if he refused. The prosecutor objects to this response and asks the judge to rule it inadmissible.
Advise on the following:
The way in which the diary was dealt with in court and whether the prosecutors request the note within it which the Crown sought to have excluded was likely to be successful.
Whether the Defence would succeed in having the audio recording excluded.
Whether the Crowns objection to the evidence of Jack about Simon holding his fingers to Simons head in the shape of a gun is likely to be upheld.
FURTHER ADVICE
The CRA refers to 2 criteria: Content and Form. The below explanations provide additional guidance as to what is expected of you in relation to each of the criteria:
Content (15%)
Content refers to whether the law has been correctly understood and applied appropriately to the facts. Your work should refer to applicable cases and legislation through footnotes. Any irrelevant and/or incorrect application of the law to the facts will be penalised.
Form (5%)
Form includes both the format of the written advice and the professional use of language. By format we mean that there is a clear, logical and effective structure to how you organise your advice. By professional use of language we mean that you eliminate any errors of spelling or grammar, avoid awkward or confusing language and that you write in a way which is precise, concise and accurate.
The word limit/page limit of 1500 words/6 pages will be strictly enforced (no leeway). Both these requirements must be met. We will be able to check easily since the assessment is being marked online. Any content after 1500 words/6 pages will not be taken into consideration for the purposes of marking. A title page containing your name, student number and a word count must be provided. This title page will not count as one of the six pages.
Headings should be used to easily and clearly delineate issues. You can choose how to structure your advice but remember the Form criterion.
Appropriate sentence structure and expression includes the correct use of grammar, punctuation and spelling, as well as general sentence structure and a plain English writing style. Please make sure you check and re-check your work to eliminate these kinds of errors. Often reading it out loud can help expose problems. Plan your time well so that you can finish an initial draft and come back to it in a few days; this can give you some critical distance to spot errors.
Please ensure all authorities are correctly referenced according to the Australian Guide to Legal Citation. This includes cases and legislation provided in footnotes. There should be no citations in the main text and no substantive content in the footnotes.
Questions
If you have any general questions, please post on the Discussion Forum for the benefit of your fellow students.
All the best!
LLB303 Evidence Semester 2,2022
Criterion Referenced Assessment (CRA) Mark Sheet
Assessment Item 2: Written Advocacy
+ High Distinction - + Distinction - + Credit - + Pass - + Fail -
Content
Whether the law has been correctly understood and applied to the facts.
(15%) All applicable law has been fully understood and applied appropriately to the facts. Most applicable law has been fully understood and applied appropriately to the facts with one or two minor errors. Most applicable law has been fully understood and applied to the facts with a few errors. Some basic understanding of relevant law with several errors.
Some irrelevant or otherwise limited application. Little understanding of the relevant law demonstrated.
There are several major errors.
There may be irrelevant or no significant application.
Form
Adherence to specified procedures relating to format, expression and citation.
(5%) Fully complies with spelling, punctuation and grammar rules with no, or very minor, errors.
Fully adheres to form requirements.
Writing is precise and concise, flows logically to convey ideas and has a professional structure.
Correctly referenced according to AGLC4. Complies with rules relating to spelling, punctuation and grammar but may contain one or two minor errors that do not interfere with meaning.
Adheres to form requirements but may contain one or two inconsistencies.
Writing flows logically to convey ideas and are fairly well structured and expressed.
Correctly referenced according to AGLC4 but may contain one or two minor errors. Complies with rules relating to spelling, punctuation and grammar but may contain one or two minor errors that may interfere with meaning
Some adherence to form requirements but a few inconsistencies.
Writing flows logically to convey ideas but are not always coherently structured and expressed;
Correctly referenced according to AGLC4 with some errors. Contains frequent errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar that may interfere with ability to understand ideas presented.
Limited adherence to form requirements.
Writing may lack logic in structure; phrases and sentences are consistently awkward and distracting to the reader;
Inconsistently referenced according to AGLC4 with frequent errors. Significant lack of attention to spelling, punctuation and grammatical conventions.
Very limited adherence to form requirements.
Style and sentence structure interfere with ability to understand ideas presented
Frequent errors
Not referenced according to AGLC4
This exemplar received a 7 because:
It answers the question, is clearly written, well formatted (according to WALS and the AGLC4), researched and structured.
The footnotes and bibliography are mostly AGLC4 compliant.
There is an introduction, body (separated into relevant sections) and a conclusion.
Each section of the policy submission logically builds, setting out a series of key points leading to a conclusion which articulates and summarises an overall thesis/argument.
The student sets out each section under separate headings using a logical, consistent structure (you might note that it resembles the structure used in ISAAC). I have colour coded the sections in some areas of the paper to demonstrate how paragraphs are generally structured. You will see that the student:
Signposts the issue or topic they are addressing in each section and paragraph using headings and initial sentence/sentences that clearly outline the topic. This immediately gives the reader a clear understanding of what point is being made and what topic will be explored.
Explains the law/evidence in the context of the issue using primary and secondary sources to define and describe key cases, legislation, concepts or legal principles. This provides the reader with foundational knowledge required to understand any critical analysis.
Footnotes authorities making sure they reference any ideas or statements that are not their own. This enables the reader to check the veracity of the argument. It also demonstrates that the paper has been well researched and is therefore a rigorous piece of academic analysis.
Applies the law/evidence through critical analysis in the context of the issue and ultimately the essays primary thesis or argument. This demonstrates to the reader how core arguments (for and against), derived from primary and secondary sources, apply and can be reconciled in the context of the main thesis. It is where the student shows they understand and can explain conflicting views and rigorously argue a particular point.
Comes to a conclusion in each section regarding the point that has been made and what that says in the context of the main thesis. This highlights to the reader the writers ultimate conclusion and emphasises how this all fits into the thesis/argument being made.
If you would like some assistance with assessment, please contact us at: success.buslaw@qut.edu.au.
The question for this essay was:
Do the administrative law rules regarding actual and apprehended bias require reform? Critically evaluate this issue with reference to administrative law cases and legislation, and relevant administrative law values.
To answer well you need to:
Break the task down before you research. This means identifying:
The overarching question Do the bias rules need reforming?
The information/aspects in the question that you need to research and incorporate into the essay. To do this you need to ask yourself questions. Highlight the information in the question that is important - as I have done.
Ask who, what, where, how and why questions such as:
What are the rules of bias?
Whats the difference between actual and apprehended bias?
How do the rules operate?
Why were they put into place?
What were they protecting against in the context of Admin Law values?
How do I measure if they need reform?
(The question tells you this in the second sentence look at administrative law values (the legislation and case law will help you create an argument). Where is there a problem?
What are the relevant administrative law values?
How do they interact with the bias rules?
What does the case law and legislation say about the bias rules?
What is going wrong with the rules in the context of upholding admin values and what is working?
Note what the task directs you to do. Here, the task is asking you to critically analyse. That means you need to research the task rigorously with your questions in mind. Understand and explain how the evidence you have found interacts with the points you are making and the overarching question, address any differences in arguments being made by academics or in the case and link it all to your argument in this case how does this fit in with the need to reform the bias rules?
Research and structure your argument logically.
This essay is beautifully structured:
The introduction gives context to the question, states the key question, outlines the way the student is going to answer that question and clearly expresses the conclusion/argument being made.
The student then breaks up the argument into the two types of bias and deals with each separately.
Actual bias the student explains the test and gives background. Then they connect it to admin law values and assess its effectiveness (using case law and evidence from articles/reports etc). Finally they conclude that reform is required.
Apprehended bias. Again, the student introduces this test and explains how it is currently applied. They then consider the underlying rationale for the test connecting it to admin law values. Then they break down the body of this part into the aspects of the test that are problematic or positive: the fair-minded observer and the third Ebner step.
For each of these sections they:
Explain how this aspect works, what the core issues are (using case law etc), how it is problematic and whether it needs reform.
Each point they are making is logical and clearly explained so the reader is able to understand the argument without having to search for meaning and connection.
The student then assesses the current test and what is positive about it its level of flexibility. This is essential because it isolates the aspect of the test that needs to be kept if there is reform.
Finally, the student brings everything together in the conclusion.
Reforming actual and apprehended bias in administrative law
Next to the tribunal being in fact impartial is the importance of its appearing to be so.
Word count 2,497.
A Introduction
The current rules for actual and apprehended bias reflect a strict rationale seeking to promote public confidence in the legal system, but does so at the expense of procedural fairness. Procedural fairness and natural justice are core values in administrative law which are implied as a condition of the exercise of statutory power through statutory interpretation. The tests for actual and apprehended bias are rooted in natural justice theories. If natural justice applies in the decision-making process, and the decision maker is found to be biased, judicial review will be successful under section 5(1)(a) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), and section 20(2)(a) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld).
The bias rule is founded in the principle that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. A finding of actual or apprehended bias in a hearing will amount to a denial of procedural fairness. As a result, the bias test is strict, and is not upheld lightly. This essay argues that the rationale behind the current test satisfies justice as seen to be done, but stands in the way of justice actually being done. The present essay will outline the current rules regarding actual and apprehended bias, evaluate their effectiveness, and identify opportunities for reform. This essay will argue that the current test effectively eliminates litigants from bringing claims of actual bias, provides an unreasonable standard for the fair-minded and reasonable observer, and purports that the third Ebner step provides little clarity whilst fostering confusion.
B The Fallacy of Actual Bias
A claim of actual bias requires evidence that a decision maker approached the issue with a closed mind, or had prejudged the matter, and was not open to persuasion by the applicants case. Distinct from apprehended bias, a claim of actual bias requires assessing the decision makers state of mind, and requires persuasive evidence that the decision maker was actually bias at the time of the decision. A successful actual bias claim requires an adverse finding against the decision maker, alternatively, finding apprehended bias does not. Upholding bias claims, whilst avoiding an adverse finding against the decision maker, ensures procedural fairness without undermining the institutional integrity the bias rule is intended to foster, and is advantageous from this point of view.
However, the high evidentiary burden demanded by an actual bias claim makes it virtually impossible to present and prove a justifiable case. Callinan J in Johnson v Johnson (Johnson) described claims of apprehended bias as no more than a polite fiction for no doubt unintended, unconscious and ultimately unprovable, but nonetheless actual bias. This problem is further compounded by the tests might threshold. Spiegelman CJ in McGovern v Ku-Ring-Gai Council (McGovern) described Australias bias test as a low threshold. Whilst the test of might requires a lesser standard of proof than a real likelihood, as previously required, the Courts have emphasised a reasonable apprehension of bias cannot arise in fanciful claims. An allegation of bias must be firmly established. Kirby J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng, questioned why a litigant would bring a claim of actual bias, which needlessly assumes a heavier obligation, when an allegation of apprehended bias from the reasonable observers perspective would suffice to obtain relief. This extremely high evidentiary burden effectively excludes individuals from bringing claims of actual bias, instead relying on the lower evidentiary standard in the apprehended bias test. The actual bias test must be reformed to allow litigants to argue actual bias, without undermining public confidence in administrative law procedures.
C The Current Apprehended Bias Test
The test for determining apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer, with knowledge of the material objective facts, might apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question at hand. This is a question of fact made in the legal, statutory, and factual context of the decision. A finding of apprehended bias requires two steps. Firstly, the individual must identify the source of apprehended bias which may cause the decision maker to decide the matter other than on its legal and factual merits. Secondly, articulation of the logical connection between the source and the apprehension of bias is required. Whilst the bias test applies to judicial and administrative officers, the same degree of impartiality cannot be expected of an individual making purely administrative decisions, which are inextricably linked to policy objectives.
The current two-limbed test reflects the Courts clear intentions in Webb v The Queen (Webb) and Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (Ebner) to eliminate the previous tests uncertainties. However, the current test frequently debated. The bias test is intended to be objective, however, the two mights included in the test exposes subjective elements. This is evident where a review court must ultimately select some, and exclude other, qualities or knowledge of the observer. The case law suggests the success of an allegation of apprehended bias depends entirely on the knowledge imputed, or not imputed, on the observer.
It is well established that the application and content of the bias test varies depending on context, including consideration of the public power exercised, differences in decision-making roles, functions, and processes. The High Court has repeatedly affirmed that bias principles developed for judges cannot be applied exactly to other decision-makers. Many argue that this intended flexibility fosters uncertainty.
1 The Rationale Behind the Test
The bias rules are founded in administrative law values of procedural fairness and natural justice. Implementing the fair-minded lay observer intended to remove the decision-makers own view of the case, and a deliberate choice to foster public confidence. The lay observer represents the publics participation in decision making processes, thereby enhancing the institutional legitimacy of government decision making and upholding administrative law values of fairness and consistency. Further, those negatively impacted by a decision are more likely to accept the outcome if the decision is masked as the assessment of a lay observer, rather than the decision makers personal view. The rationale behind the hypothetical observer provides significant procedural benefits to administrative proceedings. The Full Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16, justified these rules as reflecting the fundamental value to preserve and promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of administrative decision-making and [provides] public reassurance. However, does this rationale behind the test provide a flimsy veil for decision makers to transpose their own views onto the observer?
D Who is the Fair-Minded Lay Observer?
The High Courts decision in Webb shifted discussion from the existence of the hypothetical observer, to defining their qualities. Recent interpretations of the fair-minded observer includes: reasonable, does not make snap judgments, neither complacent or unduly sensitive or suspicious, and most impressively is an informed one who will have regard to the fact that a judicial officers training, tradition and oath or affirmation, equip the officer with the ability to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial. These qualities are clearly advantageous in a legal setting. In administrative law proceedings, the observer understands decision making outside the courts is necessarily different. In Commissioner of Corrective Services v Government and Related Employees Appeal Tribunal, the reasonable observer understood tribunal decision-making, including unavoidable features such as limited tenure of members. However, many argue that the observer is a paragon of virtue and so unlike the average member of the public.
There has been great discussion about what attributes to impute on the lay observer. However, the High Court has repeatedly affirmed that the observer is not a lawyer. In Webb, Deane J affirmed that the observer has a broad knowledge of the material objective facts as distinct from a detailed knowledge of the law. In Johnson, the High Court established the reasonableness of any apprehended bias claim should be considered in the context of modern court practice and procedure, including active case management. The difficulty is clear. The lay observer is not a lawyer, nor do they have detailed knowledge of the law, but is aware of court practice, procedure, and case management. Kirby J has criticised attributing long lists of qualities and knowledge to the hypothetical observer. In Johnson, His Honour theorised for a court simply to impute all that was eventually known to the court to an imaginary person would only be to hold up a mirror against to itself. In Smits v Roach, Kirby J furthered this criticism by arguing that the reasonable observer has been stretched to virtually a snapping point. The hypothetical observer has been weighed down so heavily by its virtuous character, that this person is far removed from the public they were originally intended to present. Reform is clearly warranted in this area to ensure the observer is an accurate reflection of the public and aligns with the rationale behind the test.
However, criticisms of the hypothetical observer seek objectivity never intended in Ebner or Webb. Mason CJ and McHugh J expressly acknowledged the inevitability of the decision makers views and findings influencing the observer. The observer must be imputed with knowledge, as it is impossible for a decision maker to know what position a lay observer would take on a particular issue. In British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie, French CJ advocated for the current test, standing as a reminder to decision makers that they must view the circumstances through the lens of the public.
If the hypothetical lay observer is neither ignorant, nor informed, an enormous range of possibilities exist in between. Some have suggested injecting a balancing exercise into the apprehended bias test, in which a review body must consider and assess competing policy considerations. This balancing exercise reduces the risk of erroneous decision making, and promotes efficiency whilst considering the interests of the party asserting apprehended bias. However, a balancing exercise would likely extend proceedings and further complicate the bias test. The hypothetical lay observer has become incredibly removed from the general public it was intended to represent and requires reform to reflect the rationale behind the test.
E The Third Ebner Step
Many have considered implementing, what has come to be known as, the third Ebner step to create further transparency and clarity. The third step is summarised as asking whether the apprehension of bias is reasonable when considered in the context of the case. This was accepted and applied by Gageler J in Isbester v Knox City Council. This step was not considered by the other judges, choosing instead to restate and apply the two-step test in Ebner. However, the third Ebner step has been criticised as adding little more than a common-sense element to the second step, only adding further obscurity and complication. Where the second step is satisfied, and the suspected source of bias is accepted as giving rise to an apprehension of bias, how can a decision maker then claim unreasonableness under the third step? It is difficult to see how this third step would enhance public confidence in government decision making and administrative proceedings. Furthermore, Gageler Js suggested third step holds potential for confirmation bias, as it only arises after a finding that a source of apprehended bias may succeed.
On the other hand, the third step could encourage greater transparency in the bias rule and in administrative proceedings. By including reasonableness in the assessment of the claim, a decision-maker can step back and assess the claim in an overall manner, rather than viewing the circumstances from the informed observer. However, the third possible step in Ebner does little to enhance procedural fairness, rather, providing a means for decision makers to transpose their views onto the lay observer, under the guise of fostering public confidence and administering justice. Whilst reform is clearly warranted in this area, the third step is unlikely to create transparency, rather stands to cause further uncertainty and confusion.
F Keeping The Current Test
The current test allows for flexible application, and this is advantageous in the administrative law space. The bias test adapts to the nature and significance of the decision concerned, the character of the office of the decision maker, and the requirements of any legislation applicable to the case. Natural justice in administrative proceedings requires an open mind, but not an empty one. Courts have taken the view that whilst administrative officers must remain impartial, the degree of impartiality expected is less than that of the judiciary.
It is accepted that executive decision makers, such as Ministers and Council officials, may have a political commitment to an issue in the proceedings, but can balance or quarantine this commitment. For example, French J stated in Century Metals and Minings NL v Yeomans that Ministers and other administrative officials often deal with recurring issues in a similar context, in which they necessarily form views. The current bias rules allow for an understanding that it would be virtually impossible for these Ministers and officers to bring an open mind to each decision pertaining to a reoccurring issue. Furthermore, a claim of apprehended bias requires a consideration of the different roles performed by that individual. In the context of a Minister, advice and analysis is generally provided by their staff. However, apprehended bias on an individuals part, for example a Ministers employee, will only invalidate a decision where that individual had a central role in the decision making. Spiegelman CJ in McGovern preferred a but-for test for collegiate decision-making. His Honour expressed this test as, whether or not any person(s) reasonably suspected of pre-judgment determined the outcome. However, this does not deviate entirely from the High Courts approach outlined above.
This flexibility is particularly important in inquisitorial proceedings, where an apprehension is more likely to arise from cross-examinations, interruptions and challenges to evidence. In R v Carter and Attorney-General, the court held that the inquisitorial nature of royal commissions included processes that would give rise to an apprehension of bias if conducted in judicial proceedings, but that the hypothetical observer would be aware of these differences, and would consider the style of proceeding in assessing bias. The current flexibility of the bias rule in administrative contexts is clearly advantageous from a procedural perspective. If the rules undergo reform, this flexibility should remain.
G Conclusion
The greatest opportunity for reform lies in the fair-minded reasonable lay observer. This fictional person, intended to represent the public, has become strained and unlike any lay person. Further, attempts to clarify the test, such as the third Ebner step, are unlikely to provide any further certainty without causing greater confusion. It is essential to reform the current actual bias test to allow litigants to successfully bring claims of actual bias, without having to rely on an apprehended bias due to the heavy evidentiary burden. The current bias rules prioritise justice as being seen to be done, rather than justice actually being done and present an opportunity for reform.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Articles/Books/Reports
Aronson, Mark, Matthew Groves, Greg Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability, (Lawbook Co, 2017)
Atrill, Simon, 'Who is the "fair-minded and informed observer"? Bias after Magill' (2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law Journal 279
Australian Law Reform Commission, Judicial Impartiality (Background Paper, December 2020) <https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The-law-on-judicial-bias.pdf>
Chisholm, Richard, Apprehended Bias and Private Lawyer-Judge Communications: The Full Courts Decision in Charisteas (2020) 29 Australian Family Lawyer 18
Griffiths, John, Apprehended Bias in Australian Administrative Law (2010) 38(3) Federal Law Review 353
Groves, Matthew A Reasonably Reasonable Apprehension of Bias: CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 41(3) The Sydney Law Review 383
Groves, Matthew, Clarity and Complexity in the Bias Rule (2020) 44(2) Melbourne University Law Review 565
Havers, Philip and Alasdair Henderson, Recent Developments (and Problems) in the Law on Bias (2011) 16(2) Judicial Review 80
Robertson, Alan, Apprehended Bias The baggage (2016) 42(3) Australian Bar Review 249
Cases
British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283
Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal(1852) 3 HL Cas 759
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, 435
Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy (2002) 210 CLR 438
Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 517
Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (No 2) (2008) 172 FCR 376
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 42
McGovern v Ku-Ring-Gai Council (2008) 72 NSWLR 504
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16(2017) 254 FCR 534
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357
R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100
R v Carter & Attorney-General; Ex parte Gray & Mcquestin[1991] Tas R 174
R v Hendon Rural District Council; Ex parte Chorley[1933] 2 KB 696
R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256
Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700
Shrager v Basil Dighton Ltd [1924] 1 KB 274
Smits v Roach(2006) 227 CLR 423
Spencer v Bamber [2012] NSWCA 274
Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board (1972) 128 CLR 509
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41
Wilderness Society Inc v Turnbull (2007) 96 ALD 655
Zaltni v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 399
Legislation
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld)
This exemplar received a 7 because:
It answers the question, is clearly written, well formatted (according to WALS and the AGLC4), researched and structured.
The footnotes and bibliography are mostly AGLC4 compliant.
There is an introduction, body (separated into relevant sections) and a conclusion.
Each section of the policy submission logically builds, setting out a series of key points leading to a conclusion which articulates and summarises an overall thesis/argument.
The student sets out each section under separate headings using a logical, consistent structure (you might note that it resembles the structure used in ISAAC). I have colour coded the sections in some areas of the paper to demonstrate how paragraphs are generally structured. You will see that the student:
Signposts the issue or topic they are addressing in each section and paragraph using headings and initial sentence/sentences that clearly outline the topic. This immediately gives the reader a clear understanding of what point is being made and what topic will be explored.
Explains the law/evidence in the context of the issue using primary and secondary sources to define and describe key cases, legislation, concepts or legal principles. This provides the reader with foundational knowledge required to understand any critical analysis.
Footnotes authorities making sure they reference any ideas or statements that are not their own. This enables the reader to check the veracity of the argument. It also demonstrates that the paper has been well researched and is therefore a rigorous piece of academic analysis.
Applies the law/evidence through critical analysis in the context of the issue and ultimately the essays primary thesis or argument. This demonstrates to the reader how core arguments (for and against), derived from primary and secondary sources, apply and can be reconciled in the context of the main thesis. It is where the student shows they understand and can explain conflicting views and rigorously argue a particular point.
Comes to a conclusion in each section regarding the point that has been made and what that says in the context of the main thesis. This highlights to the reader the writers ultimate conclusion and emphasises how this all fits into the thesis/argument being made.
If you would like some assistance with assessment, please contact us at: success.buslaw@qut.edu.au.
The question for this essay was:
Do the administrative law rules regarding actual and apprehended bias require reform? Critically evaluate this issue with reference to administrative law cases and legislation, and relevant administrative law values.
To answer well you need to:
Break the task down before you research. This means identifying:
The overarching question Do the bias rules need reforming?
The information/aspects in the question that you need to research and incorporate into the essay. To do this you need to ask yourself questions. Highlight the information in the question that is important - as I have done.
Ask who, what, where, how and why questions such as:
What are the rules of bias?
Whats the difference between actual and apprehended bias?
How do the rules operate?
Why were they put into place?
What were they protecting against in the context of Admin Law values?
How do I measure if they need reform?
(The question tells you this in the second sentence look at administrative law values (the legislation and case law will help you create an argument). Where is there a problem?
What are the relevant administrative law values?
How do they interact with the bias rules?
What does the case law and legislation say about the bias rules?
What is going wrong with the rules in the context of upholding admin values and what is working?
Note what the task directs you to do. Here, the task is asking you to critically analyse. That means you need to research the task rigorously with your questions in mind. Understand and explain how the evidence you have found interacts with the points you are making and the overarching question, address any differences in arguments being made by academics or in the case and link it all to your argument in this case how does this fit in with the need to reform the bias rules?
Research and structure your argument logically.
This essay is beautifully structured:
The introduction gives context to the question, states the key question, outlines the way the student is going to answer that question and clearly expresses the conclusion/argument being made.
The student then breaks up the argument into the two types of bias and deals with each separately.
Actual bias the student explains the test and gives background. Then they connect it to admin law values and assess its effectiveness (using case law and evidence from articles/reports etc). Finally they conclude that reform is required.
Apprehended bias. Again, the student introduces this test and explains how it is currently applied. They then consider the underlying rationale for the test connecting it to admin law values. Then they break down the body of this part into the aspects of the test that are problematic or positive: the fair-minded observer and the third Ebner step.
For each of these sections they:
Explain how this aspect works, what the core issues are (using case law etc), how it is problematic and whether it needs reform.
Each point they are making is logical and clearly explained so the reader is able to understand the argument without having to search for meaning and connection.
The student then assesses the current test and what is positive about it its level of flexibility. This is essential because it isolates the aspect of the test that needs to be kept if there is reform.
Finally, the student brings everything together in the conclusion.
Reforming actual and apprehended bias in administrative law
Next to the tribunal being in fact impartial is the importance of its appearing to be so.
Word count 2,497.
A Introduction
The current rules for actual and apprehended bias reflect a strict rationale seeking to promote public confidence in the legal system, but does so at the expense of procedural fairness. Procedural fairness and natural justice are core values in administrative law which are implied as a condition of the exercise of statutory power through statutory interpretation. The tests for actual and apprehended bias are rooted in natural justice theories. If natural justice applies in the decision-making process, and the decision maker is found to be biased, judicial review will be successful under section 5(1)(a) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), and section 20(2)(a) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld).
The bias rule is founded in the principle that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. A finding of actual or apprehended bias in a hearing will amount to a denial of procedural fairness. As a result, the bias test is strict, and is not upheld lightly. This essay argues that the rationale behind the current test satisfies justice as seen to be done, but stands in the way of justice actually being done. The present essay will outline the current rules regarding actual and apprehended bias, evaluate their effectiveness, and identify opportunities for reform. This essay will argue that the current test effectively eliminates litigants from bringing claims of actual bias, provides an unreasonable standard for the fair-minded and reasonable observer, and purports that the third Ebner step provides little clarity whilst fostering confusion.
B The Fallacy of Actual Bias
A claim of actual bias requires evidence that a decision maker approached the issue with a closed mind, or had prejudged the matter, and was not open to persuasion by the applicants case. Distinct from apprehended bias, a claim of actual bias requires assessing the decision makers state of mind, and requires persuasive evidence that the decision maker was actually bias at the time of the decision. A successful actual bias claim requires an adverse finding against the decision maker, alternatively, finding apprehended bias does not. Upholding bias claims, whilst avoiding an adverse finding against the decision maker, ensures procedural fairness without undermining the institutional integrity the bias rule is intended to foster, and is advantageous from this point of view.
However, the high evidentiary burden demanded by an actual bias claim makes it virtually impossible to present and prove a justifiable case. Callinan J in Johnson v Johnson (Johnson) described claims of apprehended bias as no more than a polite fiction for no doubt unintended, unconscious and ultimately unprovable, but nonetheless actual bias. This problem is further compounded by the tests might threshold. Spiegelman CJ in McGovern v Ku-Ring-Gai Council (McGovern) described Australias bias test as a low threshold. Whilst the test of might requires a lesser standard of proof than a real likelihood, as previously required, the Courts have emphasised a reasonable apprehension of bias cannot arise in fanciful claims. An allegation of bias must be firmly established. Kirby J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng, questioned why a litigant would bring a claim of actual bias, which needlessly assumes a heavier obligation, when an allegation of apprehended bias from the reasonable observers perspective would suffice to obtain relief. This extremely high evidentiary burden effectively excludes individuals from bringing claims of actual bias, instead relying on the lower evidentiary standard in the apprehended bias test. The actual bias test must be reformed to allow litigants to argue actual bias, without undermining public confidence in administrative law procedures.
C The Current Apprehended Bias Test
The test for determining apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer, with knowledge of the material objective facts, might apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question at hand. This is a question of fact made in the legal, statutory, and factual context of the decision. A finding of apprehended bias requires two steps. Firstly, the individual must identify the source of apprehended bias which may cause the decision maker to decide the matter other than on its legal and factual merits. Secondly, articulation of the logical connection between the source and the apprehension of bias is required. Whilst the bias test applies to judicial and administrative officers, the same degree of impartiality cannot be expected of an individual making purely administrative decisions, which are inextricably linked to policy objectives.
The current two-limbed test reflects the Courts clear intentions in Webb v The Queen (Webb) and Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (Ebner) to eliminate the previous tests uncertainties. However, the current test frequently debated. The bias test is intended to be objective, however, the two mights included in the test exposes subjective elements. This is evident where a review court must ultimately select some, and exclude other, qualities or knowledge of the observer. The case law suggests the success of an allegation of apprehended bias depends entirely on the knowledge imputed, or not imputed, on the observer.
It is well established that the application and content of the bias test varies depending on context, including consideration of the public power exercised, differences in decision-making roles, functions, and processes. The High Court has repeatedly affirmed that bias principles developed for judges cannot be applied exactly to other decision-makers. Many argue that this intended flexibility fosters uncertainty.
1 The Rationale Behind the Test
The bias rules are founded in administrative law values of procedural fairness and natural justice. Implementing the fair-minded lay observer intended to remove the decision-makers own view of the case, and a deliberate choice to foster public confidence. The lay observer represents the publics participation in decision making processes, thereby enhancing the institutional legitimacy of government decision making and upholding administrative law values of fairness and consistency. Further, those negatively impacted by a decision are more likely to accept the outcome if the decision is masked as the assessment of a lay observer, rather than the decision makers personal view. The rationale behind the hypothetical observer provides significant procedural benefits to administrative proceedings. The Full Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16, justified these rules as reflecting the fundamental value to preserve and promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of administrative decision-making and [provides] public reassurance. However, does this rationale behind the test provide a flimsy veil for decision makers to transpose their own views onto the observer?
D Who is the Fair-Minded Lay Observer?
The High Courts decision in Webb shifted discussion from the existence of the hypothetical observer, to defining their qualities. Recent interpretations of the fair-minded observer includes: reasonable, does not make snap judgments, neither complacent or unduly sensitive or suspicious, and most impressively is an informed one who will have regard to the fact that a judicial officers training, tradition and oath or affirmation, equip the officer with the ability to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial. These qualities are clearly advantageous in a legal setting. In administrative law proceedings, the observer understands decision making outside the courts is necessarily different. In Commissioner of Corrective Services v Government and Related Employees Appeal Tribunal, the reasonable observer understood tribunal decision-making, including unavoidable features such as limited tenure of members. However, many argue that the observer is a paragon of virtue and so unlike the average member of the public.
There has been great discussion about what attributes to impute on the lay observer. However, the High Court has repeatedly affirmed that the observer is not a lawyer. In Webb, Deane J affirmed that the observer has a broad knowledge of the material objective facts as distinct from a detailed knowledge of the law. In Johnson, the High Court established the reasonableness of any apprehended bias claim should be considered in the context of modern court practice and procedure, including active case management. The difficulty is clear. The lay observer is not a lawyer, nor do they have detailed knowledge of the law, but is aware of court practice, procedure, and case management. Kirby J has criticised attributing long lists of qualities and knowledge to the hypothetical observer. In Johnson, His Honour theorised for a court simply to impute all that was eventually known to the court to an imaginary person would only be to hold up a mirror against to itself. In Smits v Roach, Kirby J furthered this criticism by arguing that the reasonable observer has been stretched to virtually a snapping point. The hypothetical observer has been weighed down so heavily by its virtuous character, that this person is far removed from the public they were originally intended to present. Reform is clearly warranted in this area to ensure the observer is an accurate reflection of the public and aligns with the rationale behind the test.
However, criticisms of the hypothetical observer seek objectivity never intended in Ebner or Webb. Mason CJ and McHugh J expressly acknowledged the inevitability of the decision makers views and findings influencing the observer. The observer must be imputed with knowledge, as it is impossible for a decision maker to know what position a lay observer would take on a particular issue. In British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie, French CJ advocated for the current test, standing as a reminder to decision makers that they must view the circumstances through the lens of the public.
If the hypothetical lay observer is neither ignorant, nor informed, an enormous range of possibilities exist in between. Some have suggested injecting a balancing exercise into the apprehended bias test, in which a review body must consider and assess competing policy considerations. This balancing exercise reduces the risk of erroneous decision making, and promotes efficiency whilst considering the interests of the party asserting apprehended bias. However, a balancing exercise would likely extend proceedings and further complicate the bias test. The hypothetical lay observer has become incredibly removed from the general public it was intended to represent and requires reform to reflect the rationale behind the test.
E The Third Ebner Step
Many have considered implementing, what has come to be known as, the third Ebner step to create further transparency and clarity. The third step is summarised as asking whether the apprehension of bias is reasonable when considered in the context of the case. This was accepted and applied by Gageler J in Isbester v Knox City Council. This step was not considered by the other judges, choosing instead to restate and apply the two-step test in Ebner. However, the third Ebner step has been criticised as adding little more than a common-sense element to the second step, only adding further obscurity and complication. Where the second step is satisfied, and the suspected source of bias is accepted as giving rise to an apprehension of bias, how can a decision maker then claim unreasonableness under the third step? It is difficult to see how this third step would enhance public confidence in government decision making and administrative proceedings. Furthermore, Gageler Js suggested third step holds potential for confirmation bias, as it only arises after a finding that a source of apprehended bias may succeed.
On the other hand, the third step could encourage greater transparency in the bias rule and in administrative proceedings. By including reasonableness in the assessment of the claim, a decision-maker can step back and assess the claim in an overall manner, rather than viewing the circumstances from the informed observer. However, the third possible step in Ebner does little to enhance procedural fairness, rather, providing a means for decision makers to transpose their views onto the lay observer, under the guise of fostering public confidence and administering justice. Whilst reform is clearly warranted in this area, the third step is unlikely to create transparency, rather stands to cause further uncertainty and confusion.
F Keeping The Current Test
The current test allows for flexible application, and this is advantageous in the administrative law space. The bias test adapts to the nature and significance of the decision concerned, the character of the office of the decision maker, and the requirements of any legislation applicable to the case. Natural justice in administrative proceedings requires an open mind, but not an empty one. Courts have taken the view that whilst administrative officers must remain impartial, the degree of impartiality expected is less than that of the judiciary.
It is accepted that executive decision makers, such as Ministers and Council officials, may have a political commitment to an issue in the proceedings, but can balance or quarantine this commitment. For example, French J stated in Century Metals and Minings NL v Yeomans that Ministers and other administrative officials often deal with recurring issues in a similar context, in which they necessarily form views. The current bias rules allow for an understanding that it would be virtually impossible for these Ministers and officers to bring an open mind to each decision pertaining to a reoccurring issue. Furthermore, a claim of apprehended bias requires a consideration of the different roles performed by that individual. In the context of a Minister, advice and analysis is generally provided by their staff. However, apprehended bias on an individuals part, for example a Ministers employee, will only invalidate a decision where that individual had a central role in the decision making. Spiegelman CJ in McGovern preferred a but-for test for collegiate decision-making. His Honour expressed this test as, whether or not any person(s) reasonably suspected of pre-judgment determined the outcome. However, this does not deviate entirely from the High Courts approach outlined above.
This flexibility is particularly important in inquisitorial proceedings, where an apprehension is more likely to arise from cross-examinations, interruptions and challenges to evidence. In R v Carter and Attorney-General, the court held that the inquisitorial nature of royal commissions included processes that would give rise to an apprehension of bias if conducted in judicial proceedings, but that the hypothetical observer would be aware of these differences, and would consider the style of proceeding in assessing bias. The current flexibility of the bias rule in administrative contexts is clearly advantageous from a procedural perspective. If the rules undergo reform, this flexibility should remain.
G Conclusion
The greatest opportunity for reform lies in the fair-minded reasonable lay observer. This fictional person, intended to represent the public, has become strained and unlike any lay person. Further, attempts to clarify the test, such as the third Ebner step, are unlikely to provide any further certainty without causing greater confusion. It is essential to reform the current actual bias test to allow litigants to successfully bring claims of actual bias, without having to rely on an apprehended bias due to the heavy evidentiary burden. The current bias rules prioritise justice as being seen to be done, rather than justice actually being done and present an opportunity for reform.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Articles/Books/Reports
Aronson, Mark, Matthew Groves, Greg Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability, (Lawbook Co, 2017)
Atrill, Simon, 'Who is the "fair-minded and informed observer"? Bias after Magill' (2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law Journal 279
Australian Law Reform Commission, Judicial Impartiality (Background Paper, December 2020) <https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The-law-on-judicial-bias.pdf>
Chisholm, Richard, Apprehended Bias and Private Lawyer-Judge Communications: The Full Courts Decision in Charisteas (2020) 29 Australian Family Lawyer 18
Griffiths, John, Apprehended Bias in Australian Administrative Law (2010) 38(3) Federal Law Review 353
Groves, Matthew A Reasonably Reasonable Apprehension of Bias: CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 41(3) The Sydney Law Review 383
Groves, Matthew, Clarity and Complexity in the Bias Rule (2020) 44(2) Melbourne University Law Review 565
Havers, Philip and Alasdair Henderson, Recent Developments (and Problems) in the Law on Bias (2011) 16(2) Judicial Review 80
Robertson, Alan, Apprehended Bias The baggage (2016) 42(3) Australian Bar Review 249
Cases
British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283
Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal(1852) 3 HL Cas 759
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, 435
Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy (2002) 210 CLR 438
Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 517
Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (No 2) (2008) 172 FCR 376
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 42
McGovern v Ku-Ring-Gai Council (2008) 72 NSWLR 504
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16(2017) 254 FCR 534
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357
R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100
R v Carter & Attorney-General; Ex parte Gray & Mcquestin[1991] Tas R 174
R v Hendon Rural District Council; Ex parte Chorley[1933] 2 KB 696
R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256
Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700
Shrager v Basil Dighton Ltd [1924] 1 KB 274
Smits v Roach(2006) 227 CLR 423
Spencer v Bamber [2012] NSWCA 274
Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board (1972) 128 CLR 509
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41
Wilderness Society Inc v Turnbull (2007) 96 ALD 655
Zaltni v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 399
Legislation
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld)