How do new forthcoming businesses' business strategies impact their performance as well as established business prospects in the photography sector?

How do new forthcoming businesses' business strategies impact their performance as well as established business prospects in the photography sector?

Tutor: Sylvester MujakperuoStudent: Kashish Mehrotra

ID: 01160794

Changes made to the dissertation based on previous feedback:

The topic of the dissertation has been corrected and constructed well therefore the changes. This dissertation also now includes Harvard style, in-text citations. There has been in-depth changes made to the literature review which now focuses more on the topic itself instead of photography. Appropriate theoretical framework has been added. The methodology research gap explaining why the research on these brands are lacking. The other section sections have also been discussed in more depth. A study on forth coming businesses business strategies impact their performance as well as established business prospects in the photography sector.

Abstract:

There are no assurances that businesses, regardless of their industry, will continue to be successful. Change in business strategy can range from minor adjustments to management practices to major overhauls of the goods and services a firm provides. We already know corporations like Kodak, Yashica and Rolleiflex, failed to adapt to market changes, which contributed to their demise. While conventional photography still has many reasons to be preferred today, digital photography does have certain advantages of its own. Traditional photography may be more practical than digital image for a persons goals. Additionally, classic photography offers images with a more conventional appearance and feel. Finally, various people have a propensity to choose conventional photography, since it may be more inclusive and rewarding, according to an overall viewpoint. Many businesses have attempted to manage mild failure influencing cessation, liquidation, during the course of the past several years. Incomprehensibly, research on common failure has revolved around the justification for distinct types of levelling out failure. The environment transformed evaluation criteria around Kodak Companys collusion failure as necessary. For almost ten years, the company has been facing financial disaster. It was formerly the largest film studio in the whole globe. In any event, taking into consideration different aspects, the corporation has run into several problems that have led to a commercial collapse.

Table of Contents

TOC o "1-3" h z u AbstractIntroductionResearch AimResearch questionLiterature reviewA brief introduction to Photography IndustryThe Contribution of Kodak to the History of TechnologyDevelopment of the Kodak CameraKodachrome PhotographyExplanations behind Kodak's Company Business FailureDigital revolutionYashicas FailureRolleiflexOther dead brandsMinoltaThe USSR PAGEREF _Toc111758568 h OlympusMethodologyResearch GapAnalysis and discussionConstant Need for Change in Photographic IndustryBrand Switching Behavior of ConsumersCompanies Changing Marketing StrategyChange and the Product Life CycleExternal Factors in Marketing StrategiesDiscussionLessons from KodakConclusion and recommendationsRecommendationsConclusionReferences

Introduction:

Innovation is crucial because it gives businesses and organisations long-lasting advantages. (Hamel, 2006)

It enables a company to expand and enhance its current product line while laying the foundation for the future. Companies that formerly revolutionised certain markets and held a monopoly, eventually lost their way to competitors that can bring better product ideas, provide substitute goods and services, and/or reduce manufacturing costs. Innovation occurs deliberately and intentionally for some commercial enterprises. It is ingrained in an organisation's continuing research and development efforts on a cultural level. Other times, innovation occurs as a direct result of a triggering event, such as a shift in the internal or external performance of the market that necessitates a shift in corporate strategy (Wheelen & Hunger, 1998). The failure to maintain market leadership, the discontinuance of a formerly highly successful product line, or, in the worst case scenario, the failure of the business itself, can all be important effects of creative destruction (Gershon , R.A. 2013). One of the main points is that warning indications of a failing corporation frequently persist for extended periods of time before they come together with favourable circumstances to result in a severe corporate disaster (Couins, 2019).

These businesses, Kodak, Yashica, Rolleiflex were chosen because they had firsthand experience with a disruptive technology's consequences, which eventually led to business failure. Digital Photography is unquestionably the best option if you are motivated to create original and innovative images. In comparison to conventional photography, value production and value appropriation in digital photography have significantly changed (Gregory, P. 2006). In conventional photography, the photographer creates the image and typically, provides it to the consumer after a short period of time. The image has now been delivered to the consumer, who is free to use it as they wish (Friedman, A. Ross, D.S, 2003). In digital photography however, the picture from the companion is taken in as many instances as possible. The photographer might give the client the option to utilise the shot, but the client really demonstrates the authenticity of the photo. Since the transition, earning money from photography has become steadily compelling (Gregory, P. 2006).

There are a few clear ways that photographers might adapt to this new environment. Selling printouts of their art rather than digital files in one strategy. This enables the photographer to maintain some level of control over the image and the standard procedure. Another strategy is to concentrate on selling rights to use the image rather than selling stock images. Given that the user must purchase a new honour each time they need to use the image, this is a legitimately persuasive method of payment. The greatest strategy for monetizing digital photography will ultimately rely on the photographer and their group. Some photographers may believe that the only viable method of earning money is through the sale of prints, while others may believe that the sale of licences is truly compelling development (Prenatt, 2015). Testing and experimentation will be used to determine which structure is the best. The shift to digital photography has undoubtedly had an impact on the stakeholders in the conventional photographic industry (Prenatt, 2015). Photographers may earn decent wages by selling reproductions of their art from a long time ago.

Todays significant global breakthroughs are the consequence of the diligent labour of American scholars. One of the industries that have benefited from the contributions of American trailblazers is photography. Today, it is common culture to start with one side of the globe and go onto the next, with the exception of previewing any position and keeping in mind that studying technical advancements in photography. After a while, the possibility of the camera vanishes, with historians tracing its demise to the eighteenth century, when contributors to the essential advancement of photography included persons like George Eastman (Gershon, R.A 2013). He utilised the iconic Kodak camera from the twentieth century. For an incredible amount of time, Kodak held the top spot in the photographic industry. It battled valiantly until it was outwitted by other businesses that invested in the technology. The history of technology in America and George Eastmans contributions to the advancement of technology worldwide are crucially ignored. It is combined with a brief history of technology by Eastman in the lengthy work. As a result of certain technological advancements Eastman made in the photographic business, it has been determined by several reviews and talks that he should have been included in the global history of technology (Lars Aglii, H.L., A.B.L. 1996).

Changes in business strategy can range from minor adjustments to management practices to major overhauls of the goods and services a firm provides. Large corporations like Kodak, Yashica, and Rolleiflex failed to adapt to market changes, which contributed to their demise. However, if researched further and compared how these organisations might have maintained their market share in their respective industries had they made specific changes.

Kodak, which was established in 1892, approximately 130 years ago, was one of the most successful global corporations. Under Eastman's administration, the business grew to be one of the greatest producers of film and cameras in the world and also created a welfare capitalism model (SIMONA GIORGI, G.I.O.V.A.N.N.I.G.A.V.E.T.T.I.R.E.B.E.C.C.A.H.E.N.D.E.R.S.O. 2004)

So, what caused the Kodak business to fail? Kodaks demise was caused by misunderstanding of emerging technologies and failure to adjust to shifting consumer demands. Kodak spent its money on the acquisition of several tiny businesses, which prevented it from promoting the sale of digital cameras (Arthur N. Chester, 1994). The increased rivalry from Fujifilm contributed to Kodak's financial difficulties in the late 1990s (Finnerty, Thomas C, 2000).

Yashica was a Japanese Camera Company, originally operating from 1949 until 2005 when its then-owner, Kyocera, stopped production (Boeselager, Erik, 2022). In less than a decade the company rose to become the leading camera producer and exporter in Japan in terms of sale and output. In general, the companys quick development may be attributed to the focus of its research, design, engineering and production resources on the satisfaction of one extremely important person which was the client. Despite extensive coverage of Kyoceras 1983 acquisition, one facet of Yashicas activities that have received little attention in the numerous English-language wikis and references is Yashicas bankruptcy in 1975, which finally resulted in Kyoceras ownership (Gershon et al. 2013). Kyocera participated in the original bankruptcy rescue in 1975 at the governments request, and the merging of Yashica with Kyocera took place in 1983 (Yuzawa et al. 2018). In 1985, the rival company Minolta in particular had launched a competitively priced, high-tech autofocus 35 mm SLR camera, putting the corporation under significant market rivalry (Djudjic, Dunja, 2022).

Rolleiflex refers to a long-running and broad collection of premium cameras first produced by the German firm Franke & Heidecke, then Rollei-Werke (Dominik M. Muller, 2019).The Rolleiflex TLR film cameras were acclaimed for their outstanding design, small size, light weight, great optics, robustness, ease of use, and brilliant viewfinders (Bill Brandt, 2004). The Rolleiflex company filed for liquidation in Brunswick, West Germany, after failing to get funding for a reorganisation (Muller, Dominik M, 2019). The 1920 founded corporation suffered greatly from the Japanese rivalry. In order to compete with Japan, Rollei reduced its workforce in Germany and moved a sizable portion of its business to Singapore, where salaries were cheaper (Muller Dominik M, 2019). There are roughly 4,000 workers at the Singapore factory. Following the Norddeutsche Landesbanks refusal to extend further credit to the business, the firm, formally known as Rollei-Werke Franke and Heidecke, filed for the beginning of liquidation proceedings at a Brunwick court on June 25 (Chevreux et al. 2014). On sales of around $75.7 million, the firm was anticipated to lose nearly $14 million this year.

Research Aim:

I want to know why companies like Kodak were not capable of surviving the changes in the industry?

Research Question:

How do business strategies of new upcoming businesses affect the performance and profitability of existing companies in the photography industry?

Why is this business struggling to compete in a new market?

Chapter 2

Literature Review:

A brief introduction to the Photography Industrys business strategies.

The usual balance between customers and suppliers has changed as a result of changes in the global economy (Teece, D.J, 2010). Since technology has advanced to enable the lower cost provision of information and customer solutions, businesses must thus become more customer-centric (Chambers, C. 2004).

With technological advancements, businesses in the photography sector may now advertise themselves more affordably than they could in the past through print media (Teece, D.J, 2010). Also, technology has made it possible for digital photography, specifically, to process photos more quickly. Businesses must therefore reassess the value propositions they make to clients in light of these developments (Teece, D.J,2010). The photography business is a thriving sector that creates products and services for the use of photographs, images, and occasionally, films. Although photography as a form of correspondence can be traced back to the 1600s, it really took off in the 1800s, when capturing pictures and keeping track of individuals on paper became popular (Newhall, B, 2002). The fundamental prevailing logic of the photography industry's strategy is the overarching framework for value creation. Also one alternative approach is to pinpoint the elements that cause more noticeable symptoms (Sabatier, V. 2012). Overall, all industries it serves are due to its tangled industry borders. Given that the sector is accordingly drawn to the production of electronic products like cameras, visual central conditions, and burst boxes, it is reasonable to assume that it will have a discretionary area (Ho and Lee, 2015). Many of these industries employ strategy innovation, which is the modification of an organisation's business strategy to produce new benefits for both the corporation and the customer (Johnston, R.E. and Bate, D. 2013). The photography industry serves as an excellent example of the value of strategy innovation in changing marketplaces (Johnston, R.E. and Bate, D. 2013). Kodak took the initiative in the late 1980s to recognise the promise of the new technology that was challenging earlier photographic technology, that had been developing via the computer revolution. Digital imaging was the terminology for this (Johnston, R.E. and Bate, D. 2013). Kodak's managers employed expert panels in two significant strategy innovation efforts to examine the development of digital photography and pinpoint potential new market prospects (Johnston, R.E. and Bate, D. 2013). But regrettably, Kodak was forced to declare bankruptcy afterwards. Reduced prices, a steady stream of incremental product improvements, or the introduction of new items are the three fundamental strategies used by large firms to boost sales in a cutthroat industry (Bereznoi , A. 2015). From the perspective of boosting sales, each of these factors has the potential to deliver and maintain measurable outcomes. Yet, these strategies inevitably start to show decreasing returns once huge businesses have been active in their industries for a while (Bereznoi, A. 2015). The point of diminishing return occurs very quickly when prices are reduced, which is thought to be the easiest approach to increase sales. Yet, many businesses who drop prices in the hopes of seeing a quick return have discovered that a simple price cut without making the proper adjustments to other aspects of the business model can swiftly result in decreased profitability. Businesses that obstinately stick to enhancing the product alone can limit their potential for growth and invest in new ideas that are unlikely to be well-received by customers, which ultimately causes them to lose market share to competitors with greater vision (Bereznoi, A. 2015). Even though consumer value is created not by the product as such but by the outcomes associated with its use, the potential to apply this competitive method as a means of boosting revenue is quickly exhausted in the case of gradual upgrades to current products that are already well-known to the market (Bereznoi, A. 2015). Data acquired from their predecessors is typically utilised well by newcomers or successors (Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube, 2001). In the first occurrence, Germany voluntarily shifted many specialists to Japan and transferred cameras technical expertise there. Naturally, they began copying German camera technology and tried to create a Japanese Leica by decrypting engineering (Donze, 2014). However after a certain period, incumbent CEOs were unwilling to share their knowledge and technology with other businesses, which could cause issues (Kogut and Zander, 1996). The most crucial success elements in this third leadership period were undoubtedly firm strategies. Newcomers adopted a path-creating sometimes used technique in order to pioneer a modern technological path and change the games principles. Companies like Panasonic, originating from Japan and Samsung originating from Korea changed the games principles as well as refused to play along the same path as the other photography companies therefore the two companies went ahead and projected newer and different models (Wakabayashi, 2012, Demolder, 2011). Infact, Samsungs newer model, The Mirrorless Camera may have represented the biggest technological advancement in the interchangeable lens camera business in the past 60 years (Yasu and Amano, 2011).

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, George Eastman published a research institution in Rochester, New York, known as the Eastman Kodak Industrial Research Laboratory. Eastman joined the photography industry with the best chance of producing the best dry plates and capturing the biggest market (Gershon , R.A. 2013).

The Contribution of Kodak to the History of Technology.

A bank clerk named George Eastman created and patented a dry-plate technique and a machine for mass production plates in 1880, three years after he began conducting photographic experiments. He established the Eastman Kodak Company in the same year, renting the third story of a structure on State Street in Rochester, New York. Although the business first encountered financial and technological obstacles, it created the first snapshot camera in 1888 and swiftly rose to prominence in the United States (Henderson, R. 2004). The company's creator understood from the start that a user-friendly product was essential to success, and as he plainly put it, his goal, to make the camera as convenient as the pencil(Gavetti, G. 2004). George Eastmans decision to enter the photography industry and subsequent promotion of the continuous shot in 1888 made the frontal cortex of the photography industry evident (McCandless, 1998). Sales for Kodak surpassed $1 billion in 1962. The corporation began to release new products in the 1960s (126 cameras in the 1960s, 110 in the early 1970s) that went above consumer photography to graphic design and medical imaging. The majority of these products offered slight advancements over conventional silver-halide technology (Gavetti, G. 2004).

Throughout the late 1890s and the first decade of the 1900s, Kodak expanded quickly and outsmarted rivals by combining innovation, acquisitions, and exclusive contracts. Eastman concentrated on gaining control of the film market after realising that film would generate greater profits than the cameras that used it. For many years, this razor and blades sales model would remain mostly unchanged. Rochester quickly required more facilities, so in 1890 work on building Kodak Park started. Particularly in the UK, Kodak bought a number of stores and factories throughout Europe and opened them (Hiltzik, Michael, 2011). Kodak desired to enter the digital market, but they intended to do so independently, from Rochester, and mostly with their own workforce. In the past, Kodak has assessed the anticipated demands of the photography market, carried out research to ascertain its size and development potential, designed the products, established the necessary manufacturing capacity, and launched the new products (Henderson, R. 2004).

Kodak's approach is to collaborate with other significant businesses. Selective acquisition is another tried-and-true Kodak strategy. In order to perform joint research in areas including manufacturing productivity, biotechnology, microelectronics, and integrated circuits, Kodak is also expanding its collaboration with a number of top universities (Henderson, R. 2004). The first electronic image sensor with 1.4 million pixels (or picture elements) was introduced by Kodak in 1986, and the electronic photography business was established the following year. By 1989, Kodak had released more than 50 items, including printers and scanners, that incorporated electronic image capture or conversion (Gavetti, G. 2004). The first widely publicised digital product was the Picture CD, despite the fact that the business had been the first to create an image sensor, one of the essential components of a digital camera. In order to influence the emerging market, Kodak developed "film-based digital imaging." (Gavetti, G. 2004).

Development of the Kodak Camera

In February 1900, George Eastman unveiled the Kodak camera. Brownie was the name of the hand-held fundamentally valuable camera. It was easy for everyone to use the camera. Eastman created and made available the brownie at a more affordable price to support more roll film sales and make photography accessible to individuals starting on one side of the globe and moving on to the other (Wheelright, S.C and Clark, K.B. 1992). He created the name Kodak since K was his first letter. His brand name selection was based on three interrelated rules; it had to be brief, it must not be mispronounced, and it could not really be the name of another thing. The brownie helped shape a new photographic culture in America and other parts of the world. Products of people became participants in the Kodak Camera Challenge and Brownie Camera Club members, and accordingly, qualified photographers emerged (Wheelright, S.C and Clark, K.B. 1992).

The launch of Kodak camera in the 20th century influenced famous individuals to purchase the camera, including amateurs and members of the middle class. Since the camera only cost $1 in 1900, many people could afford it (Moon et al. 2019). More than 150,000 Eastman Company development wound regions of strength were sold in that particular year for professional photographers. The camera was very simple to operate because most people just needed to pop the film cartridge, close the entrance, hold the camera at a comfortable weight, focus on the subject using the viewfinder, and flick the switch (Moon et al. 2019). The component advertised to its potential customers that the camera was really simple to use and could perhaps be used by more imposing kids (Moon et al. 2019).

Before the invention of the Kodak Camera, the cost of owning one was beyond the means of the middle class. The Brownie cameras affordability had a democratising effect on American cultural history. Women, children and regular experts all had the option to snap photos at any desirable moment they choose (Newhall, B. 2002). Eastman used widespread promotion to encourage the purchase of his goods by appealing to the teenss emerging standard society. He advertised his goods in periodicals and newspapers. By putting a lot of emphasis on children as young girls and delighted brownie additions, he prepared his product for success among children. Similar to this, the Eastman Company published fictional works that explained the basic early stages of the camera, connected the appropriate areas for youngsters across the USA, and also had the option of reporting the preview culture (Henderson, R. 2004). That is Eastmans approach for closely monitoring taking into account assisting in introducing children to photography there, interest would arise throughout the advanced ages. Additionally, cameras were brought in to provide professionals like photojournalists and fashion photographers a platform to express themselves (Henderson, R. 2004).

Kodachrome Photography

Before the Eastman Kodak Company introduced the Kodachrome structure in 1935, coloured Chrome photography did not exist. People expected to work with expanded development frameworks in order to understand colourful visuals. However, the visuals were dull and moved at a distance from the objects fundamental reality which produced less remarkable views (FHJ Figge, CD Clarke, 1942). The Kodachrome cycle examined three emulsion coverings for a certain film base, each with an unsound mix of its own. The Eastman Research Laboratorys scientists developed the approach (GK Asdourian, KC Nagpal, 1976). Making colourful graphics ultimately led to thinking about how poorly put together a movie that the experts had watched in 1916 looked. The specialists laboured on the framework for years until 1935, when they applied their theories to the Kodak and used 16-mm film. The 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of Kodachrome as a result of America's increasing desire to capture special moments like birthdays and family vacations on camera (J, Jewkes, D Sawers, R Stillerman, 1968). The Kodak Company changed the Kodachrome approach into the quicker, more adaptable Kodachrome II. The link communicated the markets recent shift in 1965 (Moon et al. 2011). Due to increased sales of its products in the market, Kodak Company continued to cross national boundaries. For a fairly long period, after it was founded, the corporation continued to dominate the market.

Explanations behind Kodaks Company Business Failure

Despite Eastmans significant contributions to the photographic industry, the business continued despite major blunders that contributed to its collapse. The business was the shining star in the photography sector thanks to its cutting-edge technology and affordable pricing. Moderate model hindered its alteration with the inciting technology, which was one of the urgent first phases for its downfall. A new technology with aggressive competition, low margins, and the potential to cannibalise its high margin core business was a challenge for Kodak, but the company failed to act aggressively to address the emerging challenges (J Kotter, 2012). Eastman Kodaks revenues climbed by only 3% to US$10.07 billion as of September 30, 2005. While the company reported a net loss from continuing operations of US$1.32 billion as opposed to an income of US$139 million. Even though the rest of the industry experienced similar shocks last month, Kodaks film sales fell the steepest, by 37% for rolls and 13% for single-use cameras, compared to Fujis declines of 28% for rolls and 5% for single use cameras and other private labels declines of 12% for rolls and gains of 5% for single-use cameras (G Mendes, 2007). Kodak Company received attention for a chapter 11 bankruptcy explanation in 2012. In any case, the advent of phones with cameras led to a significant democratisation of technology (Ho and Chen, 2018).

Digital Revolution

The digital revolution is without a doubt the most important development and may represent a more profound revolution in human communications (M Clarke, 2012). Kodak Company was a well-known brand in photography and filmmaking for a certain period of time, it was also once the biggest in these industries (Henderson, R. 2004). Despite the several strategies the corporation thought would point it in the right direction, its reluctance to fully embrace change and technology led to both corporate failure and company obliteration (Gavetti ,G. 2004).

For instance, the corporation decided not to produce digital cameras for the enormous market because it was afraid it would destroy its core film business despite investing billions of dollars in the advancing technology. As a result of this laxness, Canon and other competitors in the business ultimately defeated Kodak Company (Gershon , R.A. 2013).

Poor Leadership

Poor leadership became a secondary goliath factor in the companys demise. When it came to leadership, the firm had a lot of internal problems that made it difficult for it to make bold decisions that would help it survive the obvious financial collapse it was about to experience (Gavetti, Henderson, Giorgi, 2005). For instance, the acquisition of other businesses, such as Ofoto was one of the companys questionable leadership mistakes. The company focused less on producing digital cameras that would specifically serve the manufacturing industry and more on persuading other businesses, like Ofoto, to work to increase the number of individuals who print digital photographs. The companys culture is developed by the collective actions of senior leaders and employees and is based on shared values and perspectives of what is significant to the company (Reigle, 2001). With an incredibly destructive technology like digital photography, strong leadership is needed to persuade staff to embrace change and steer the business in a new path (Lucas, Jr. & Goh, 2009).

Bankruptcy

The executives at Kodak thought that Americans would never purchase a competing brand of film. Although losing a considerable amount of market share, Kodaks management were unable to effectively counter Fujis assault on the U.S film market due to the overprecision bias (Gavetti et al. 2005). Kodak had developed a culture where it refrained away from developing novel products that required a lot of innovation or were at high risk. The transition to digital was seen as difficult by executives, a threat to the jobs of staff members and less profitable for research and development (Lucas Jr. & Goh, 2009). Kodaks management had legitimate concerns regarding the long-term durability of silver-halide technology because Kodaks sharp colour film images are developed using chemical emulsion as the basis for these operations. Kodak Company also spent enormous amounts of money acquiring little businesses that have seized resources for media. Considering turning was too far, regardless of how much the corporation altered its design later on after cunningly producing digital cameras. Many businesses, including Canon, have really established their curious foundations nearby and are keeping an eye on things. Since Kodak had spent so much time producing the major events in the industry, it was unable to keep up with the competitors speed. The corporation pursued making an appeal for financial security in 2012 after consuming enormous amounts of money in off-course innovations (Gavetti et al. 2005).

The companys delayed development shift into digital cameras forced it to chase after other businesses in order to compete. The businesss plan anticipated a pressing need to adapt its systems to the changes occurring in camera technology in the early to mid-2000s. The business continued to advance film photography by manufacturing pocket cameras (Gavetti, Henderson, Giorgi, 2005). Due to its impact on the film business, the organisation would have preferred not to implement significant changes quickly since, in their opinion, there is no future without movies. Digital photography failed to contribute to change and was expensive, just as it did with analogue photography in the past and with surrounding technologies (Gavetti et al. 2005).

As a result, the company neglected to put in place certified structures to ensure that it occurred with strength and success, ultimately leading to its business failure. This was due to the companys self-confidence that it was a dominant and successful company and that no rival in the industry at the time would be able to outperform it (Gavetti et al. 2005).

Wrangles with Other Companies

The conflicts that Kodak Company experienced with other businesses in the very complex film and photographic industries were one of the main factors that contributed to its financial downfall. A genuine Kodak rival by the name of Fujifilm. Clearly, Fujifilm has grown from a small participant in the early 1980s to assume a strong second place in the American market, attracting Kodaks attention as well as its displeasure. Finally, over the past five years, the retail industry in America has undergone a significant transformation. After the firm fizzled and did very nothing to ensure that it did not put itself in a position for the future obstacle, which is what ultimately led to its economic demise. Competitors like Canon and Fujifilms at that time, contributed and focused on making progress in the photography and videography industries rather than engaging in disputes and conflicts with Kodak. Kodak Company persisted in luring customers and convincing those in the film and video sector that film cameras were superior to digital cameras during this period. As a result, the company wasted money and resources thinking about how trustworthy it was, which ultimately led to its downfall.

Failure of reinvention

The ability of the brand to recover, advance, and perform above pre-environmental turbulence levels of performance is referred to as reinvention. It is necessary for a brand to reinvent itself in order to navigate the turbulence of the environment and enter new categories, markets, or value chains (Aaker, 2005). Additionally, the majority of businesses redeploy their resources for offers and engage in making marketplaces. However, a sizable portion of them have an excuse to actually contribute and accept the new dangerous abilities by spreading. In less than eight months, Kodak sold Sterling Drug, L&F Products, and Clinical Diagnostics for a combined $7.9 billion, the majority of which was used to settle debt. Eastman Chemical, which was founded in 1920 to provide raw ingredients for Kodak's photographic business but only earned 8% of its sales from Kodak by 1993, was spun off by the firm in December 1993. The balance sheet improved as a result (Gavetti, Henderson, Giorgi, 2005). Digital photography was close to being better than traditional film since it was more cost-effective and had better picture quality. Many assisting associations realized Kodak was abandoned since it had not embraced the new technologies. Despite the marketing division's and group's best efforts to convince the company's leadership of the changes in the market and the necessity of changing the ways things were done to advance, the leadership and affiliation chose not to listen, which further contributed to the company's financial failure (Gavetti, Henderson, Giorgi, 2005). The company's management continued to hold on to the antiquated idea of relying on film cameras, and the marketing department could not provide convincing evidence that digital cameras will take over the movie business. Digital photography was close to being better than traditional film since it was more cost-effective and had better picture quality. Many assisting associations realized Kodak was abandoned since it had not embraced the new technologies. Despite the marketing division's and group's best efforts to convince the company's leadership of the changes in the market and the necessity of changing the ways things were done to advance, the leadership and affiliation chose not to listen, which further contributed to the company's financial failure (Gavetti, Henderson, Giorgi, 2005). The company's management continued to hold on to the antiquated idea of relying on film cameras, and the marketing department could not provide convincing evidence that digital cameras will take over the movie business. lacking measurable agility and complacency

The lack of other evened-out agility and the leaders' complacency were two major factors that contributed to the company's downfall. Due to its lack of various evened-out agility, Kodak was unable to be creative and find ways to get past the risky market drives that were taking place in the sector. The corporation made it difficult for itself to compete in the market by failing to transition quickly into the digital era like its competitors (Gavetti, Henderson, Giorgi, 2005). The corporation continued to make mistakes by moving forward with the production of expensive and more marketable items rather than conceiving techniques and perspectives that would connect with its change and embrace the new digital market, which added to the agility's affinities. Accordingly, the company's laziness contributed to its financial downfall. As demonstrated by many academics, such as Mui, the firm leadership was remarkably odd from the last portion of the 1980s. The corporation chose to remain in the traditional film market rather than staying informed of the impending digital revolution. No pioneer or manager gave the manufacture and marketing of digital cameras any serious attention because complacency had already crept into the company's management (Gavetti, Henderson, Giorgi, 2005). As needed, the company's operation completely collapsed in 2012 when it pulled in for cash-related security due to complacency and lack of convincing agility. The company's laziness thus contributed to its commercial collapse. Many academics, including Mui, have demonstrated how odd corporate leadership was in the latter decade of the 1980s. The business decided to stay in the traditional film industry rather than keep up with the upcoming digital transformation. Nobody in the company's leadership gave the manufacture and marketing of digital cameras any real attention because of the complacency that had become so deeply ingrained. When the company drew in for cash-related protection in 2012, as needed, because of its complacency and lack of convincing agility, business completely collapsed.

Yashicas FailureIn less than ten years, the Yashica Company has grown to become Japan's top camera manufacturer and exporter in terms of both production and sales. Yoshimasa Ushiyama, the 37-year-old president of Yashica, is mostly responsible for the company's astounding promotion to this position (E Boeselager, 2014). When Mr. Ushiyama and his more energetic brother, Jisaburo, opened their processing facility in Suwa in 1946, they got things moving. They diversified into optical devices and watch components before uniting the company in 1949 under the name Yashima Precision Machinery Company (MR Peres, 2013). Shortly after, Mr. Ushiyama proposed the idea that mass-produced, unnecessary-cost, remarkable cameras would actually succeed as much as possible and take use of the genuine, widespread, and profound passion in photography.

The business decided to concentrate on the camera market as a result of the early Yashica reflex cameras' popularity. Violently reduced pricing, which were the outcome of convincing mass manufacturing, led to tremendous volume sales. When the average monthly production of rival businesses was 500 cameras, Yashica was constantly producing 3,000 to 5,000. The company's cameras quickly climbed to the top of the list of about 40 partner brands (E Boeselager, 2014). The Yashicaflex A and Yashicaflex S, which were introduced in April 1955 and were the first reflex cameras in the world to have exposure meters, are only two of the company's many firsts. Yashica continues to hold the top position in the twin-lens reflex industry (Lu et al. 2022). In Japan, its cameras of this kind continue to outsell any rival brands. Reflex Yashica cameras made up 68.8% of all Japanese cameras of this kind exported in 1959 (E Boeselager, 2014).

Kyocera acquired Yashica in October 1983. As digital photography dominated the market in 2003, Kyocera ceased making its Contax, Yashica, and Kyocera-take a look at cameras, both film-based and digital. In 2008, the Yashica brand was subsequently sold to the MF Jebsen Group of Hong Kong has quickly advanced to become Japan's top camera and photographic goods exporter in terms of both production and sales in less than 10 years (MR Peres, 2013). The company's rapid development is typically attributable to the concentration of its research, design, designing, and manufacturing efforts on appeasing a single bossthe client. In any case, Kyocera's acquisition has been well publicized. However, one element of Yashica's activities that has not been thoroughly covered by the numerous English language wikis and references is Yashica's bankruptcy in 1975, which finally led to Kyocera's takeover. The corporation was hit by a "perfect storm" of theft by its accounting supervisor, over-investment in a new facility at Okaya, Nagano, and a recession brought on by the 19731974 "oil shock," according to the Google translation of the Japanese Wikipedia paragraph about Yashica. A television recipient company investment problem is also mentioned. I have learned through reading another source that appears to be related to this line that, at the government's request, Kyocera was involved in the covert bankruptcy rescue of 1975, and that Yashica was eventually merged with Kyocera in 1983 (MR Peres, 2013).

RolleiflexThe demise of Rollei is a typical example of how technology combined with aggressive marketing, a specialty of the Japanese, can destroy well-established enterprises. The 1920-founded business placed an undue amount of reliance on its renowned Rolleiflex twin lens reflex cameras (B Schott, K von Grebmer, 1974).When the Japanese suddenly appeared, continually utilizing German start-up concepts but with superior marketing and lower costs, Rollei felt under pressure (B Schott, K von Grebmer, 1974). The corporation subsequently established a unit in Singapore, where wages were, surprise, cheaper than in West Germany and Japan. Thus, the Japanese were to be put to the test right in front of them using a combination of German expert knowledge and affordable resources (W Heering, 1935). However, the new project ended up losing money, expenses turned out to be greater than expected, and the Japanese continued to put pressure on Rollei while the company was overstaffed (Grundberg 2021). According to rumours, even if the Brunswick facility is shut down, the Singapore development may still move on with a far lower labour force. The llei camera firm, maker of the well-known Rolleiflex camera, has sought to enter an immediate liquidation after neglecting to get funding for reorganization (Grundberg 2021). The decision might have an impact on the Rollei action in Singapore and puts 700 workers' jobs at the Brunswick facility in danger. The firm, founded in 1920, suffered greatly from Japanese competition (W Heering, 1935). In order to deal with the Japanese problem, Rollei reduced its workforce in Germany and moved a sizable portion of its development to Singapore in order to take advantage of the lower salaries there. There are over 4,000 employees at the Singapore factory. The Norddeutsche Landesbank declined to provide the business further credit, thus the firm, doing business as Rollei-Werke Franke und Heidecke, asked that liquidation procedures be started on June 25 at a Brunswick court. On revenues of roughly $75.7 million, the firm was predicted to lose around $14 million this year.

Other dead brandsMinoltaMinolta was founded in Osaka, Japan, in 1928 and initially produced a variety of SLRs and rangefinders, one of whichthe Minolta Hi-Maticwent into space. The first camera in the series, the Minolta CL, was made in Osaka and introduced on the Japanese market in 1972 as a result of a partnership between Minolta and Leica. The outrageous culmination of the collaboration, the Minolta CLE, which had Leica M lenses and perspective metering, was unveiled in 1980. The Minolta Maxxum 7000 Alpha Mount Camera will eventually become the first autofocus 35mm SLR with an in-camera motor after five years. As a result of the discovery that this camera violated Honeywell patents, Minolta was forced to back out and subsequently merged with the independent Japanese brand Konica (Weeks 2019). In 2005, Sony and the company that is now Konica Minolta collaborated on a new line of DSLRs. However, after a year, Konica Minolta handed its key project assets to Sony and stopped making cameras entirely.

The USSRThroughout its existence, the USSR created a large number of camera brands that, often unrestricted by western conceptions of licensed development, had the choice to gain significant market share from rivals. Despite the fact that Soviet cameras are often not renowned for their brilliance or constant quality control, they are typically easy to convince damaged and repairable near to the end user. The "FED" line of rangefinder cameras, which were mass-produced from 1934 until the 1990s, were the first cameras produced in the USSR (Weeks 2019). Another outstanding Soviet camera is the Kiev 88, sometimes known as the "Hasselbladski," which is made in the Ukrainian Arsenal processing facility and is an exact replica of the much more expensive Hasselblad 1600 F. Another category is the easy-to-use zone-focusing auto-exposure Lomo LCA was initially introduced in 1984 and is still being produced today (in significantly updated form).

OlympusOlympus may not yet be forgotten, but it is unquestionably no longer there. In 2019, Olympus handed up its camera division after 84 years. The Japanese firm, which was founded in 1919, began its camera production in 1936 with the Semi-Olympus I and the first "Zuiko" genuine look at the lens. The business would go on to manufacture a large number of tiny point-and-shoot cameras that are still popular among photographers worldwide, such as the battery-free Olympus Trip 35 with its selenium light meter and the tiny clamshell Olympus XA2. One of the smallest 35mm SLR lines produced is their range of professional-grade SLRs, the OM series (Wang 2017). Olympus backed the Micro-Four Thirds crop sensor as the digital era began, creating a range of very compact mirrorless cameras in its OM-D line until eventually leaving the camera industry in 2019.

MethodologyThis research article discusses the difference between traditional photography and digital imaging which leads us to know about some of companies that mastered the art of producing cameras. Now some of these companies grew very big and developed a name for themselves in the whole industry as well as in the world. But later some faced newer challenges or went bankrupt, giving way to new successors that produced cameras up to date with the technology.

I gathered the research through numerous, articles, journals, document; I also went through interviews, documents, case studies and records of these companies, making the whole research qualitative research.

Going through this research, we discovered the various reasons that makes a company big as well what leads to its downfall. Kodak being the biggest camera company had one of the biggest downfall in the business world, resulting in bankruptcy. These findings prompted me to conclude that often these companies make one of a kind, extremely helpful products, and how beneficial it is to the consumers, but regardless some business strategies dont work out in the end.

The business decisions of the firms that failed because they refused to adapt and the business decisions of the companies that did choose to adapt to the new, constantly-evolving market

Research GapThis particular research gap is a methodological gap, which means there is research on this topic that is lacking.

The research on this topic had a lot of missing information, to start with, the companies, like Yashica and Rolleiflex. There is hardly any information out there. There are numerous records, case studies, with their names involved, but not a single record has the full details of the company.

But to conclude because of the information on these companies, we miss the perspective of these companies. Both Yashica and Rolleiflex had the strength to go ahead.

Analysis and discussionConstant Need for Change in Photographic IndustryHaving a market cap of $10 billion, Kodak was a key participant in the image and film industries. Prior to going bankrupt in 2012, the company concentrated on four important business sectors: medical services, realistic communications, film and picture finishing, and commercial digital imaging. Despite several levelling out and financial failures in the last years, the company has spent the last almost ten years paying off its debts and making an effort to emerge from bankruptcy. Numerous factors contribute to the ongoing need for change in marketing. Some of the adjustments are made as a result of unsuccessful tactics, such as advertising that does not perform as well as anticipated. Other changes could occur as a result of incorrectly identifying an interest group, which is the demographic most dedicated to using a product. The need for a modification in marketing tactics may also be brought on by external circumstances. There are a number of additional important factors that force small businesses to modify their marketing plans frequently.

Brand Switching Behavior of ConsumersConsumer preferences are ever-evolving. Small businesses must thus always be aware of the kinds of goods and services that clients want. Additionally, as Vallencia College notes, businesses must continually modify their marketing to capture consumers' attention.

Imagine, for instance, that a tiny consumer goods firm may provide a different beverage with the tastes of strawberry and blueberry. No matter the market share, they might have to offer varieties that customers want. If not, people could start buying other beverages with these tastes. Similar shifts occur in customer preferences for other aspects of products, including their features, designs, sizes, measurements, and services (Lien et al. 2020). To determine what their customers always need, the majority of small businesses do marketing research surveys. Due to everyone's limited means and need for curiosity, the more people buy something, the less likely they are to continue buying standard items. This is referred to as the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility, according to CSU Northridge.

Companies Changing Marketing StrategyFor small businesses, maintaining a complacent attitude toward marketing and promotion is practically impossible. One important factor is that a rival may launch a marketing campaign that threatens the market leadership of a small business.

For instance, a big rival can contest the tiny business' position as the sector's quality forerunner. They may use a variety of engineers to enhance the potential of their own goods. The rival may then promote its outstanding reputation, taking some customers away from the smaller firm. In this situation, the small business has to show clients that it is still in charge of quality.

To show how much better its products are than those of the rival, this corporation may start running more comparison advertisements. To keep up with evolving competing techniques, small business owners may also need to switch up their distribution methods (Larsen and Sandbye 2018). A company's market share and ongoing performance may also be threatened by new rivals.

Change and the Product Life CycleSmall businesses must adjust their marketing plans during the many phases of the product life cycle. Once a product enters the market, it goes through four stages of the product life cycle: introduction, development, growth, and decline. When everything else fails, sales are robust during the launch and development phases. Despite this, most businesses in the sector eventually see a decline in sales when their products reach the development stage. As a result, it becomes more challenging to keep track of sales growth.

In the early stages of development, a small business may be forced to lower costs since customers would become more price conscious. A business could also need to differentiate itself from rivals to develop a niche market. A small computer software business, for instance, may add new features to its goods to boost sales. The business may also discover fresh applications for current items.

External Factors in Marketing StrategiesSmall businesses may also be influenced by external circumstances to alter their marketing plans. These uncontrollable factors may include the government, new regulations, scarce shared resources, and evolving technology.

A different packaging regulation, for instance, would force a small maker of frozen dinners to alter its packaging. The business might need to start providing more nutritional information. The lack of traditional resources could force businesses to look for alternatives for putting items together. Technology shifts may cause certain goods to become obsolete (Schifino 2013). Small-business entrepreneurs might need to produce additional goods to maintain their operations. Consumer media tastes are also subject to change, which pushes businesses to modify the media mix they use to sell their goods or services.

DiscussionWith the benefit of hindsight, it is intriguing to consider how Kodak may have made the choice to get a different result. One argument is that instead of competing in the markets it was in, the corporation may have tried to compete on capabilities. This would have proposed combining its expertise in sophisticated chemical chemistry and quick coating with other items, such as complex materials, a strategy that Fuji successfully used. However, this would have resulted in a remarkable consumer franchise disappearing. That is not the kind of thinking that managers are taught in business schools, and Kodak executives would have found it difficult to accept. It could have also meant Kodak should seize control of the division it split out in 1994, Eastman Chemical Co. After coming out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2013, Kodak made the decision to maintain its position in the image industry. Today, a much smaller corporation provides goods like commercial printing solutions, and Kingsport, Tennessee-based Eastman Chemical has emerged as a key player in the industrial chemicals, textiles, and plastics industries. (Unexpectedly, George Eastman's greatest enduring legacy may turn out to be Eastman Chemical.) Another likely option for Kodak was to depart its legacy industries in a suitable manner, as IBM Corp. did. Sincerely, IBM developed a plan for achieving this between the middle of the 1990s and the early 2000s, abandoning industries like printer manufacturing, flat board displays, personal computers, and disk drives. Departing legacy companies offers a wonderful chance for the firm undertaking the exiting to restructure and reduce costs significantly. This was finally accomplished by Kodak with their consumer film division, which is now owned by Kodak's U.K. pension plan. However, maintaining a development pipeline full of new goods and services that can replace the outdated ones is the key test for a company quitting its conventional business. That may be a big challenge, as Kodak has demonstrated.

Lessons from Kodak1: Difficult Technology Transition

The first test Kodak ran used technology. Over the course of more than a century, Kodak and a select few of its rivals created and improved the assembly processes that drew customers to capture and preserve photos for a lifetime. Making color film was a very difficult process. A total of 24 layers of complex chemicals, including photosensitizers, dyes, couplers, and other substances, must be applied to the 60-inch "wide rollers" of plastic base material while moving at a constant 300 feet per second. Wide rolls must be continually switched over, and gradually joined together, and the coated film must be cut to size and packagedall in complete darkness. With movies, the obstacles to entry were quite high. Only two rivals, Fujifilm and Agfa-Gevaert, possessed the knowledge and capacity to pose a real threat to Kodak.

There were various difficulties with moving from analog to digital imaging. First, digital photography was based on a semiconductor technology stage that was globally beneficial but had nothing to do with making movies; it had its own scale and expectations that needed to be learned and adjusted to. In addition to digital photography, the technological stage's broad range of materials suggested that it might be scaled up in a number of high-volume sectors (such as microprocessors, logic circuits, and communications chips). The technology was made available to everyone who could afford it by component suppliers, and there were generally few hurdles to entry. Digital technology is also particular. A friendly designer could buy all the components and put up a camera.

These basic blocks abstracted practically all of the necessary technologies, so you currently do not need to have a great deal of expertise and specific knowledge. The core cutoff and progressive capabilities of Kodak were far apart from semiconductor technology (Desai and Bumb 2008). Despite the fact that the company made significant financial investments in the fundamental study and construction of solid-state semiconductor picture sensors and supported some notable inventions, it was difficult for Kodak to stand out from the competition as a volume supplier of picture sensors components. Sony Corp., in contrast, joined the sensor industry to bolster its electronic video recording business. Its varied rounded-out skills were certainly more in line with what was generally expected to prosper as an electronics firm. Similarly, it arrived just on time. However, Sony and other Japanese manufacturers of consumer electronics anticipated having to adapt to the changes brought about by digital technology. When it came to "fitting and play" measured digital componentsin this case, liquid crystal displays, level board displays, and TV chipsTrinitron Sony's color television, a class leader, was defeated. Modularization "makes consumer items, our consumer products, a commodity," according to Yukio Shohtoku, retired executive vice president of Panasonic Corp. Shohtoku pointed out that as consumer electronics became digital, leading firms like Sony and Panasonic lost their competitive edge in those industries. This describes how dozens of businesses, many of them startups, entered the image industry as well as how a firm like San Mateo, California-based GoPro Inc. appeared overnight and completely disrupted the consumer video recorder market. It is a scenario that many manufacturers of technological items are currently facing or may face in the near future.

2. Downsizing Is Hard

Finding a way to manage diminishing movie sales while trying to maximize profits created a different set of challenges than the technology itself did. Growing businesses develop a plan for investing in achieving scale economies and assembling effectiveness. Unit costs decrease as volumes rise, and capital productivity rises. In any case, going down is difficult. It helps to imagine a situation where you would actually need to reduce the size of your production runs, even if your capital base is entirely depreciated. You just need greater volume after a certain point in order to cover your fixed costs. In Kodak's instance, film had a short shelf life, so when sales dropped, the business anticipated coming up with a plan to reduce the size of production batches without significantly raising unit costs or restricting the selling price, which would have triggered a death cycle. I can recall a time when a certain type of Kodak film's annual sales fell within a single broad, roll manufacturing cluster. Reduced run length would increase the amount of time and materials needed for setup, and switching to smaller manufacturing lines would result in additional capital costs that could not be justified. A product line that included a variety of film types performed admirably when sales were soaring but doomed the firm as volumes dropped.

Film photographersespecially professionalswere pushed onto digital by discontinued goods, which also reduced cost absorption. For a while, Kodak was fortunate that the industry manufacturing motion picture prints were willing to take up a significant amount of the industrial office above. However, when theatres ultimately switched to digital projection, the business was unable to reduce expenses quickly enough to remain aware of traffic declines. For Kodak, the declining size of its retail distribution relationship was a serious issue (Siri 2017). Finding shelf space grew more difficult just as the number of movies sold in physical stores began to decline. This is not a unique issue; other markets experience it as a result of unnecessary import costs, market disruption, or the resurging fall of items as newer, more advanced products are introduced. However, in Kodak's situation, the class was going away. Kodak management resisted discussing the issue in public for a time to avoid it becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy (something critics misconstrued as management not grasping the weightiness of the situation). One may argue that the best course of action was to shut down the company and force customers to switch to other options. However, nobody would have predicted Kodak to give up billions of dollars in earnings and abandon services like motion picture print distribution so quickly, especially without any competing goods to fill the void.

3. Ecosystem Troubles

The environment of Kodak was the third factor in the company's issues. The need of creating an ecosystem when another product or service needs to leverage complementary assets has been discussed extensively. To support film-based photography, Kodak built a cutting-edge and robust infrastructure. Retail partners generated large profits from photo finishing, even though film assembly and sales accounted for the majority of the company income. It was a remarkable business for merchants since clients came into their stores on several occasions: first to buy film, then to drop off exposed film for manufacturing and printing, and last to pick up the prints. Every visit resulted in ancillary purchases, with photofinishing serving as an enticing illustration of how certain stores and corporate retailers generate profits. Nevertheless, the end of straightforward imaging was capping off this wonderful time. There were two issues with the ecosystem design, in retrospect. The demise of basic photography made it difficult for shops to justify their loyalty to Kodak products; many were just as sincerely pleased to use Fuji chemicals and paper. Second, Kodak management was not entirely aware of the fundamental implications that the development of digital photography would have for the long-term future of picture printing.

Conclusion and recommendationsRecommendations

Concocting and Establishing New Strategies and Policies

One of the suggestions I would give to the business to help it turn around is to come up with fresh plans that include ongoing market activities. Once more, new marketing and technological models should be incorporated into the strategy, and collaborations with other businesses should be encouraged. This will make it simpler for the business to recover. To guarantee that the plans and objectives are achieved, the corporation should not only orchestrate initiatives but also seek financial support from other organizations and the government. The new policies should also build a different leadership structure. The leadership of the firm was one factor in its failure. I would thus suggest that the business adopt a new leadership structure that would ensure collaboration amongst all departments. Leadership structures that will go to any lengths to avoid undermining office suggestions and avoid becoming complacent.

Technological innovation

Another suggestion that I believe would help the business move forward is technological innovation. The business will actually need to compete in the ongoing market through technological innovation. For instance, the business attempted to create the Kodak Extra smart phone, which had a digital camera. The phone was unique in the ever-growing market. It has an appealing updated camera system and an android operating system. Therefore, if the business increases its investment in these technological advancements, it will be simpler for it to come back and start seeing advantages moving forward.

Diversification of Products

Product diversification is one of the tactics that can help Kodak Company turn things around and avoid its ongoing business failures. The business should broaden its product line to include consumer electronics rather than merely concentrate on manufacturing and assembling digital cameras. The plan will help the business increase sales volume and extend its market penetration. In order to complete the cycle, the business should evaluate the items on which consumers should perceive the brand Kodak and benefit. In addition to consumer electronics, the corporation may concentrate on launching a clothing line under the Kodak brand.

Retain Iconic Designs in the Products

One firm that has a strong sense of place in the world and that is easy for people to relate to is the Kodak Company. Because of this, keeping some classic designs in its products, particularly the camera, would make it simpler for customers to accept the items and create a full circle in the market. For instance, it ought to offer technology upgrades similar to those earlier offered by other firms through the Gen-X cameras that the company is still making. Nevertheless, it must make sure that the design stands out in order to draw clients. As a result, the organization will benefit from this plan since it will aid in creating and preserving its unique history.ConclusionThe photography business can be seen as a tertiary sector that massively combines the exchange of services as well as products. Master photographers and studios are paid for providing their skills to cover various events. The most impressive photographic service was beaten by wedding photography. Advertising and public relations are only a couple of the services that the sector may offer. A company's goods should be prominently displayed along major thoroughfares and near a prominent brand endorser. Additionally, pictures are used by newspapers and magazines.

Additionally, several professions including forensics, medical, and fashion depend in different ways on the photography business. Additionally, the PC and programming sectors have partnered with the photography sector to upgrade devices, notably camera models. Various digital cameras today have capabilities like anti-shine, grin ID, and face support. The swift results of various PC experiences and programming that may endlessly modify images, brighten the light settings and even "erasing" a few tiny imperfections in the picture have been notably felt by the commercial photography business. The discipline of verbalization and design relies heavily on the photographic business. The power and creativity needed by the industry will inevitably be added to every good and service it creates. The capacity of the industry to obtain an item, an experience, and, most significantly, memory makes it valuable in the end.

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