Final Research Proposal: Political Polarization and Protesting Behaviours in the BLM Movement
Final Research Proposal: Political Polarization and Protesting Behaviours in the BLM Movement
Introduction
In the aftermath of the Trump Era, an ever-widening chasm has emerged between proponents of mainstream political ideologies; both amongst political candidates, and the general US population (Bttcher et al., 2020). As opposed to past decades, the median voter today represents an increasingly smaller proportion of society a phenomenon termed political polarisation (Bttcher et al., 2020). For example, Schaffner et al. (2018) found that the 2016 US election yielded the largest difference in vote preferences between whites based on education level in over three decades; with non-college educated whites overwhelming skewing Republican. Of note, at least two-thirds of this divide was found to be linked to attitudes regarding race and gender, with non-college educated whites exhibiting significantly more non-progressive beliefs. This is significant, as in conjunction with the observed rise in political polarisation there has been a recent increase in protests regarding the racially charged Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement (Green et al., 2021); an issue which has been identified as politically polarising (Updegrove et al., 2020).
Specifically, Updegrove et al. (2020) found that Republicans and conservatives were up to 2.6 times more likely to oppose the BLM movement than other demographics. Additionally, states were more likely to oppose BLM if the 2012 Republican candidate won the vote by a greater majority. Moreover, Miller at al. (2021) found that individuals who opposed BLM demonstrated higher levels of racism and greater support for All Lives Matter or Blue Lives Matter (both movements created in direct opposition of BLM), with inverse beliefs correlated with greater support for BLM. Whilst on the surface, Miller et al.s (2021) study does not appear to exemplify political polarisation, other studies have linked racism and support for Blue Lives Matter to support for Republican political candidates. Notably, Drakulich et al. (2020) described a dog-whistle effect whereby claims of supporting Blue Lives Matter were tied to votes for Trump, predominantly amongst individuals who expressed greater levels of racial resentment. Effectively, these studies overwhelmingly demonstrate that BLM is a polarising issue with strong political ties. Of further interest; the apparent concurrence of (i) the recently observed rise in BLM protests, and (ii) the increasingly polarised landscape of modern US politics, suggests a possible direct link between the two phenomena.
In establishing a theoretical link between political polarisation and protesting behaviours, there are several interrelated concepts which warrant mention. First, political polarisation has been linked to a rise in individual polarised beliefs; where it is becoming increasingly common for individuals to align with more extreme partisan views as opposed to moderate, or centrist ideologies (Bttcher et al., 2020). Effectively, individual polarization manifests in a total fixation on a single viewpoint, such that any competing perspectives are completely disregarded (Hoffman et al., 2016). A key example of this which has also increased over recent decades is affective polarisation; where self-identified Democrats or Republicans exhibit a tendency to more favourably view copartisans, whilst reserving negative opinions nigh exclusively for opposing partisans (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Moreover, polarised individuals may often seek out others with shared beliefs, leading to the formation of a polarised group based on in-group bias (Keum & Miller, 2018). When such group polarisation is related to specific political beliefs, this can sometimes result in politicised identities; where collective identities become politicised in order to achieve collective action (van Stekelenburg and Klanderman, 2013). In achieving a politicised identity, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) describe a collective process; where first, an individual becomes aware of grievances shared by other group members, followed by the blaming of an external enemy, and ultimately resulting in a power struggle whereby the group demands some form of compensation from the enemy. This translates near perfectly to the case in the recent BLM movement: shared grievances take the form of systemic oppression and racism (Hoffman et al., 2016), the external enemy is predominantly the police (as a consequence of alleged police brutality), and the claims for compensation are largely demands for police reform (Vaughan, 2021). Crucially, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) note that the more politicised a group member is, the more likely it is that they will engage in active political behaviour, such as protest.
Whilst several studies have been conducted in the aftermath of the 2020 BLM protests, the vast majority have focused on the topics of news media framing (e.g., Banks, 2018), social media engagement (e.g., Kilgo & Mouro), and attitudes regarding racism (e.g., Hunt et al., 2021). However, it has yet to be established whether the recent reports of an increase in political polarisation, particularly in the United States, might be linked to the recently observed increase in protests surrounding key political issues; most notably, the BLM protests. In light of recent studies which have identified BLM as being a politically polarising issue (Updegrove et al., 2020), this research proposal seeks to explore this potential gap in the literature.
As such, the present proposal aims to investigate whether an increase in political polarisation is correlated with an increase in protesting around political issues; specifically, in the case of the recent BLM protests. In the context of the recently observed growth in political polarisation and in conjunction with existing literature on the connections between polarisation, politicised identity, and protesting it is thus likely that people who engage in protesting behaviours will express significantly more polarised political views than people who do not engage in protests. Subsequently, in the case of the proposed study, it is hypothesised that supporters of the BLM movement who attended recent protests will have significantly more polarised political views than BLM supporters who did not attend any protests.
Method
Participants
Since it has been reported that as many as 26 million individuals participated in the 2020 BLM protests across the United States (Oborne & Cooke, 2020), a minimum sample size of at least 385 participants is recommended to achieve a representative sample with a 95% CI. However, since the proposed study needs to additionally account for people who did not participate in the protests, the sample size will effectively need to be doubled to maintain an even ratio of participants. Hence, the study aims to recruit a total of 770 participants (385 protestors; 385 non-protestors). Participants will be recruited via social media, and offered a monetary incentive for participation ($20 USD). Participants must be permanent residents of the United States, and must have lived there for the duration of 2020. Additionally, participants must be at least 18 years of age. Though there is no upper age limit, participants must not have any underlying health conditions which might prevent them from partaking in physical activity (i.e., protesting). Most importantly, all participants should be supporters of BLM.
Materials
To measure the extent of polarisation in participants, a questionnaire will need to be developed and administered. Following recommendations from Greene (2002), a multi-item measure will be used for greatest efficacy. Furthermore, Greene (2002) suggests that when assessing partisan attitudes, it is important that respondents should rate both political parties as opposed to just one in order to fully assess individual polarisation. Additionally, it is pertinent to consider Iyengar & Westwoods (2015) description of affective polarisation; where polarised individuals more favourably view copartisans, and more negatively view opposing partisans; when developing questions.
Hence, a 5-point Likert scale comprised of 15 polarising political statements centred on both dominant US political parties (the Democratic Party and the Republican Party) will be administered to all participants, where scoring will occur based on degree of agreement (i.e., least polarised = neutral; most polarised = strongly agree/disagree). Specifically, a neutral response would receive a score of 0, slightly agree/disagree would receive a score of 1, and a strongly agree/disagree response would receive a score of 2. As such, the minimum possible score, and thus the least polarised score, would be 0 (comprised entirely of neutral responses); and the maximum possible, or most polarised score, would be 30 (comprised entirely of strongly agree/disagree responses). A sample question on the scale might be: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Democrats are considerate of others. On the basis of Iyengar & Westwoods (2015) description of affective polarisation, a highly polarised Democrat is likely to select strongly agree (scoring 2 points), whereas a highly polarised Republican would probably select strongly disagree; similarly scoring 2 points. 5 additional non-polarising questions will be included in the survey (though not scored) in order to assess whether participants completed the survey validly. A sample non-scored question might be: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Yellow is a primary colour. Since there is only one correct answer to this question, it is anticipated that all respondents should select strongly agree for this question. Participants who do not select strongly agree will be removed from the final data analysis due to of invalid data. The total summed score of all 15 assessable questions will be used to determine level of polarisation for each participant. These scores will then be compared to each other to determine whether supporters of the BLM movement who attended protests expressed more politically polarised views than BLM supporters who did not attend any protests.
Procedure
In order to determine whether polarisation is related to the action of protesting, the independent variable must be participation in protest. As such, subjects will be categorised into two groups: (i) supporters of BLM who participated in the recent BLM protests, and (ii) supporters of BLM who did not participate in protests. Support of BLM acts as a controlled variable, as by controlling for individual attitudes, one is more effectively able to identify whether differences in protest behaviour is associated with polarisation. Essentially, if support for BLM is not controlled, it is possible that many respondents would not have participated in the protests simply because they were not concerned or did not support the movement, thus limiting the studys ability to validly examine protesting behaviour in relation to level of individual polarisation.
Before commencing the survey, participants will be informed that the study relates to the recent BLM protests, as well as the current US political climate. The concept of political polarisation will not be explicitly mentioned, so as not to influence the respondents. Participants will additionally be informed of the possible mental health impacts of protesting (see Green et al., 2021) and as such, participants will be notified that they are able to withdraw from the study at any point preceding or during the survey. At the start of the survey, participants will be screened for support of BLM; respondents who do not indicate support of BLM will not be permitted to complete the survey. Additionally, participants will be asked whether they were physically able to partake in protesting behaviours; with respondents who indicate no not permitted to complete the survey. Participants will be asked to provide their age, gender, political alignment (i.e., conservative, liberal, or moderate), and whether they attended any of the 2020 BLM protests. Participants will be given unlimited time to complete the survey, within the margins of the study start-date and deadline. Finally, participants will be debriefed at the end of the survey, and provided with links to mental health resources in case they experienced any adverse reaction during the survey.
Analysis
An independent samples t-test will be utilised to compare the mean polarisation scores of the two groups (protesters vs non-protesters), in order to determine whether any observed difference in the results of the two group means is statistically significant. In the event that the results obtained do not meet one or more of the assumptions of a t-test, a Mann-Whitney U test will be utilised instead.
References
Banks, C. (2018). Disciplining Black activism: post-racial rhetoric, public memory and decorum in news media framing of the Black Lives Matter movement. Continuum, 32(6), 709-720. https://doi.org/10.1080/10304312.2018.1525920Bttcher, L., Montealegre, P., Goles, E., & Gersbach, H. (2020). Competing activistsPolitical polarization. Physica A, 545, Article 123713. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2019.123713Green, D. A., Williams, B. A., & Park, K. (2021). Crisis counseling for Black Lives Matter protests. Journal of Mental Health Counseling, 43(3), 198-211. https://doi.org/10.17744/mehc.43.3.03Greene, S. (2002). The Social-Psychological Measurement of Partisanship. Political Behavior, 24(3), 171-197. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558395Hoffman, L., Granger Jr., N., Vallejos, L., & Moats, M. (2016). An existential humanistic perspective on Black Lives Matter and contemporary protest movements. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 56(6), 595-611. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167816652273Hunt, J. S., Folberg, A. M., & Ryan, C. S. (2021). Tolerance of racism: A new construct that predicts failure to recognize and confront racism. European Journal of Social Psychology, 00, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2759Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 690-707. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12152Keum, B. T., & Miller, M. J. (2018). Racism on the internet: Conceptualization and recommendations for research. Psychology of Violence, 8(6), 782-791. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/vio0000201Kilgo, D. K., & Mouro, R., R. (2021). Protest coverage matters: How media framing and visual communication affects support for Black civil rights protests. Mass Communication and Society, 24(4), 576-596. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2021.1884724Oborne, P., & Cooke, M. (2020). Reflections on the Black Lives Matter movement. The Round Table, 109(5), 612-613. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2020.1820218Schaffner, B. F., Macwilliams, M., & Nteta, T. (2018). Understanding white polarization in the 2016 vote for president: The sobering role of racism and sexism. Political Science Quarterly, 133(1), 9-34. https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12737Updegrove, A. H., Cooper, M. N., Orrick, E. A., & Piquero, A. R. (2020). Red states and black lives: Applying the racial threat hypothesis to the Black Lives Matter movement. Justice Quarterly, 37(1), 85-108. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2018.1516797van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (2013). The social psychology of protest. Current Sociology Review, 61(5-6), 886-905. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392113479314Vaughan, A. G. (2021). Phenomenology of the trickster archetype, U.S. electoral politics and the Black Lives Matter movement. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 66(3), 695-718. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5922.12698
Final Research Proposal: Political Polarization and Protesting Behaviours in the BLM Movement
Introduction
In the aftermath of the Trump Era, an ever-widening chasm has emerged between proponents of mainstream political ideologies; both amongst political candidates, and the general US population (Bttcher et al., 2020). As opposed to past decades, the median voter today represents an increasingly smaller proportion of society a phenomenon termed political polarisation (Bttcher et al., 2020). For example, Schaffner et al. (2018) found that the 2016 US election yielded the largest difference in vote preferences between whites based on education level in over three decades; with non-college educated whites overwhelming skewing Republican. Of note, at least two-thirds of this divide was found to be linked to attitudes regarding race and gender, with non-college educated whites exhibiting significantly more non-progressive beliefs. This is significant, as in conjunction with the observed rise in political polarisation there has been a recent increase in protests regarding the racially charged Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement (Green et al., 2021); an issue which has been identified as politically polarising (Updegrove et al., 2020).
Specifically, Updegrove et al. (2020) found that Republicans and conservatives were up to 2.6 times more likely to oppose the BLM movement than other demographics. Additionally, states were more likely to oppose BLM if the 2012 Republican candidate won the vote by a greater majority. Moreover, Miller at al. (2021) found that individuals who opposed BLM demonstrated higher levels of racism and greater support for All Lives Matter or Blue Lives Matter (both movements created in direct opposition of BLM), with inverse beliefs correlated with greater support for BLM. Whilst on the surface, Miller et al.s (2021) study does not appear to exemplify political polarisation, other studies have linked racism and support for Blue Lives Matter to support for Republican political candidates. Notably, Drakulich et al. (2020) described a dog-whistle effect whereby claims of supporting Blue Lives Matter were tied to votes for Trump, predominantly amongst individuals who expressed greater levels of racial resentment. Effectively, these studies overwhelmingly demonstrate that BLM is a polarising issue with strong political ties. Of further interest; the apparent concurrence of (i) the recently observed rise in BLM protests, and (ii) the increasingly polarised landscape of modern US politics, suggests a possible direct link between the two phenomena.
In establishing a theoretical link between political polarisation and protesting behaviours, there are several interrelated concepts which warrant mention. First, political polarisation has been linked to a rise in individual polarised beliefs; where it is becoming increasingly common for individuals to align with more extreme partisan views as opposed to moderate, or centrist ideologies (Bttcher et al., 2020). Effectively, individual polarization manifests in a total fixation on a single viewpoint, such that any competing perspectives are completely disregarded (Hoffman et al., 2016). A key example of this which has also increased over recent decades is affective polarisation; where self-identified Democrats or Republicans exhibit a tendency to more favourably view copartisans, whilst reserving negative opinions nigh exclusively for opposing partisans (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Moreover, polarised individuals may often seek out others with shared beliefs, leading to the formation of a polarised group based on in-group bias (Keum & Miller, 2018). When such group polarisation is related to specific political beliefs, this can sometimes result in politicised identities; where collective identities become politicised in order to achieve collective action (van Stekelenburg and Klanderman, 2013). In achieving a politicised identity, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) describe a collective process; where first, an individual becomes aware of grievances shared by other group members, followed by the blaming of an external enemy, and ultimately resulting in a power struggle whereby the group demands some form of compensation from the enemy. This translates near perfectly to the case in the recent BLM movement: shared grievances take the form of systemic oppression and racism (Hoffman et al., 2016), the external enemy is predominantly the police (as a consequence of alleged police brutality), and the claims for compensation are largely demands for police reform (Vaughan, 2021). Crucially, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) note that the more politicised a group member is, the more likely it is that they will engage in active political behaviour, such as protest.
Whilst several studies have been conducted in the aftermath of the 2020 BLM protests, the vast majority have focused on the topics of news media framing (e.g., Banks, 2018), social media engagement (e.g., Kilgo & Mouro), and attitudes regarding racism (e.g., Hunt et al., 2021). However, it has yet to be established whether the recent reports of an increase in political polarisation, particularly in the United States, might be linked to the recently observed increase in protests surrounding key political issues; most notably, the BLM protests. In light of recent studies which have identified BLM as being a politically polarising issue (Updegrove et al., 2020), this research proposal seeks to explore this potential gap in the literature.
As such, the present proposal aims to investigate whether an increase in political polarisation is correlated with an increase in protesting around political issues; specifically, in the case of the recent BLM protests. In the context of the recently observed growth in political polarisation and in conjunction with existing literature on the connections between polarisation, politicised identity, and protesting it is thus likely that people who engage in protesting behaviours will express significantly more polarised political views than people who do not engage in protests. Subsequently, in the case of the proposed study, it is hypothesised that supporters of the BLM movement who attended recent protests will have significantly more polarised political views than BLM supporters who did not attend any protests.
Method
Participants
Since it has been reported that as many as 26 million individuals participated in the 2020 BLM protests across the United States (Oborne & Cooke, 2020), a minimum sample size of at least 385 participants is recommended to achieve a representative sample with a 95% CI. However, since the proposed study needs to additionally account for people who did not participate in the protests, the sample size will effectively need to be doubled to maintain an even ratio of participants. Hence, the study aims to recruit a total of 770 participants (385 protestors; 385 non-protestors). Participants will be recruited via social media, and offered a monetary incentive for participation ($20 USD). Participants must be permanent residents of the United States, and must have lived there for the duration of 2020. Additionally, participants must be at least 18 years of age. Though there is no upper age limit, participants must not have any underlying health conditions which might prevent them from partaking in physical activity (i.e., protesting). Most importantly, all participants should be supporters of BLM.
Materials
To measure the extent of polarisation in participants, a questionnaire will need to be developed and administered. Following recommendations from Greene (2002), a multi-item measure will be used for greatest efficacy. Furthermore, Greene (2002) suggests that when assessing partisan attitudes, it is important that respondents should rate both political parties as opposed to just one in order to fully assess individual polarisation. Additionally, it is pertinent to consider Iyengar & Westwoods (2015) description of affective polarisation; where polarised individuals more favourably view copartisans, and more negatively view opposing partisans; when developing questions.
Hence, a 5-point Likert scale comprised of 15 polarising political statements centred on both dominant US political parties (the Democratic Party and the Republican Party) will be administered to all participants, where scoring will occur based on degree of agreement (i.e., least polarised = neutral; most polarised = strongly agree/disagree). Specifically, a neutral response would receive a score of 0, slightly agree/disagree would receive a score of 1, and a strongly agree/disagree response would receive a score of 2. As such, the minimum possible score, and thus the least polarised score, would be 0 (comprised entirely of neutral responses); and the maximum possible, or most polarised score, would be 30 (comprised entirely of strongly agree/disagree responses). A sample question on the scale might be: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Democrats are considerate of others. On the basis of Iyengar & Westwoods (2015) description of affective polarisation, a highly polarised Democrat is likely to select strongly agree (scoring 2 points), whereas a highly polarised Republican would probably select strongly disagree; similarly scoring 2 points. 5 additional non-polarising questions will be included in the survey (though not scored) in order to assess whether participants completed the survey validly. A sample non-scored question might be: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Yellow is a primary colour. Since there is only one correct answer to this question, it is anticipated that all respondents should select strongly agree for this question. Participants who do not select strongly agree will be removed from the final data analysis due to of invalid data. The total summed score of all 15 assessable questions will be used to determine level of polarisation for each participant. These scores will then be compared to each other to determine whether supporters of the BLM movement who attended protests expressed more politically polarised views than BLM supporters who did not attend any protests.
Procedure
In order to determine whether polarisation is related to the action of protesting, the independent variable must be participation in protest. As such, subjects will be categorised into two groups: (i) supporters of BLM who participated in the recent BLM protests, and (ii) supporters of BLM who did not participate in protests. Support of BLM acts as a controlled variable, as by controlling for individual attitudes, one is more effectively able to identify whether differences in protest behaviour is associated with polarisation. Essentially, if support for BLM is not controlled, it is possible that many respondents would not have participated in the protests simply because they were not concerned or did not support the movement, thus limiting the studys ability to validly examine protesting behaviour in relation to level of individual polarisation.
Before commencing the survey, participants will be informed that the study relates to the recent BLM protests, as well as the current US political climate. The concept of political polarisation will not be explicitly mentioned, so as not to influence the respondents. Participants will additionally be informed of the possible mental health impacts of protesting (see Green et al., 2021) and as such, participants will be notified that they are able to withdraw from the study at any point preceding or during the survey. At the start of the survey, participants will be screened for support of BLM; respondents who do not indicate support of BLM will not be permitted to complete the survey. Additionally, participants will be asked whether they were physically able to partake in protesting behaviours; with respondents who indicate no not permitted to complete the survey. Participants will be asked to provide their age, gender, political alignment (i.e., conservative, liberal, or moderate), and whether they attended any of the 2020 BLM protests. Participants will be given unlimited time to complete the survey, within the margins of the study start-date and deadline. Finally, participants will be debriefed at the end of the survey, and provided with links to mental health resources in case they experienced any adverse reaction during the survey.
Analysis
An independent samples t-test will be utilised to compare the mean polarisation scores of the two groups (protesters vs non-protesters), in order to determine whether any observed difference in the results of the two group means is statistically significant. In the event that the results obtained do not meet one or more of the assumptions of a t-test, a Mann-Whitney U test will be utilised instead.
References
Banks, C. (2018). Disciplining Black activism: post-racial rhetoric, public memory and decorum in news media framing of the Black Lives Matter movement. Continuum, 32(6), 709-720. https://doi.org/10.1080/10304312.2018.1525920Bttcher, L., Montealegre, P., Goles, E., & Gersbach, H. (2020). Competing activistsPolitical polarization. Physica A, 545, Article 123713. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2019.123713Green, D. A., Williams, B. A., & Park, K. (2021). Crisis counseling for Black Lives Matter protests. Journal of Mental Health Counseling, 43(3), 198-211. https://doi.org/10.17744/mehc.43.3.03Greene, S. (2002). The Social-Psychological Measurement of Partisanship. Political Behavior, 24(3), 171-197. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558395Hoffman, L., Granger Jr., N., Vallejos, L., & Moats, M. (2016). An existential humanistic perspective on Black Lives Matter and contemporary protest movements. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 56(6), 595-611. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167816652273Hunt, J. S., Folberg, A. M., & Ryan, C. S. (2021). Tolerance of racism: A new construct that predicts failure to recognize and confront racism. European Journal of Social Psychology, 00, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2759Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 690-707. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12152Keum, B. T., & Miller, M. J. (2018). Racism on the internet: Conceptualization and recommendations for research. Psychology of Violence, 8(6), 782-791. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/vio0000201Kilgo, D. K., & Mouro, R., R. (2021). Protest coverage matters: How media framing and visual communication affects support for Black civil rights protests. Mass Communication and Society, 24(4), 576-596. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2021.1884724Oborne, P., & Cooke, M. (2020). Reflections on the Black Lives Matter movement. The Round Table, 109(5), 612-613. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2020.1820218Schaffner, B. F., Macwilliams, M., & Nteta, T. (2018). Understanding white polarization in the 2016 vote for president: The sobering role of racism and sexism. Political Science Quarterly, 133(1), 9-34. https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12737Updegrove, A. H., Cooper, M. N., Orrick, E. A., & Piquero, A. R. (2020). Red states and black lives: Applying the racial threat hypothesis to the Black Lives Matter movement. Justice Quarterly, 37(1), 85-108. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2018.1516797van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (2013). The social psychology of protest. Current Sociology Review, 61(5-6), 886-905. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392113479314Vaughan, A. G. (2021). Phenomenology of the trickster archetype, U.S. electoral politics and the Black Lives Matter movement. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 66(3), 695-718. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5922.12698
101683 Social Psychology Mid-semester Exam Information It is an open book test available on vUWS in the Mid Semester Exam folder in Week 7.
It is utterly fine to refer to notes and texts to remind yourself of specific details from a body of material that you have already mastered (you wont have time to learn material from scratch in two hours). We all check material in professional contexts (an analogy might be a physician checking a text before confirming a diagnosis). Content The exam will cover all lecture, textbook and tutorial content (week 1 to week 6). Some tutorials (e.g., weeks 3 and 5 especially) amplify or provide background to ideas as does the week 1 lectures. However, you wont be asked questions that can only be answered by referring to the content of tutorials and the Week 1 lecture (but the Week 1 lecture and tutorial activities should help you understand some content). There will be a total of 60 questions, and you will have 90 minutes to complete the exam from the time you start unless you have an AIP adjustment that covers in-class tests. 12 questions will come from each of the following categories. Social Cognition, Perceiving Others, The Self, Attitudes and Attitude Change, and Social Influence All questions are drawn from the textbook material and most of those questions (around 2/3) are drawn from topics covered in detail in the lectures. A rough guide is that if you knew the lecture content and had never opened the text book you could probably obtain a pass mark (50%) if you answered around 70% of those questions correctly (and guess a few others). To obtain a credit or better you will need to have a broader knowledge of the material. A practice quiz is available with a total of ten questions. There are also some example questions below. Timing and Setup
Please ensure you have a good internet connection and a quiet space to avoid distractions You need to commence the exam between the hours of 6am to 11.59pm Tuesday of Week 7. I will monitor my email for issues about the exam during those hours (if you start at 11.59pm it seems the vUWS system will still allow you to start and allow you until 1.29am Wednesday to finish but if you have any problems after midnight I wont see your email until it is too late). I would recommend starting before 10pm. In every case you need to commence the exam before 11.59pm Tuesday Week 7. I plan for the AIP exams (with appropriate timing) to be delivered through the same link but I need to test that that works. Collusion
The exam is not invigilated but you must complete the exam independently of other people. Do not record or copy questions or answers, do not ask other people for answers, do not share questions or answers. Most students completing this unit are completing this unit with a view to gaining a professional qualification in psychology. Psychologists, and other professionals, are required by society to act with integrity. We dont want people who get other people do tests for them, or people who help other people avoid doing their own tests, to be accredited as psychologists (would you want to send your relative to a psych who had not sat their own tests?). Based on past experience across the university we expect a small number of students to attempt to collude with others. It is important, however, that you act with integrity. It is also important that you dont help people gain qualifications to which they are not entitled. If other students do approach you to collude with them we suggest that you instead encourage them to act with integrity and focus on exam preparations that involve mastering the material. We dont mark to a distribution. If one student does well on the exam that cannot affect the mark awarded to any other student. It follows that there are no problems at all with collaborative revision and peer learning BEFORE the test. If other students are apprehensive about their performance and you wish to help them, or gain mutual benefit by revising with them, then that is perfectly acceptable and that collaboration may help to build interpersonal learning skills for all involved. As soon as either you, or they, commence that exam all collaboration must stop. Also bear in mind that if you do collude with other students then you and those other students will be acting without integrity. You will know that you are acting without integrity and the people who you have colluded with will know that you have acted without integrity. The question arises as to whether it is safe to trust persons who have not acted with integrity (who may have physical evidence of your collusion and may not end up gaining the qualification they are pursuing) not to reveal information about you if they are caught. It is not worth the risk even if you dont buy the arguments about integrity. We have done a few things in the exam set up to make collusion less effective. You wont have exactly the same questions, in the same order of questions and answers as any other student. We have tried to avoid taking steps that would make it harder for students who are doing the exam independently and the University is doing its best to avoid invigilated online exams. Your time is better spent revising than developing methods of collusion that may be ineffective. To sum up, those points. Collusion in exams is a problem, left unchecked it is likely to be a fairly small problem, with your help it can be a negligible problem and, if it is, that is good for you, and good for the world. Helpful Tips Most questions will fall into one of the following three categories 1) Definition questions. You will be required to provide the correct explanation/definition of a theory
2) Applied questions. You will need to apply a particular social psych theory to a real-world example.
3) Key studies. You will be required to have a thorough understanding of the key studies in the field. I recommend proceeding through the exam and answering all the questions you are confident about and then coming back to the ones you are not sure of. The software will automatically submit your answers after two hours so you want to be sure that you have all of the marks you can get in the bag and avoid getting tied down on the tricky ones. All questions are of equal value so get the quick ones out of the way. As time is limited for revision focus on the lectures first and then the related text book material and then turn your attention to a broader coverage
Sample multiple choice exam questions (these questions are very close to the form used in the exam): A political candidate is preparing a speech about an election issue. According to what you have learned so far in this unit, which of the following is NOT an important factor for the candidate to consider: a) the audiences involvement or interest in the issue b) the audiences mood c) the candidates image d) the size of the audience Answer: D According to the Theory of Planned Behaviour, the best predictors of behavioural intentions are a) attitudes toward the situation, subjective perceptions, and perceived behavioural norms b) emotional evaluations and cognitive beliefs c) attitudes toward the behaviour, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control d) attitudes toward the behaviour norms, beliefs about the behaviour, and perceived behavioural control Answer: C A persons action is most informative when the behaviour a) is coerced b) departs from norms c) is discounted d) is in-role Answer: b
