AL NOOR COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - LEGAL ANALYSIS

QUESTION 1: CASE STUDY - LEGAL ISSUES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

ISSUE 1: VALIDITY OF ENGINEER'S INSTRUCTION TO VARY MARINE OUTFALL DESIGN

Legal Issue

The Contractor challenges the validity of the Engineer giving the instruction to re-align the marine outfall and introduce sediment-control structures to the Contract as being a valid variation to the scope of the Contract, or whether it is a matter of contractual scope and therefore includes a contravention to the rule that variations should not materially change the economic balance of the Contract.

Appropriate Contractual and Legal Provisions.

The FIDIC Red Book 1999, Sub-Clause 13.1 (Right to Vary) permits the Engineer under Right to Vary to make variations at any stage up to the issuance of Taking-Over Certificate. This authority is not, however, unlimited. The power in the 1999 Red Book is described using open-ended terms (and, in English law, with the underlying law seeking to interpret a Contract under the meaning of UAE law), and states that the instructions should be reasonable and not to the extent that they are materially different than instructions in the original Contract.

Contrary to this, the FIDIC Red Book 2017 specifically limits the authority of the Engineer in Sub-Clause 13.1(d)-(e). Importantly, the Contractor can protest in case the varied work was Unforeseeable, considering the scope and nature of the Works as in the Requirements made by the Employer.

Application

The fact-specific inquiry emerges as a result of the Environmental Authority dictate on the issue of coastal erosion and marine biodiversity. First, did the environmental restrictions risk knowable at tender stage? The FIDIC contracts place the burden on the contractors to survey the site and determine risks and they should consider all available information. The inability of the Contractor to foresee any alterations in the environmental design can be the evidence of poor tender-stage evaluation but not the occurrence of an unforeseeable variation.

Nevertheless, the content of the deviation is paramount. Where the instruction of the Engineer demands large re-design which has the effect of varying the cost and programme disproportionately that which would be practicable on the basis of the original scope the variation can be more than that which the Engineer has authority to make. In the 1999 version, Sub-Clause 13.3 (Variation Procedure), the Contractor is entitled to make a proposal to vary Contract price and time. When the Engineer insist is incapable of constituting a true variation to Clause 12 (Measurement and Valuation), then this implies that it is out of scope.

The position of the Contractor is given by the express right of the Contractor to object under the condition where the variation is not foreseeable under the 2017 edition, replacing the unforeseen ground conditions of Sub-Clause 4.12 which incorporates the same standard.

Conclusion on Issue 1

The instruction of the Engineer is perhaps a valid modification within Sub-Clause 13 (regardless of whether it is in the 1999 or 2017 versions) since environmental changes are not necessarily not within scope, and the Engineer has wide discretion to vary in the absence of specific contractual terms.

ISSUE 2: CONTRACTOR'S ENTITLEMENT TO EXTENSION OF TIME AND COST FOR UNFORESEEN GROUND CONDITIONS

Legal Issue

The Contractor came across limestone cavities and inflows of water and these were not mentioned in the site information which had been supplied to the Contractor by the Employer. Whether these circumstances are unforeseeable under the Contract and, in that case, whether the Contractor is entitled to time and cost adjustments or is required to accept the risk because he failed to undertake site inspection responsibility prior to tender is the issue.

Applicable Contractual and Legitimate Provisions.

The unforeseeable physical conditions are tackled by Sub-Clause 4.12 (Contractor Obligations-1999 Red Book) or Sub-Clause 4.11 (2017 Red Book). According to this clause, the Contractor will ensure the site will be inspected and all the data which has been given by the Employer is reviewed considering the cost and duration of time. The Contractor however, may claim extension of time and cost where it is subjected to physical conditions which are not reasonably foreseeable by an experienced Contractor and which impact on progress and cost unfavourably.

The burden distribution according to FIDIC is subtle. Although the Contractor must conduct pre-tender investigations, this Investigation is subject to what was practicable likely considering cost and time. The Employer on the other hand possesses an obligation to furnish precise site investigation information. Assuming the inaccuracy of the data provided by the Employer, or its incompleteness, the pre-tender inquiries made by the Contractor would be unable to rectify such a lack.

Case law advocates a narrow differentiation. Van Oord UK Ltd v Allseas UK Ltd, the court of England stated that an experienced contractor was obliged to pay attention to the fact that conditions could be different than the presented information and has to make its own judgment on available information. The Sub-Clause 4.12 specifies that the Contractor should continue works and should inform the Engineer as soon as possible. The notice has to explain the circumstances, why they are not predictable and the negative effects on the progress and cost.

Application

The claim of the Contractor hinges on the facts that the limestone cavities and ground water inflows were not outlined in the site data and could not be easily predicted by an experienced contractor to occur given the information available. The factual questions are critical and they are:

What are the emotechnical inquiry and site data that were provided by the Employer on tender?

Were limestone cavities and ground water conditions indicated or suggested by data provided?

Was the Contractor a reasonable site investigator in time-constrained circumstances before tender?

Were the conditions inconsistent with previous borehole logs revealed on the location of excavation?

The defence by the Employer that the Contractor did not perform a good site inspection is a fair defence, however, it will not fly when the data provided by the Employer was inaccurate in the nature of it. On the principle of mutual accountability, should the Employer have supplied the Engineer with misleading or incomplete information about site investigation, the Employer is responsible for its failure to disclose that which was within its control. The Contractor has the responsibility of giving the appropriate notice to the Engineer under Sub-Clause 20.1 (or Sub-Clause 20.2 under the 2017 edition). Failure to give notice within 28 days of learning of the situation (or getting informed of the effects of delay) may disallow or restrict the claim.

Conclusion on Issue 2

To establish a valid extension of time and cost addition, the Contractor needs to be able to prove: (1) that the conditions were not revealed in the site data documentation provided by the Employer; (2) they were not foreseeable by an experienced contractor with the available information; and (3) that they were not communicated by the Contractor to the Engineer in time. It is the onus of the Contractor to have such elements evidenced.

ISSUE 3: SUBCONTRACTOR DEFAULT AND EMPLOYER'S CLAIM AGAINST HydroTech SYSTEMS LLC

Legal Issue

HydroTech Systems LLC, a subcontractor engaged by the Contractor to provide and install wastewater pumps, did not provide equipment on time which led to a three month delay. The Employer is interested in bearing HydroTech directly liable under tortious liability (probably negligence or breach of duty). The issue is that is such direct liability as there was no contractual privity between the Employer and HydroTech.

Applicable Contractual and Legal Provisions.

FIDIC contracts do not tend to create privity of contract between the Employer and subcontractors. Sub-Clause 4.4 in Red Book 1999 gives that there shall be no privity between the Employer and the Subcontractor. This implies that the Employer cannot commit any kind of contractual action against a subcontractor directly.

Nevertheless, the Employer can initiate tortious liability (e.g., negligence) claims in case the former can prove that the subcontractor was under an owed duty of care to the Employer and the subcontractor breached the duty of care leading to loss. A duty of care may exist under the law of tort (much of the law of a tort being explained by reference to English law, which is commonly used to interpret FIDIC contracts) where: The subcontractor should have known or actually knew that the Employer would rely on its performance; The Employer was a foreseeable victim of negligence; It is fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty.

Application

The claim against the HydroTech by the Employer on the basis of tortious liability, in this instance does not have a smooth sail:

Privity Absence: HydroTech was not in an actual contractual relationship with the Employer. The Contractor and HydroTech were the Supply and installation contractors.

Duty of Care: Although the failure of HydroTech to supply equipment in time could have led to a delay, it is hard to prove that HydroTech had a direct duty of care towards the Employer (rather than the Contractor). The Employer was not contracting with HydroTech, did not give any requirement to HydroTech, and did not have any control over actual operation of HydroTech. They often do not allow courts to provide tortious obligations in the commercial contracts between chains of contractors and subcontractors because it would circumvent accepted contractual distribution of risk.

Causation and Foreseeability: The Employer can contend that HydroTech could have been recognized as a vital vendor and the Employer ought to have been aware of the fact that the Employer would suffer a loss due to delayed delivery. Nevertheless, this argument is not as strong when the Contractor (the intermediary party) was in charge of overseeing the contract and supervising the performance.

Contractor Role: It is found under Sub-Clause 4.4 where the Contractor is bound by contract to the subcontractor performance. The Contractor also risks the subcontractor default and has to bears the loss or recover losses incurred with the subcontractor. The recourse of the Employer lies against the Contractor and not HydroTech.

Conclusion on Issue 3

It is likely that the Employer will fail in his effort to have HydroTech hold directly liable on tortious negligence. This is reinforced by the privity exclusion in FIDIC and the fact that contractual risk distribution and sharing must not be evaded with the help of tortuous actions. The Contractor remedy that the Employer can take is to sue the Contractor based on Sub-Clause 4.4 (obligation to perform subcontract works) and on Sub-Clause 8 (Time for Completion).

ISSUE 4: ABUSIVE CALL ON PERFORMANCE BOND

Legal Issue

Non-performance and delays were cited when the Employer called upon the on-demand performance bond. According to the liquidator of the Contractor, the call was abusive, and the Employer breached FIDIC and UAE law by not proving the breach of the contract and then claiming the invocation of the bond. The issue here is whether such a call can be legally justified and the UAE courts will step in to stop payment.

Applicable Contractual and Legal Provisions.

Sub-clause 4.2 (Performance Security) of the FIDIC Red Book sets out that the following: The Employer shall not claim under the Performance Security over any amount to which the Employer would be entitled had the Contract been forfeited in the circumstances outlined in either (a) Failure by the Contractor to extend the validity of the Performance Security... or (b) Failure to remedy defects within a timetabled period... This gives a contractual obligation, that the Employer can only invoke the bond in respect of specified breaches in amounts to which it is entitled by the contract.

Articles 411-419 of the Federal Law No. 18 of 1993 ( Commercial Code ) in the UAE law applies to bank guarantees ( performance bonds ). Article 417 states that a bank is obligated to make payment on demand unless the guarantor (the Contractor) has acquired a court order prohibiting its payment. Most importantly, Article 104 of the UAE Civil Code states that no individual who exercises his rights rightfully should be subjected to liability arising out of it.

The FIDIC Conditions of Contract in themselves impose a procedural obligation: the Employer would need to prove its case prior to shooting the bond. This is informal in the fact that Sub-Clause 4.2 points out that the call must be to amounts into which the Employer has a right against the Contract.

The recent case law, especially J Murphy and Sons Ltd v Beckton Energy Ltd, a decision of the English High Court based on an amended FIDIC Yellow Book, questioned whether the Employer is obliged to obtain an agreement or determination of the liquidated damages by the Engineer before calling the bond. VII The court determined that the right of the Employer to liquidated damages is a regime in itself, and does not require an agreement with or determination by the Engineer to be made as a condition precedent to any liability.

Application

The arguments available to the Contractor, liquidator are: (1) the Employer has made the bond call without reputing any violation; (2) the call is abusive according to Article 106 UAE Civil Code.

In terms of substantiation, the most crucial issue is whether the Employer mentioned the reasons of the call when making a payment request. Sub-Clause 4.2 of the FIDIC states that the call should be of the nature that it should not relate to the amounts to which the Employer is entitled to under the Contract.

The three-month delay realised because of HydroTech not supplying equipment is, however, a literal breach (failure to meet Time for Completion under Sub-Clause 8). Provided the Employer invoked this particular delay as a pretext to the call, the call is in compliance with the contractual requirement of Sub-Clause 4.2(b).

Concerning the coverage of abuse of rights under the UAE law, the Contractor has to demonstrate that the telephone call was done with the intention of damaging or within the scope of other factors listed in Article 106(2). The UAE has continually maintained that this intent requirement is high and in fervent need of proving.

Conclusion on Issue 4

The call on the performance bond by the Employer can be justified in case he called it in response to a particular, substantiated breach of contract (e.g., the three-month delay that can be blamed on the subcontractor failures, which the Contractor will still be liable under FIDIC).

ISSUE 5: ENFORCEABILITY OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE UNDER UAE LAW

Legal Issue

The Employer brought a counter claim of liquidated damages by delay. The liquidator of the Contractor declares that the clause is not enforceable under the territory of the UAE law due to the fact that the sum is more than the loss taken and therefore, it is an uncalculable penalty that can not be enforced. Moreover, a professional report made the finding of both parties as having contributed to delays, which would nullify the claim of the Employer. It is a question of whether the law in the UAE will apply the clause of liquidated damages as it is or decrease it.

Applicable Contractual and Legal Terms.

FIDIC Red Book Sub-Clause 8.7 covers liquidated damages: in case of non-observation of the Time for Completion by the Contractor, the Contractor should pay delay damages at a rate that has been defined in the Contract Data per day of delay. They are described as liquidated damages (pre-estimation of loss) and not penalties.

Nevertheless, common law jurisdictions differ greatly with UAE law. According to Article 390(2) of the UAE Civil Code (Federal Law No. 5 of 1985), on application of either party, a court may also, in its discretion, vary (adjust) the amount of the damages in case the principal obligation has been partially or wholly performed, and the damages is disproportionate to the harm suffered.

Application

The liquidator of the Contractor is very likely to have a point in the UAE law. The analysis will follow as;

Evidence of Breach: The Employer should demonstrate that the Contractor was slow in completion. This is probably agreed with considering that the HydroTech subcontractor failure resulted in a three-month delay recorded.

Calculation of Damages: Liquidated damages clause is an amount calculated at a rate per day (or week) of delay. Counterclaim quantum of the Employer would be computed as: Liquidated Damages rate x Days delay. An example is when the rate is AED 50,000/day and delay is 90 days, the claim will be AED 4,500,000.

Expert Report on Shared Causation: The conclusion made by an expert report that delays were caused by both parties is of great relevance as it is regulated by the UAE law. This fact is a confirmation of the thesis that the liquidated damages are incommensurate to the size of the harm.

Discretion to Compensate by Court: Under Article 390 (2), the court will determine whether the pre-determined liquidated damages figure is disproportional to the harm. The expert report should prove that: The actual damages (e.g., the lost revenue, extended overhead costs) which have been actually incurred are much less than the liquidated damages which were asserted to have been incurred. The two parties caused the delay, and the causal responsibility of Contractor is minimized.

Conclusion on Issue 5

Principally, the liquidated damages provision is enforceable under UAE law; however, the sum is liable to judicial modification under Article 390(2). The fact that there is a pre-agreed amount of damages which are disproportionate to actual loss gives the Contractor a good case to argue that its liquidator in its defence.

QUESTION 2: DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS UNDER FIDIC 1999 AND 2017

Critical Analysis
The fact that the dispute resolution process in the FIDIC 2017 edition has failed to present a meaningful difference to the one in 1999 is also to be looked into closely. This claim is massively false, and a close review of the two versions shows that although the basic tiered architecture is still the same, the 2017 version is marked with substantial procedural reforms, more institutional roles, and crucial clarifications to the actual shortcomings of the 1999 version. In order to adequately test this assertion, it is important to distinguish between the background dispute resolution framework (that has not changed that much) and the operational processes or timelines and functional roles of the institution (that have indeed improved significantly).

FIDIC in both editions are founded on the same basis: a multi-layer system that is meant to administer disputes in an effective manner, which ends in an arbitration. The two editions of the Red Book, published in 1999 and 2017, share a single fundamental principle, namely that of pay now, argue later, which means that the decisions of Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) or Dispute Avoidance and Adjudication Board (DAAB) are immediate binding on the parties, although not final until the tension is resolved by arbitration. Such an assumption is made about both versions as well by assuming that at the end of the DAB/DAAB procedure either of the sides may turn to arbitration activity or in case no mutually agreeable solution can be reached within a certain time span. There is no difference between editions in the substantive law that should be used in the case (UAE law, in this case) and the arbitration rules regarding the process, which implies that the overall philosophy of dispute resolution has not been significantly transformed.

Though, behind this surface similarity, there exists a complex of procedural improvements that were presented in 2017 and can be seen as meaningful evolution, not stagnation. The greatest change in structure is the separation of claims and disputes into two different clauses. All claims, disputes, and arbitration forms have been combined in one Clause 20 of the Red Book thus creating an operational ambiguity as to when a matter has progressed to the stage of a dispute and at what procedural regime is applicable at any point in time in twenty years of practice. The 2017 edition, in its turn, divides these processes into Clause 20 (Claims) and Clause 21 (Disputes), which makes the role of the Engineer as a decision-maker on claims in the early stage more clear compared to the role of the DAAB as the arbitrator of disputes later. Although in seeming only organizational, this bifurcation is a fundamentally new procedural innovation that tackles a longstanding source of confusion in contracts in 1999 and shows the procedural route to take to all parties involved.

The second significant discovery in 2017 is the mandatory timelines to be imposed on Engineer determination of claims. The 1999 version does not give a specific date within which the Engineer must issue a determination on Sub-Clause 3.7 (Agreement or Determination) to give the Engineer an indefinite right to postpone decisions. The consequence of this ambiguity has been continuing contractor complaints regarding Engineer delay, as well as legal wrangles as to whether or not Engineer delay in itself is a breach, and what redress can be taken in the failure to determine. This is corrected by the 2017 Clause 20, which imposes a time limit of 42 days within which the Engineer is obliged to issue a determination, failing which the claim is considered as having been accepted -a provision that offers a contractual source of redress in terms of Engineer delay and puts pressure on prompt action by the Engineer. This is a temporal form that was not present in the 1999 version and constitutes a major procedural protection against a historical practical issue that has been bedeviling FIDIC contracts perennially. Of importance, however, is the introduction of this deemed acceptance mechanism since it abolishes the vacuum of uncertainty that was present in 1999 contracts where any reference to Engineer non-determination created a transient state of limbo with no apparent repercussion.

Another significant shift that entirely redefines the role of the institution is associated with the development of the role of the DAAB further related to the proactive avoidance of disputes as opposed to the reactive adjudication. The DAB in the 1999 version is basically a tribunal that is forbidden to make decisions to settle disputes after they have crystallized between the disputants. This is a reactive and post-dispute role: a dispute has first to be recognized, claims have to be made and the DAB then decides the issue, in respect of the evidence provided by the disputing parties. The 2017 version, especially Sub-Cluster 8.3 (Early Warning) and Sub-Cluster 21.1 (Dispute Avoidance/Adjudication Board), transforms the role of the DAAB to take the form of proactive prevention of disputes. The DAAB has the mandate of holding early warning meetings and coordinating philosophical problem solving activities prior to the formalization of disputes into claims that need to be adjudicated. It is a radical redefining of the DAAB as a post-dispute adjudicator to a pre-dispute facilitator and mediator.

The systematic Early Warning System that is introduced in the 2017 version, which is not present in the 1999 version, shows a general tendency to proactive dispute management and common problem-solving. Sub-Clause 8.3 of the 2017 edition specifies that every party should inform the other one about the act, omission, occurrence, or circumstances which could influence the work, the cost, or time of completion. This is not a mere courtesy notice, rather it is a contractual obligation in breach of which will put the non-notifying party into a possible liability of other additional costs and time liabilities which the other party may have incurred due to the failure to warn. The 1999 version has no similar systematic requirement but it has depended on the cooperation and the goodwill of the parties.

One such clarification that was made in the 2017 edition concerns what has come to be known as the Persero gap a key ambiguity in the 1999 edition of the rule, which governs the enforcement of binding non-final decisions of the DAB. Among the 1999 edition stipulates (in Sub-Clause 20.4) that a decision of DAB is binding on both Parties, who will immediately execute it. Nonetheless, Sub-Clause 20.7 gives either party the right to give a Notice of Dissatisfaction (NOD), breaching which acceptance is no longer a final decision but rather referred to arbitration.However, to what extent does this lack clarity: once one party has failed to uphold a binding yet non-final decision, how can that party be enforced to comply with it? The 2017 edition fills this gap by explicitly stating in Sub-Clause 21.3 that a separate arbitration proceeding may be sought only to seek to enforce compliance of a previous decision by the DAAB and, in Sub-Clause 21.5(c) that defaulting party con may initiate arbitration whilst seeking the enforcement of compliance under a previous arbitration decision by the DAAB.

The shortening of the amicable settlement period of the 1999 edition by 56 days (Sub-Clause 20.5) to 28 days in the 2017 edition (Sub-Clause 21.4) is a manifestation of the intention of FIDIC to hasten the process of resolving disputes. All these factors, together with the 42-day Engineer determination period and the dispute avoidance mechanisms, bring about the timeline of claims processing and dispute resolution in the 2017 edition being more tightly regulated, which causes pressure in the ethical timeline of earlier resolution and less time on the unresolved disputes. Such a speed is essential especially when conducting construction projects where the time loss in dealing with conflict exacerbates financial risk and programme influence.

In the 2017 edition, Contractor and Employer claims are furthermore accorded more equal treatment, having the same treatment under identical determination and dispute processes and with the same timeframes and decision-making criteria, unlike the naturally asymmetric FIDIC contractor-heavy drafting tradition of 1999. Although this symmetry is not explicitly pointed to, it is a significant advance in more balanced sharing of risks and procedural fairness. The 2017 approach acknowledges both sides might well have valid claims that would be entitled to the same degree of procedural protection and clarity.

Nevertheless, the sentence with the statement of no significant change has a kernel of truth that cannot be fully discounted. The foundational interest towards a multi-level dispute resolution system is the same: Engineer determination (or, in 2017, Engineer claims decision) results in DAAB determination in case of persistence of disputes, which ends up in arbitration. In both editions the principle of pay now, argue later, that contractors must have interim relief pending the determination, on the merits, of the dispute, is preserved. The rule of ruling out litigation, and the tendency of ruling out litigation and favoring arbitration as the ultimate venue has not been altered. There are no changes in substantive principles controlling burden of proof, applicable law, and remedies in the editions. In this fundamental meaning, the dispute resolution structure under the carpet is similarly familiar in both versions, and someone who was used to 1999 FIDIC dispute resolution would be able to perceive the necessary structure in 2017.

The closest description of the correlation between FIDIC 1999 and 2017 dispute resolution processes will be that major procedural improvements have been overlaid over a robust underlying framework. The 2017 version does not abandon the multi-tiered approach or the DAB/DAAB mechanism but rather, perfects and reinforces these institutions by providing more explicit timeframes, succinct institutional functions, positive mechanisms of avoiding conflicts and addressing the enforcement channel. These changes are of great importance to practitioners in the daily day-to-day contract administration and dispute management and will make a material difference on how parties to a contract handle disputes and claims. The continuities might seem dominant to analyze the philosophy of dispute resolution proposed by FIDIC theoretically. The sentence in question confuses the two facets of thought by arguing that things are the same when procedural specificity shows the presence of significant change.

To summarize, the suggestion that FIDIC 2017 has presented no major change to the dispute resolution as opposed to 1999 is misleading and ought not be accepted. A more descriptive fact would be to recognise the continuity and the change: not only the basic tiered structure of 1999 is preserved but fundamental changes in procedure are fundamental to clear institutional roles of dispute avoidance and substantial resolutions of ambiguities found in 20 years of practice. These reforms relate to actual shortcomings of the 1999 version, which were demonstrated by the Persero lawsuit and ongoing practical conflict over Engineer determination schedule and enforcement of DAB.

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