Week one: introduction
Week one: introduction
What is administrative law?
Administrative law is about challenging decisions and actions taken by official authorities. Usually those of executive government and can be other public government bodies. This mainly is about avenues, mechanisms, tools, techniques and bodies for the members of society where they would be individuals or corporate entities or other organisation to challenge decision that affect them or directly or to which they object. Political battleground.
For example, governments cutting off benefits.
Page one of the textbooks.
wherever there is a man who exercises authority, there is a man who resists authority
Oscar Wilde
Administrative law in the news?
Traditional owners on South Australia's Eyre Peninsula have won a legal challenge to stop the federal government building a nuclear waste facility near Kimba.
The government had planned to store low and intermediate level radioactive waste at the proposed facility.
Barngarlatraditional owners applied for a judicial review in the Federal Court,arguing the facility would interfere with a sacred site.
They also said they were not properly consulted about the plan before it was approved in 2021.
Justice Natalie Charlesworth ruled there was apprehended bias in the decision-making process in selecting the site due to "pre-judgement".
Are these administrative law issues? If so, why? What are the legal issues?
Administrative law contexts
Policy dictates (e.g. dole)
Administrative necessity (e.g. unis)
Economic interests (e.g. Peko)
Political pressures (e.g. war)
Expanding executive power
(e.g. national security)
Privatisation (e.g. Telstra)
Curtailing judicial review
Human rights laws?
What is administrative law?
Generally public law the relations between the individual or company and the state
But public-private distinction not rigid
Procedural fairness extends into private law (e.g. unions)
NB: Impact of privatisation
Haneef v Minister for Immigration
Case hinged on one word!
Minister applied invalid character test
Under Migration Act s 501, Minister reasonably suspected Haneef had association with people involved in terrorism: Haneefs cousins
S 501 does not define association
Minister misinterpreted association
Completely innocent people could fail
improper purpose not proven
Case studies in statutory interpretation
See also Mutitjulu and Malaysian solution cases [Head Ch 1]
Common law inadequacies
Legal review only
Limited grounds
Limited powers
Technical remedies
Expensive, slow
No right to reasons
The New Administrative Law
Steps by courts to extend
and regularise judicial review
e.g. expansion of procedural fairness
2. Legislation to simplify judicial review, e.g. the ADJR Act
3. Non-judicial review, through tribunals, Ombudsmen and FOI
Five factors led to change:
(1) welfare state
(2) demand for recognition of basic rights
(3) perceived loss of parliamentary power
(4) demand for access, uniformity, flexibility and certainty
(5) application of international law via UN Covenants
Since 1980s ... backlash
MERITS vs LEGAL REVIEW
Courts only review legality, not merits
Only procedural, not substantive, fairness
Courts may set aside a decision, but not re-make it: e.g. Green v Daniels
Tribunals generally have same powers as original decision-maker
But merits review includes legality!
Merits review possible disadvantages
Tribunal powers
may be limited
Facts or law may have changed
Tribunal can decide afresh
Constitutional framework
Parliamentary rule
Parliamentary sovereignty
Rule of law
Separation of powers
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Theoretically, three arms of government :Legislative
Judicial
Executive
Reflected in the 1901 Australian Constitution
But incomplete separation of powers
Cabinet members must be in parliament
Cabinet usually controls parliament
Executive exercises legislative power via delegated legislation
Tribunals exercise quasi-judicial powers? But part of executive!
Parliamentary sovereignty
Administrative law cannot challenge legislation, only use of powers granted by legislation!
Separation of powers contrast
Judiciary more strictly protected from interference than the legislature
Brandy v HREOC: Human
Rights Commission cant enforce
Same strictness not applied to delegation of legislative power to executive: Victorian Stevedoring and Meakes v Dignan
Moves to curtail judicial review
Standing
Jurisdiction
Justiciability
Privative or ouster clauses
Limits of grounds of review
Conclusive certificates
Not invalid clauses
Time limits
No duty to exercise clauses
Tailoring discretion: satisfaction, broad, narrow
Privatisation
Executive discretion can be broad
Still bound by law
Criteria important
Even if subjective
Green v Daniels
Administrative law: a shifting politico-legal landscape!
The federal tribunal system changed in 2016, due to legislation to incorporate all tribunals within the AAT
Now calls for Labor
government to replace
(stacked) AAT
Tutorial questions
Week 1
Head p 38 Q 3:
The New Administrative Law:
Key features? An improvement?
p 54 Q 7: What is merits review?
Key cases for Week 1
Haneef v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 161 FCR 40
Green v Daniels (1977) 3 CLR 66
Quiz 1:
Administrative Law Quiz 1 (correct answers underlined)
1.Where do the federal administrative law tribunals belong in the separation of powers?
a)Judicial
b)Executive
c)Legislative
d)Administrative
2.The difference between judicial review and merits review is: (pick the correct answer)
a)Judicial review can overturn a decision while merits review cannot
b)Judicial review can allow fresh evidence at the time of hearing while merits review must only look at the evidence the administrative decision maker had at the time of the decision
c)Judicial review is more expensive, generally slower and does not have the power to re-make decisions
d)Tribunals cannot decide the legality of a decision, only its merits
3.The changes to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal include the amalgamation of: (pick the correct answer)
a)The Migration Review Panel, Land and Environment Court and Social Security Appeals Tribunal
b)The Migration Review Tribunal, Social Security Appeals Tribunal and the Classification Review Board
c)The Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Social Security Appeals Tribunal and the Migration Review Tribunal
d)Refugee Review Tribunal, Social Security Appeals Tribunal and the Information Commissioner
4. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal can conduct merits review of: (pick the most correct answer)
a)Decisions made by federal ministers, departments and agencies under an enactment
b)Decisions made by federal and State ministers and agencies under an enactment
c)Decisions made by administrators, excluding Ministers
d)Decisions made under delegated legislation only
5.Which of the following statements is true about AAT procedure?:a)The AAT must be fair, just, economical, informal and quick
b)Most cases proceed to a formal hearing
c)Procedural fairness is not required in the AAT
d)The AAT is bound by the strict rules of evidence
6.Jurisdiction to go to the AAT is determined by: (pick the correct answer)
a)Whether the matter is administrative
b)The legislation under which the original decision was made
c)S25 of the AAT Act, which gives jurisdiction to all Federal decisions
d)Whether the agency that made the decision has a policy to refer matters to the AAT
7.The New Administrative Law was largely influenced by the following factors: (pick the correct answer)
a)A recognised need to protect national security
b)The demand for social security to be a privilege, not a basic right
c)The demand for greater transparency, consistency and certainty in decision making
d)The need to combat judicial activism
8.In Haneef v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1273, the court held: (pick the correct answer)
a)It is for the executive to determine the reach of the words of Parliament
b)The Ministers interpretation of association was so broad that anyone would fail to meet the test
c)The Ministers visa decision was impugned by an improper purpose
d)The executive should have exclusive responsibility over all matters involving national security
9.In Green v Daniels (1977) 51 ALJR 463, Karen Green successfully challenged a decision by the Director General of Social Security to deny her benefits by arguing: (pick the correct answer)
a)Discrimination against school-leavers
b)An inflexible policy was applied which was inconsistent with the eligibility criteria set down by Parliament
c)The Director General should exercise his discretion given her circumstances
d)The Director-General had failed to give her an opportunity to be heard
10. In Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd and Meakes v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73 the court held: (pick the correct answer)
a)The executive did not have the power to make laws, due to the separation of powers
b)Delegatus non potest delegarethe delegate cannot delegate
c)There should be a stricter approach to the separation of the legislative and executive powers than to the legislative and the judicial powers
d)Effective government would be impossible without delegated legislative power
Week two: non-judicial review
Possibilities (not always):1. Review by original decision-maker2. Approach MP or minister3. Internal review within agency4. Review by tribunal: AAT or NCAT5. Ombudsman or FOI
Administrative law in the news?
Is this about administrative law?
If so, why andhow?
What avenues of legal/non-legal review were open?
Which avenue achieved the result?
AAT to be replaced
The federal government plans to introduce legislation in 2023 to replace the AAT with a new tribunal:
https://www.ag.gov.au/legal-system/new-system-federal-administrative-reviewIt has established a review panel, which has published an issues paper:
https://consultations.ag.gov.au/legal-system/administrative-review-reform-issues-paper/user_uploads/public-issues-paper-new-system-federal-administrative-review.pdfAttorney-General Mark Dreyfus said the AAT had taken up to two years to make decisions, particularly formigrationandNDISmatters.
Over the previous three years,40 per cent of AAT appointments had political ties. That was eight times the level of political appointments made under the Howard, Rudd and Gillard governments.
ATT problems
Dreyfus: Cannot have confidence in AAT at present
Almost 90 former Liberal MPs, candidates or staffers appointed 2013-22 (of 320 AAT members)
FOI documents: Asylum seekers almost twice as likely to be rejected if they come before a tribunal member appointed by the former Coalition government
28% of claims were successful when the applicant had legal representation, compared with 4% for those who did not.
Saturday Paper: https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/politics/2022/07/23/odds-stacked-against-justice-politicised-aat
Key features
a transparent and merit-based appointments process
additional capacity to enable rapid resolution of existing backlogs
consistent funding and remuneration arrangements to respond flexibly to fluctuating case numbers
improved accessibility of merits review by providing additional support services and emphasising early resolution where possible
a single, updated case management system to address critical business risks
procedural efficiencies to ensure efficient resolution of cases.
https://www.ag.gov.au/legal-system/new-system-federal-administrative-review
tribunals amalgamated
Administrative Appeals Tribunal amalgamated with Migration
Review, Refugee Review and
Social Security Appeals Tribunals
from 1 July 2015.
AAT Fact sheet:
http://www.aat.gov.au/AAT/media/AAT/Files/Brochures/The-Amalgamated-AAT-What-is-changing-and-what-is-staying-the-same.pdfAAT structure
Eight Divisions:
Freedom of Information
General
Migration and Refugee
National Disability Insurance Scheme
Security
Social Services and Child Support
Taxation and Commercial
Veterans Appeals Division
Official rationale
part of government's overall aim
to attain greater efficiencies in Australian Public Service and provide a single body for external merits review. The overall objective of fair, just, economical, informal and quick will remain.
Two-tier review?
AAT Fact Sheet:
The two levels of merits review that existed for the SSAT are still available. People dissatisfied with a decision made by the AATs Social Services & Child Support Division in relation to most Centrelink decisions and some child support decisions can apply for a second review in the AATs General Division.
New procedures?
AAT Fact Sheet:
The AAT has new practice directions, guides, guidelines and forms.
In general, however, the review processes that applied in the AAT, MRT, RRT and SSAT prior to 1 July 2015 have been preserved.
Issues of concern?
Fees
Independence
Second review on papers
But tripartite support
(Senate report)
Fees (indexed)
$1,011 standard
$100 concession
$3,153 for Migration
$1,940 for Refugee
None for Centrelink, NDIS, Vets, Compo and related FOI
Shades of ART plan
Water down review?
Impact on quality?
Less right to appeal?See Head pp 61-4
Administrative law values? [Head pp. 4-5]
Administrative Review Council (axed in 2015):
lawfulness
fairness
rationality
openness (transparency)
efficiency
ARC: essential for public confidence in decisions
political expediency?
Potential conflicts exist, e.g. efficiency vs. fairness
Key changes introduced with tribunals
Review on merits,
not just legality
A right to obtain reasons for decisions
Review of policy?
AAT Act: some key sections (1)
Jurisdiction
25: AAT may review decisions made in the exercise of powers conferred by an enactment (currently more than 400)
Standing
27: Applicant must be a person whose interests are affected by the decision
Reasons
28: A person entitled to apply for review of a decision mostly may apply for a written
statement of the reasons (not SD)
AAT Act: some key sections (2)
Representation
32: A party may appear in person or be represented (except SSCSD)
Procedure
33: AAT shall proceed with as little formality and technicality as possible
39: Reasonable opportunity to present case and make submissions (except SSCSD & SD)
Powers
43: AAT may exercise power and discretion of original decision-maker
AAT objectives: fair and quick
AAT Act s 2A [Head pp 65-7]:
Tribunal must pursue objective of providing review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick
These objectives may conflict: e.g. sacrificing procedural fairness for economy
Added objectives
AAT Act s 2A:
[Head p 65]
Accessible
Proportionate
Promote public trust in AAT
Added provisions
33(1AB) all parties must assist
38AA continuous disclosure
34D & 42C: power to revoke or vary
42B: dismiss for no reasonable prospect of success or abuse of process
Must read the
legislation!
Sometimes, must exhaust tribunal avenue before judicial review: e.g.
NSW Breeding (2001) 53 NSWLR 559
In class:
These are questions to ask when answering problem questions:
Is this about administrative law?
If so why and how?
What avenues of legal and non-legal review were open?
Which avenue achieved the result?
Chapter 3 question 6: what is discretion?
The power to make it limited within the limits of the law.
Green v Daniels: (from chapter 3 &6)
Still bound by law
Criteria important
Even if subjective
But outcome: return to make decision again
Page 363 state of mind satisfies
(for words involved in Green v Daniels see D&J 363-4)
Chapter 4 question 3: AAT amalgamation
AAT structure:
Eight divisions:
Freedom of information
General
Migration and refugee
National disability insurance scheme
Security
Social services and child support
Taxation and commercial
Veterans appeals division
Chapter 4 question 4: Main AAT sections
Jurisdiction
25: AAT may review decisions made in the exercise of powers conferred by an enactment (currently more than 400)
Standing
27: applicant must be a person whose interests are affected by the decision
Reasons
28: a person entitled to apply for review of a decision mostly may apply for a written statement of the reasons (not SD)
Tutorial questions for Week 2
Head p54, Q 6: What is
discretion? (see the words involved in Green v Daniels)
Head Ch 4, Q 3: AAT amalgamation
Head Ch 4, Q 4: Main AAT sections
Key cases and materials for Week 2
Green v Daniels (1977) 3 CLR 66
AAT Act sections on standing, jurisdiction, procedures and powers (remedies)
Week three: ombudsman and freedom of information (FOI)
Administrative law news?/
Defence department stonewalled FoI requests on politicians use of RAAF VIP jet fleet, says Greens
The Greens senator David Shoebridge requested details about the aircrafts use through freedom of information laws last month.
In a decision on 10 July, the OAIC was scathing of the departments approach to the FoI and ordered that it meet its original statutory deadline for responding to the request, which was 2 July.
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jul/20/defence-department-stonewalled-foi-requests-on-politicians-use-of-raaf-vip-jet-fleet-says-greensFOI Senate inquiry
On 28 March 2023, the Senate referred an inquiry into the operation of Commonwealth Freedom of Information (FOI) laws, to the Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee. The reporting date is7 December 2023.
Terms of Reference
The operation of Commonwealth Freedom of Information (FOI) laws, with particular reference to:(a) the resignation of the Commonwealth Freedom of Information Commissioner and the resulting impacts;(b) delays in the review of FOI appeals;(c) resourcing for responding to FOI applications and reviews;(d) the creation of a statutory time frame for completion of reviews; and(e) any other related matters.
OAIC survived (just!)
The Freedom of
Information Amendment
(New Arrangements) Bill 2014, which proposed the closure of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), was withdrawn.
OMBUDSMEN ADVANTAGES
Informal, free, easy
Flexible redress, systemic approach
No strict standing rule
DISADVANTAGES
Discretionary
No control by applicant
No binding decisions
Starved of resources
High level of dissatisfaction
Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth)
Functions: s 5 Complaints and investigations
Jurisdiction: ss 3, 3A, 5 Limited to administrative
NB: Ministers excluded
NB: discretion s 6
Standing: s 6 No formal rule but sufficient interest discretion
Grounds: s 15 [See list Head pp 84-5]
Powers: ss 9, 13, 14 Investigative powers
s 15(2) Recommendations (NB compensation)
ss 15-17 Reports
Accountability: Not to individual, but parliament (s 19 Annual Report)
Appointment: ss 21,22. By G-G for up to seven years. Removal s 28. Query: Allan Asher quit in 2011.
A Freedom of Information process flowchart and accompanying summary information, including statutory timeframes where relevant, is available on the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner website at: https://www.oaic.gov.au/freedom-ofinformation/freedom-of-information-guidance-for-government-agencies/freedom-ofinformation-reviews/summary-of-the-freedom-of-information-review-processFrom 1 July 2016, the Australian Information Commissioner resumed the investigation of complaints about agency actions relating to the handling of FOI matters.
The Information Commissioner can decide not to investigate a matter as a complaint if the alternative ofInformation Commissioner reviewis available.
Guardian Australia investigation January 2019 (will this change under Labor?)
FOI refusals at their highest level since records began in 2010-11
More than 2,000 FOI requests took three months longer than the statutory time frame to finalise
FOI teams shrank in at least 20 government departments or agencies
Use of practical refusal grounds to block FOI requests reached record highs, increasing by 163% in a year
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner chronically understaffed, despite an expanding remit and a 72% increase in the number of complaints received about FOI
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jan/02/how-a-flawed-freedom-of-information-regime-keeps-australians-in-the-darkOfficial FOI objectives
Increase public scrutiny and accountability
Increase public participation in policy-making and government processes
Provide individuals with access to personal information
FOI LAWS - ADVANTAGES
Access to personal files
Some access to public information
Agencies required to publish reports
DISADVANTAGES
Charges
Confined to known documents
Many exemptions
Public interest limits
FOI reform changes 2009-10
Cth
>Abolish exclusive certificates
>Information Commissioner
NSW
>Government Information (Public Access) Act (GIPA)
>Information Commissioner
Open standing!
Freedom of Information
Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act) s 11 enshrines a right of every person to obtain access to documents held by the federal government, subject to exemptions, irrespective of the persons reasons for seeking access
FOI main changes
>Stronger objects: 3(4) >Powers to facilitate access
>No conclusive certificates
>Information Commissioner
>Stricter exemptions
>Public interest factors
>Onus always on govt.
>Purely factual material not exempt
Federal FOI exemptions
33 national security, defence or
international relations
34 Cabinet documents
37 Law enforcement & public safety
38 secrecy provisions of other Acts
42 legal professional privilege
45 material obtained in confidence
46 contempt of Parliament or court
47 trade secrets or commercially valuable information
47A Electoral rolls & related documents
Public interest conditional
exemptions
47B Commonwealth-State relations
47C deliberative processes
47D financial or property interests of Commonwealth
47E certain operations of agencies
47F personal privacy
47G business
47H research
47J the economy
Public interest factors (FOI 11B)
Factors favouring access
>promote the objects of this Act
>inform debate on matter of public importance
>promote effective oversight of public expenditure
>access to personal information
S 11B Irrelevant factors
>embarrassment or loss of confidence in government
>could result in misunderstanding document
>high seniority
>confusion or unnecessary debate
Guidelines
(s 93A)
Agency or minister must have regard to Information Commissioner guidelines
FOI Act review mechanisms
>Internal review (52-54E)
(not compulsory)
>Information Commissioner (54F-55ZD)
>IC may make preliminary inquiries (54V)
>IC may decline or refer to AAT (54W)
>IC decision reviewable by AAT (57-67)
(must go to IC first)
>Appeal to Federal Court on law (56-56A)
FOI Act and statutory interpretation
34: dominant purpose
47C: purely factual material
47J: substantial adverse effect by....
11B: result in confusion or unnecessary debate
Government Information
(Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW)
>Presumption for disclosure (s 5)
>Mandatory proactive release of open access information (6(1))
>Proactive release of government information unless overriding public interest(7, 8)
>Access unless overriding public interest (9)
>Act overrides other secrecy provisions (11)
>General public interest for disclosure (12)
>Agencies to advise & assist (16)
GIPA Exemptions
>Public interest considerations against disclosure (Schedule 1): >Cabinet information; Contempt; Legal professional privilege etc)
Review
>Application process (41-64)
>Reviewable decisions (80)
>Internal review by agency (82-87)
>Review by Information Commissioner (89-99)
>Referral of agency decision to NCAT (s 99)
>Review by NCAT (100-111)
>Ombudsman not to investigate related conduct (124)
Common law right to reasons?
No: Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond (1986 HC)
But note statutory provisions (e.g. AAT and ADJR Acts)
Also:
discovery and interrogatories versus public interest immunity
RATIONALE FOR REASONS
Per Kirby J in Ex parte Palme
>encourage careful examination
of relevant issues
>provide guidance for future like decisions
>promote acceptance of decisions
>facilitate work of supervising courts
>encourage good administration
>promote real consideration of issues
>guard against arbitrariness
>increase public confidence
* No mention of empowering applicant
Questions for Week 3
Head Ch 5
Q1: key sections in the Ombudsman Act (Cth)
p.117 answer the three main functions complaints, investigation or government investigation.
Q3: effectiveness of the FOI Act (Cth)
Q4: should there be a common law right to reasons?
Q5: problem question covering FOI Act (Cth) and rights to reasons
Notes on Q5: Issue 1: Access via FOI
Practical refusal? S 24
Exemptions? S 45 confidence?
Conditional exemptions? S 47F privacy?
S 47C deliberative processes?
Guidelines 6.77: exception for expert reports does not include social sciences
Public interest factors FOI Act s 11B
Check recent IC, AAT cases
Issue 2: Reasons?
Common law no: Public Service Board v Osmond (1986)
But see PMCH Act s 10(7):
If the Minister refuses to grant the permit, the Minister shall, within the prescribed period after the decision is made, cause to be served on the applicant notice in writing of the refusal, setting out the reasons for the refusal.
Also AAT s 28 & ADJR Act ss 13-14, but note s 13 exemptions & s 13A A-Gs certificates, also Schedules 1 & 2.
Week four: delegated legislation
Questions for Week 4
Head chapter 6: Questions 2, 3 and 4
Cases and legislation to read for Week 4 questions:
New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1
Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)
Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494
Administrative law in news?
Disorganized developments Pty Ltd v South Australia [2023] HCA 22 (2 August 2023)
A case on strict approach to delegated legislation and a broader application of procedural fairness to the proclamation of at least some types of regulations that affect certain individuals.
High court majority held: (1) regulations purportedly making land prescribed place upon which it was unlawful for members of criminal organisation to enter afforded to the property owners.
What is delegated legislation?
Difficult to define, except broadly
The transfer of law-making power
Variety of labels, including:
disallowable instrument
regulation
by-law
proclamation
rule
ordinance
university statute
WESTERN SYDNEY UNIVERSITY ACT 1997 (NSW)
S 40 By-laws
The Board may make by-laws, not
inconsistent with this Act, for or with
respect to any matter that is required
or permitted to be prescribed
or that is necessary
or convenient to be prescribed
for carrying out or giving
effect to this Act
and, in particular, for or with
respect to the following:
the management, governance and discipline of the University, (z)
Delegated legislation: two-step process
1. Is the delegated legislation within the power of the parent Act?
2. Is the decision authorised
by the delegated legislation?
Primary and delegated legislation
A fundamental difference
Courts cannot impugn legality of statutes, except on constitutional grounds
Courts decide if delegated legislation authorised by parent Act
Any constitutional limit? (1)
Meakes v Dignan (1931)
Regulations relating to preferential employment of unionists on waterfront
Act said regulations would have force of law notwithstanding other Act
Held: no breach of separation of powers
Any constitutional limit? (2)
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003)
* Parliament cannot
delegate almost unlimited power
* Can delegate power with respect to a particular head in Constitution s 51
Any constitutional limit? (3)
NSW v Commonwealth (2006)
Majority sanctioned WorkChoices regulation-making clauses, despite saying it was undesirable
Minister can outlaw basic workers rights and conditions
Regulations can specify
prohibited content
Regulations can even amend Act itself
Kirby J: Borders on abdication of Parliament's responsibilities
Judicial review of delegated legislation
Austral Fisheries
Courts decide if authorised by parent Act
May declare uncertain, unreasonable, or for improper purpose
Fisheries management plan statistically impossible
Legislation Act 2003
Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) became Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) (LA) in 2016.
The LA requires (1) public consultation in making delegated legislation, (2) registration in the Federal Register of Legislation, (3) tabling in both parliament houses within six sitting days and (4) a 10-year sunset clause.
Check the parent Act!
However, the parent or
enabling legislation, under which a legislative instrument is made, can modify or override these requirements, so always check the parent Act. In other words, the LA largely provides default requirements, which operate where the enabling legislation is silent.
3 different legal consequences of LA breaches
s 15K: legislative instrument not
enforceable unless registered [valid
but not enforceable]
s 19: fact that consultation does not occur does not affect validity or enforceability of instrument
s 38(3): if legislative instrument is not laid before both houses of parliament within six sitting days, or is disallowed by Parliament, it ceases to have effect, as if it had been repealed from that time
You will find the Federal Register of Legislation on-line at: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Legislative instrument
defined in LA s 8
An instrument made under an Act is a legislative instrument if the parent Act specifies that it is a legislative instrument or if it is registered as a legislative instrument.
By s 8 (4), instrument is also legislative instrument if:
made under a power delegated by Parliament; and any provision of the instrument:
(i) determines the law or alters the content of the law, rather than determining particular cases or particular circumstances in which the law is to apply; and
(ii) has the direct or indirect effect of affecting a privilege or interest, imposing an obligation, creating a right, or varying or removing an obligation or right
The LA also declares
certain kinds of rules
to be not legislative
instruments and allows the enabling legislation to declare an instrument not to be legislative, and therefore exempt from the LA requirements (see ss 8-10 of the LA)
FOI Act Guidelines exemption
For example, FOI Act s93A(3) states that Guidelinesare not legislative instruments
Hence, FOI Guidelines are exempt from Legislation Act requirements, but still legally binding
Notifiable instruments
The LA introduced new category: notifiable instrument. Not legislative instruments, but may be placed on Register if considered important for public accessibility or centralised management reasons.
Examples include commencement, amendment and repeal instruments. Instruments can become notifiable instruments in 3 ways: by registration, prescription by regulation under the LA or declaration in the relevant enabling legislation.
Publication (registration) rules
Delegated legislation must be published (now registered)
Golden-Browne v Hunt
Watson v Lee
Lack of publication renders regulation inoperative, not invalid
(not enforceable s 15K)
Tabling requirement
What happens if
Government fails to table?
Totally void or merely invalidated?
LA s 38(3) indicates second outcome: failure has effect of repeal from end of tabling period
Case study: Maritime Union of Australia v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCA 34 [Head pp 131-3]
High Court effectively imposed some limits on use of ministerial determinations and other forms of delegated legislation to thwart legislation.
The saga involved repeated bills and regulations by Liberal-National government to overturn Labor governments extension of visa requirements to offshore oil and gas industry.
Court held determination was invalid
because it purported to negate
the effect of the Act.
New web address for Senate scrutiny committee
The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation assesses delegated legislation against a set of scrutiny principles that focus on compliance with statutory requirements, the protection of individual rights and liberties, and principles of parliamentary oversight.
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Scrutiny_of_Delegated_Legislation
COVID emergency exemption controversy
On 16 March 2021, the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation tabled its report on the exemption of delegated legislation from parliamentary oversight. The report made 11 recommendations.
Media release: There are over 31,000 legislative instruments currently in force. However, last year 17.4 per cent of legislative instruments were exempt from disallowance.
Recommendation 1: The committee recommends the Legislation Act 2003 be amended to require all exemptions from disallowance and sunsetting to be in primary legislation.
On 16 June 2021 the Senate resolved: delegated legislation should be subject to disallowance and sunsetting to permit appropriate parliamentary scrutiny and oversight unless there are exceptional circumstances
Statutory interpretation
Much administrative law is about statutory interpretation
>decision-makers may exercise only powers conferred on them by law
>must be substantial compliance with procedures prescribed by law
Therefore:
>read legislation carefully
>interpret it critically
Haneef v Minister for Immigration
[Head pp 9-13]
Case hinged on one word!
Minister applied invalid character test
Under Migration Act s 501, Minister reasonably suspected Haneef had association with people involved in terrorism: Haneefs cousins
S 501 does not define association
Minister misinterpreted association
Completely innocent people could fail
On the decisive importance of statutory interpretation, see also Mutitjulu and Malaysian solution cases [Head
pp 13-15]
Combet v Commonwealth (2005)
High Court divided three ways
By 5-2, permitted use of budget funds to finance advertising campaign
Four judges held spending was not limited to specified outcomes
Gleeson CJ found advertising campaign came within one stated outcome
McHugh & Kirby JJ dissented: expenditure had no rational connection to outcomes
CARDINAL RULES
>Check jurisdiction
>Check statute
>Read statutes critically. Do not
assume legality
>Apply literal, golden and purpose rules
>Apply maxims, ejusdem generis & noscitur a sociis
>s15AA preference to promoting purpose of Act
>s15AB(1) reference may be made to extrinsic materials
CARDINAL RULES (cont)
Two presumptions:
Statutes not intended to invade common law rights
democratic rights, such as liberty, free speech
property and contract rights
B. Minimise discrepancy between domestic and international law
Presumptions are rebuttable but courts will require clear expressions of parliamentary intent
Presumptions and
fundamental rights
World Youth Day case:
Head pp 140-2
Critical importance of detailed interpretation
Annoyance was key word
Fundamental freedom of speech
Limited victory, however
What is fundamental right?
Community values?
Tutorial questions for Week 4
Head chapter 6:
Q2: Implications of Work Choices case
Q3: Legislation Act 2003
Q4: Three-way split in Combet case
Cases and legislation to read for Week 4 questions:
New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1
Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)
Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494
Week five: jurisdiction, justiciability and standing
Tutorial questions for Week 5
Head chapter 7:
Questions 1, 4, 5 (problem question)
Cases and legislation to focus on for Week 5 questions (in addition to the overall readings set out in the Learning Guide):
Constitution s 75
Plaintiff S157
ACF case (1980)
Whats in the news?
8 august 2023 official government response to parliamentary committee injury
Welcomes recommendation that decisions regarding armed conflict are fundamentally a prerogative of the executive powers.
How do this weeks topics relate to the assignment?
Jurisdiction
Justiciability
Standing
Quiz 2 is on
Week 3 &4
Flow chart for judicial review
Head 144-5
Jurisdiction
First issue to consider:
Federal or state?
Superior courts have inherent jurisdiction
ADJR Act and State legislation provide
statutory jurisdiction
Also specific acts, e.g. AAT and FOI Acts
Federal courts
Most cases go to Federal Court, via ADJR Act or Judiciary Act s 39, including High Courts constitutional jurisdiction (see below)
High Court can refer matters to Federal Court, via Judiciary Act s 44
Federal Circuit Court (FCC) can hear some applications under ADJR Act (ss 5-8) and certain appeals from AAT (AAT Act s 44AA)
Federal Court can transfer some appeals from AAT to FCC
FCC can review someMigration Act decisions
High court jurisdiction
Constitution s 75
= Original jurisdiction:
(iii) where Commonwealth is party
(v) where Mandamus, prohibition or injunction sought against Commonwealth officer
Jurisdiction cannot be removed without referendum
Ouster clauses ineffective (Plaintiff S157)
High Court can grant all writs (constitutional writs): Ex parte AalaJason Donnelly, was to appear in High Court, seeking original jurisdiction for an application for certiorari alone unders 75(v) of Constitution (but Samoan detainee would have had to wait months)
JUSTICIABILITY
No strict political questions doctrine
But courts may avoid sensitive political decisions
Prerogative powers (war, treaties)
No review of Attorney-General's intervention
Must be a matter, not hypothetical
Non-justiciable prerogative war powers
August 2023 official government response to parliamentary committee inquiry
Welcomed recommendation that decisions regarding armed conflict are fundamentally a prerogative of the Executive exercised by the PM and cabinet national security committee.
However, the government rejected a proposal that such decisions be formally made in the name of the Governor-General, as commander in chief of the armed forces under section 68 of the Constitution, particularly in conflicts not approved by the UN
Committee report: such decisions of the Governor-General are not justiciable, unlike a ministers direction
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Armedconflict/Government_Response
Changing face of justiciability?
Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299:
David Hicks sought a writ of
habeas corpus instructing government to ask the US to release him
Tamberlin J refused to summarily dismiss on the grounds that courts should not interfere in negotiations between two countries
The concept of a forbidden area arguably states the position far too generally where executive power is vested by s61 of the Australian Constitution
R(Miller) v the Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41: Unlawful Prorogation in Brexit crisis
Supreme Court unanimously held that the prorogation of Parliament had been unlawful and was null and void.
Justiciability
[Every] prerogative power has its limits, and it is the function of the court to determine, when necessary, where they lie. (at [38])
Standard of lawfulness
"(...) a decision to prorogue Parliament (or to advise the monarch to prorogue Parliament) will be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive. In such a situation, the court will intervene if the effect is sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course." (at [50])
Remedy
It was for Parliament to decide what would happen next. In response, Johnson said he would not prevent Parliament from meeting.
Influence in Australia?
Although Australias (written) constitutional arrangements differ from those in the UK, the Millerapproach, despite being controversial, is likely to be influential in Australia, both in relation to justiciability and proroguing parliament.
National security cases
Justiciable, but courts unlikely to overturn decisions
Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward:
Security a fluctuating concept
How can a court evaluate?
Note:
A v Hayden
OSullivan v Parkin
Leghaei v Director General of Security
Stewart v Ronalds [2009] NSWCA 277
Tony Stewart dismissed at Governors pleasure Constitution Act
>Not justiciable
>No procedural fairness
required
Aye v Minister for Immigration [2010] FCAFC 69 (2 to 1 majority)
UWS student barred
Visa ban a political matter
Foreign policy interests
Internment not justiciable?
STANDING
Check the relevant Act
E.g. FOI Act every person or EPBC Act s 487 engaged in environmental activities
2. ADJR Act or state equivalent: person aggrieved
3. Common law: special interest
2015 standing controversy
George Brandis attacked lawfare and vigilante litigation by environmentalists (s 487 of EPBCA)
Proposed to revert to ADJR Act
No amendment passed to repeal s 487
STANDING
ACF v Commonwealth (1980): no open standing
special interest not intellectual or emotional concern
EVOLUTION OF COMMON LAW STANDING
Onus v Alcoa: community values and beliefs
ACF v Minister for Resources: public perception
Government funding as a criteria?
>Prerogative writs: strangers can sue?
THREE TROUBLING STANDING CASES
Vardalis (Tampa)
McBain (IVF and Catholic Church)
Combet (WorkChoices ads)
See: Head 160-3
MORE OPEN STANDING: FOR OR AGAINST?
1. Current law
2. Issues
Head 160-70
Standing problem (Question 5)
a. No: see Batemans Bay
b. At common law Ms Brown yes: commercial interest; Ms Black unclear, but first check the legislation. Ms Black might qualify if club is large or receives government funding!
c. Yes, seek certiorari: see Re Smith; ex parte Rundle
Cases and legislation to focus on for Week 5 questions (in addition to the overall readings set out in the Learning Guide):
Constitution s 75
Plaintiff S157
ACF case (1980)
Questions for week 6Head chapter 8 Q 2: Is each regulation valid? [Must answer!]
Head chapter 9 Q 2: Are the councils decisions valid?
Cases to focus on for Week 6 questions (in addition to the overall readings set out in the Learning Guide):
King Gee Clothing
Vanstone v Clark
Yes "Because, as this Court has held, the constitutional writs of prohibition and mandamus are available only for jurisdictional error and because s 474 of the Act does not protect decisions involving jurisdictional error, s 474 does not, in that regard conflict with s 75(v) of the Constitution and, thus, is valid in its application to the proceedings which the plaintiff would initiate."
Week six: ultra vires and procedural fairness
Two main grounds for judicial review:
Ultra vires (beyond power)
Procedural fairness (natural justice): hearing and bias rules.
Two grounds but may overlap
Ultra vires road map
1. Simple ultra vires: examine parent Act and regulations
2. Procedural ultra vires
3. Broad ultra vires: Eight headings
4. Status of irregular decision: open to review?
Simple or substantive ultra vires
Ascertain meaning of Act
Examine breadth of regulation or decision
Decide whether 2 authorised by 1
High court split on national interest test
This High Court case again shows the centrality of ultra vires, as well as the capacity of judges to split over its application. (NB The WSU law schools Jason Donnelly appeared as a barrister for ENT19).
InENT19 v Minister for Home Affairs[2023] HCA 18 the court split 4/3 on the proper construction of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), sch 2,cl 790.227which specifies the national interest as a criterion for the grant of a specified class of Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). The plaintiff came to Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival and applied for a SHEV once he was able to do so. After making the application he was convicted of people smuggling, which led to the Minister taking the view that it was not in the national interest, percl 790.227, to grant a protection visa to a person convicted of such an offence.
The majority concluded that the Ministers decision was invalid. It was an accepted premise that the plaintiffs conviction meant that he failed the character test. All other criteria for granting the visa were satisfied. Being satisfied as to those criteria and disavowing the character ground under the Migration Act, s501, but then concluding that the visa should be refused under s65because it was not in the national interest undercl 790.227were inconsistent with one another.
The majority concluded: [106] As has been said, cl 790.227 was not intended to be a trump card for the Minister to use to refuse the visa under s 65 without needing to consider, or be constrained by, any of the other criteria and powers relevant to the decision. Unlike s 501 of the Act, cl 790.227 is not a special visa refusal power conferred by the Act. It is a positive visa criterion in the Regulations to be satisfied for all grants of a protection visa by the Minister and delegates alike. It cannot be treated as if it were a personal dispensing power. The Decision should be quashed.
For discussion see: Douglas McDonald-Norman, The Trump Card: ENT19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] HCA 18 on AUSPUBLAW (7 July 2023) <https://www.auspublaw.org/blog/2023/7/the-trump-card-ent19-v-minister-for-home-affairs-2023-hca-18/>
Two key cases
London County Council v Attorney-General
Council could operate tramways not buses
Shanahan v Scott
No power can go outside the field of operation which the Act marks out for itself
Liberal or literal approach
Paull v Munday
strict and legalistic approach
presumption of protecting private property
a polluting company
Regulation and prohibition
Melbourne Corporation v Barry
power to regulate does not include prohibit
presumption in favour of protecting freedom of assembly
A contrasting approach
Foley v Padley
ban on Hare Krishna in Rundle Street Mall
3 to 2 majority on legal technical grounds
conditional prohibition OK
specifying powers and uncertainty
King Gee Clothing
prices order did not fix and declare or specify
Vanstonev Clark
determination did not specify misbehaviour
misbehaviour must relate to fitness for office
Procedural ultra vires
Procedural pre-requisites for decision must be met
Not the same as procedural fairness!
Statute might impose procedural rule that exceeds natural justice
Mutitjulu case
Guiseppe v Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations
Act required reasonable period
Held: one day not reasonable period
Reasonable for court to decide
But PF not breached: no adverse allegations
Mandatory or directory?
Mandatory: invalid
Directory: not fatal
Parent Act may specify
Project blue sky
Rejected elusive mandatory/directory distinction
Determine intent of legislation
Public inconvenience should be weighty factor
Although mandatory/directory distinction was sidelined in Project Blue Sky, courts have effectively retained it, as end result of statutory interpretation
Gageler and Keane JJ in Weiv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015):
there remains utility in maintaining the traditional terminological distinction between an "imperative" (or "mandatory") duty, and a "directory" duty
Another procedural ultra vires case in the High Court, applying both Project Blue Sky and Wei: (No reference to mandatory/directory distinction)
Forrest & Forrest v Wilson [2017] HCA 30 at [82]-[90]
(Non-compliance with prerequisites for mining lease application ruled invalid)
Parent Act may say a procedural failure does not affect the validity of decision
But in Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Limited, the High Court ruled that could not protect deliberate failures to administer the law according to its terms
Hard case in Mt Druitt?
Formosa v Secretary, Department of Social Security
Imposed strict compliance on individual
Not entitled to pension
Not told to apply in writing
Act said a claim shall be made in writing
Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case
Norvill v Chapman
Minister failed to sufficiently meet notification and consultation requirements in Heritage Protection Act
Extended ultra vires
Improper purpose
Irrelevant and relevant considerations
Unreasonableness and irrationality
Uncertainty
No evidence
Inflexible application of policy
Acting under dictation
Sub-delegation
Improper purpose
Not a moral judgment
Was power used for a purpose not authorised by Act?
Parramattas Civic Place
R & R Fazzolari Pty Limited v
Parramatta City Council [2009]
Council entered public-private
partnership with GroconLocal Government Act 1993 (NSW), a Council could not acquire land the purpose of re-sale (s 188(1)).
NSW Court of Appeal: council acquired the land for public purpose
High Court: but that ruling did not address the question posed by s188(1). French CJ also cited presumption on property rights.
NSW government, however, drafted legislation to give local councils explicit powers to undertake such developments.
Partly proper purpose
Thompson v Randwick Municipal Council
Would power have been exercised but for improper purpose?
Darwin land case
R v Toohey (Aboriginal Land Commissioner)
Review possible against Administrator
Town Planning Act misused to defeat Aboriginal land claim
Court can look behind words of regulation
Ultra vires relevant to assignment?
Simple?
Procedural?
Extended?
Week seven: extended ultra vires
Improper purpose
Irrelevant and relevant considerations
Unreasonableness and irrationality
Uncertainty
No evidence
Inflexible application of policy
Acting under dictation
Sub-delegation
IRRELEVANT AND RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS TWIN
REQUIREMENTS:
take into account all relevant considerations
do not take into account irrelevant matters
IRRELEVANT AND RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS
The legislation might state what factors are relevant
(e.g. FOI Act)
Usually, however, these must be implied from the legislation as a whole
Roberts v Hopwood
notoriously political case
socialistic philanthropy
equality of the sexes
For accommodating approach and importance of statutory material:
Plaintiff M-64-2015 [2015] HCA 50
High Court unanimously rejected argument that Ministers delegate wrongly considered the limited number of places in the Special Humanitarian Programme (SHP) and the priorities set by the government within the SHP.
A more recent case on irrelevant considerations
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Thornton [2023] HCA 17
(Visa revoked under Migration Act s 501 character test)
By taking into account the fact that Mr Thornton had beenchargedwith offences committed when he was a child for which no convictions were recorded (at para. 74, per Gordon and Edelman JJ), the Minister had relied on an irrelevant consideration
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend
distinction between entitled and bound to consider
Note: Mason Js 5 points, (a) to (e) [D&J 403-5]
Gwandalan v Minister for Planning [2009]
Nothing expressly prevented Minister from taking other matter into account
But found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation: Peko Wallsend
MOU and deed inconsistent with statutory scheme
Therefore, Minister took into account irrelevant considerations
UNREASONABLENESS AND IRRATIONALITY
Wednesbury unreasonableness:
so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker, acting according to law, could have made it
Previous restrictive approach in Australia
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu
Gleeson CJ and McHugh J : illogical
Kirby and Gaudron JJ : no logical basisUNREASONABLENESS: TWO HIGH COURT VICTORIES
Chan (1989): Minister
misconstrued
persecution in China
A new approach?:Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18: Refusal to adjourn visa hearing was unreasonable (Wednesbury test not the final word!)
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18
Unreasonable if the decision lacked an evident and intelligible justification
Not confined to decisions regarded as irrational
(Tribunal acted unreasonably by refusing to adjourn hearing to allow applicant to seek a reconsideration of her trade qualifications)
On unreasonableness see: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018]
HCA 30 (8 August 2018)
Kiefel CJ at [11]: Statements such as that
made in the Wednesburycase, that a
decision may be regarded as unreasonable if no reasonable person could have made it, may not provide the means by which a conclusion ofunreasonablenessmay be arrived at in every case. But it serves to highlight the fact that the test forunreasonablenessis necessarily stringent. And that is because the courts will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 (8 August 2018)
Also: Edelman J at [134]
The precise content of
reasonableness will be based
upon the context, including the scope, purpose, and real object of the statute
(Tribunal did not act unreasonably when it exercised discretion to reject protection visa review when applicants twice failed to appear)
Unreasonableness update
As foreshadowed in Head, starting at p 201, the post-Licase law shows thatunreasonablenessremains strict but depends entirely on the statutory and factual context.
DVO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 12illustrates the importance of the legislation, while Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16; Minister for Home Affairs v CHK16[2020] HCA 46 shows the importance of the facts.
While there has been a dramatic rise in the number of cases that raiseunreasonablenesssinceLi, the vast majority still fail. Cases in whichunreasonableness succeeded, includingDUA16andABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34, involved decision-making processes that denied applicants a fair and reasonable opportunity to put their case (which is also an issue of procedural fairness, but that ground is sidelined by the Migration Act code of procedure).
See: Boughey, Janina --- "Legal Unreasonableness: In Need of a New Justification?" [2022] UNSWLawJl 5; (2022) 45(1) UNSW Law Journal 113
Irrational fact-finding
Ex parte Applicant S20/2002
Distinction between Wednesbury unreasonableness (exercise of discretion)
and irrationality or illogicality (fact-finding)
Kirby J: elusive distinctions
Categories?
Discrimination
Parramatta City Council v Pestell
Reasonable inquiries
Prasad v Minister for Immigration
Disproportionality
South Australia v Tanner
Others?: Implausible, capricious, unequal
Not the same as statutory reasonableness!
e.g. Guiseppe (Multitjulu case)
UNCERTAINTY
King Gee Clothing v Commonwealth
Dixon J ruled out uncertainty as a ground
Simple ultra vires instead
Racecourse Cooperative Sugar Association v Attorney General
Vague measures did not determine and declare
price, as required by Act
But ADJR Act lists uncertainty in ss 5(2)(h), 6(2)(h)
NO EVIDENCE
no cogent or probative evidence
Pochi, Bond, RajamanikkamRejected English no sufficient evidence test
Jurisdictional fact doctrine
erroneous decisions on facts on which jurisdiction depends are fatal
R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board
INFLEXIBLE APPLICATION OF POLICY
Green v Daniels
Hindi v Minister for Immigration:
proper, genuine and realistic consideration
ACTING UNDER DICTATION
Conflicting judgments : R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air
Ansett Transport Industries
SUB DELEGATION
No delegation, unless Act provides
But: alter ego or Carltona principle
OReilly v State Bank of Victoria Commissioners
Extended ultra vires relevant to assignment?
Improper purpose?
Relevant/irrelevant considerations?
Unreasonableness?
Inflexible policy?
Week 8 break
Week 9 procedural fairness (natural justice)
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (NATURAL JUSTICE)
Two major strands:
fair hearing
unbiased decision
Two further strands?
3. logically probative material
4. reasons for a decision
Chameleon-like?: Brennan J
From a full-blown trial into nothingness
Procedural fairness
The doctrine is one of common law. It is an underlying right said to exist to the extent that it is not clearly extinguished by statute.
A classic test:
Kioa v West (1985), Mason J:
The law has now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, in the making of administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary intention.
A new classic test?
(Legitimate expectation discarded):
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40, per Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ:
[I]n the absence of a clear, contrary legislative intention, administrative decision-makers must accord procedural fairness to those affected by their decisions. Recourse to the notion of legitimate expectation is both unnecessary and unhelpful [It] may well distract from the real question; namely, what is required in order to ensure that the decision is made fairly in the circumstances having regard to the legal framework within which the decision is to be made.
Procedural fairness extends in some circumstances to private bodies such as clubs and professional associations.
NATURAL JUSTICE OR PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS?
Although the terms are often used interchangeably, the more modern term is arguably both broader and thinner.
Modern rationale
Fairness: opportunity to be heard
Rule of law: transparent, equal and certain decision-making
Good administration: better decisions
Method of approach
Two inter-related questions:
Whether duty to observe PF exists
Content of duty in the circumstances
Whether duty exists
Expressly provided for, or excluded or limited by legislation?
Implied on general principles or recognised category?
Excluded by another factor?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Legislation may specifically include or exclude PF
e.g. Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
See: Ex parte Miah (2001)
Commissioner of Police v Tanos (1958):
Legislative intent to exclude PF must be very clear
The common law and legislation interface
The legislation may determine whether the duty to provide procedural fairness exists and, if so, what it requires on the facts of the case. Procedural fairness may involve an interplay between the common law and legislation.
Ex parte Miah [2001] HCA 22,
per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J:
The true construction of the statute will determine not only whether the rules of natural justice apply, but also what those rules require.
IMPLICATION OF DUTY: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Interest is legally recognised or substantial
Power is not political or highly discretionary
Decision has serious consequences
Durayappah v Fernando (1967)
Broader approach embraced
FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1981)
High Court adopted legitimate expectation
FAI had no legal right but legitimate expectation
Governor in Council no barrier
Hearing delegated to appropriate minister
Kioa v West (1985)
Tongan family won residence status
Underlying right to procedural fairness, more flexible than natural justice
Prejudicial statements require a hearing
NB: Impact on migration law
Widening scope?
Three 2005 decisions
NAIS v Minister
Delay of five years was denial of PF
Applicant VEAL of 2002
RRT denied PF by not disclosing adverse letter
SAAP v Minister
PF breached in situation not envisaged by procedural code under Migration Act
Narrowing scope?
Three 2009 decisions
Minister v Kumar
Legislation should not be interpreted to frustrate its administration
Minister v SZIZO
Failure to meet notification requirement not necessarily unfair hearing
Minister v SZIAI
Refugee was given opportunity to respond to uninvestigated information
Minister for Immigration and Border
Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29
High Court curtailed the VEAL principle by unanimously rejecting arguments by two asylum seekers that they were denied procedural fairness when the department failed to provide them with full details of a data breach that had resulted in their personal details, and those of almost 10,000 other asylum seekers, being posted on the departments web site
Breach not relevant
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3
High Court further curtailed
(distinguished) the VEAL principle
[9] AAT breached PF
[29] applicant must be told of procedural change
[62] but no JE because not material, unlike VEAL: not deprived of possibility of successful outcome (2 to 3 split)
VEAL update
Wilson Transformer Company Pty Ltd v Anti-Dumping Review Panel [2022] FCAFC 4 (21 January 2022)
[VEAL was applied, but emphasising the protection of confidential information]:
the procedure adopted by the Panel had the effect of disclosing the substance of the conference, without disclosing the details of information passed on by the Commissioners staff to the Panel which was commercial-in-confidence... There was no procedural unfairness.
Procedural fairness update
Procedural fairness decisions in the High Court generally continue to revolve around the troublesome issue of jurisdictional error and its requirement for applicants to prove that a denial of PF was material. (The issue arises in this form because of the privative clause in the Migration Act.) Here is another example:
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26 (17 August 2022)
KIEFEL CJ, KEANE AND GLEESON JJ:
[1] The Tribunal's error in failing to afford the appellant procedural fairness involved jurisdictional error only if that failure was material to the Tribunal's decision. Materiality is established if the error deprived the appellant of a realistic possibility of a different outcome. The appellant bore the onus of demonstrating that the denial of PF was material in this sense. [SZMTA cited]
[2] Applying these principles, the appellant discharged his onus of demonstrating that the Tribunal's denial of PF deprived him of a realistic possibility of a different outcome the appellant was not required to articulate a specific course of action which could realistically have changed the result.
[15] In upholding the visa cancellation, the AAT took no steps to draw to the appellant's attention that the Minister had raised a new issue, namely, that the evidence of domestic violence was to be viewed "very seriously," as per a 2019 Ministerial Direction on the application of the character test in s 501 of the Migration Act.
IMPLICATION OF THE DUTY: PARTICULAR CATEGORIES
undertakings by the administrator
acts or conduct by the administrator
international covenants
dismissals
where reputation at stake
investigations
Undertakings
Haoucher v Minister for Immigration (1990)
Minister said AAT decisions would be overturned only in exceptional circumstances
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995)
Rights of the child covenant ignored
Teoh doctrine thrown into doubt by Re Minister; ex parte Lam (2003)
Majority took restrictive view of legitimate expectation produced by Convention on Rights of the Child
Undertakings still important
NAFF of 2002 v Minister (2004)
PF denied when RRT broke promise to give further opportunity to respond, even though no statutory obligation
Acts by administrators
Other conduct, including long-standing practices, may give rise to entitlements to PF
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister (1985)
Thatcher Government should have consulted unions
Dismissals from office
Person cannot be disciplined or removed from post without hearing
Jarratt v Commissioner of Police for NSW (2005)
Investigations
Annetts v McCann (1990)
PF will apply generally to investigations
Subject to factors, including:
specific charges
(2) whether findings have any legal effect
Investigations and reputations
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992)
CJC report commenting adversely on Ainsworth group
Where reputation might be adversely affected, must provide PF
Preliminary decisions
Similar considerations apply
PF now more widely required
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990)
Hearing required to even hold inquiry
Contrast: Edelsten v Health Insurance Commission (1990)
Legislation had detailed procedure
EXCLUSIONARY FACTORS
where effective appeal provided
political decisions
policy or rule-makingmaking interim decision only
necessity, secrecy, national security
How is this weeks
topic relevant to the assignment?
Procedural fairness or natural justice (hearing and bias rules?)
FOI Act?
Outline answer to theory question: Head Ch 11 Q 1 on Kioa (1985) and WZARH (2015)
Explain both the immediate decisionthe right to be informed of adverse informationand the much broader impact(1) judicial review of visa decisions (reversing previous High Court stance) and (2) wider more flexible scope of PF.
Then emphasise the even broader proposition in the arguably new classic statement 30 years later.
That is a more sweeping proposition, freed from the problematic legitimate expectation doctrine, although note the focus on the legal framework, i.e. the relevant parent legislation.
See the quotes from the two cases on p. 227 of Head (also in the PowerPoints).
Week 9 outline answer on PF problem: Ch 11 Q 4
(a) Yes, in principle, as per WZARH, reinforced by fact that Dawn has been in business for 10 years (compare FAI) and Ministers undertaking of fairness (Haoucher and NAFF)
(b) (NB leave aside the issue of bias, for week 11).
Not for reasons (Osmond)
Yes for adverse material (Kioa and VEAL) (explore VEAL more next week)
Maybe for oral hearing (WZARH, Chen and Li Shi Ping) (explore more next week)
(c) Council only recommends, but see Annetts v McCann, Ainsworth and Laws. (Impact on Dawns reputation and livelihood?) Is Ministers decision a political one as per SA v OShea? (Note also Miah and McHughs factors)
Week 10 hearing and bias rules
PF EXCLUSIONARY FACTORS
effective appeal provided
political decisions
policy or rule-makinginterim decision only
necessity, secrecy
& national security
Where appeals provided
Two conflicting arguments:
Decision-maker does not need to act fairly because injustice can be rectified on appeal
Existence of appeal may show important interests, especially where applicant faces expense and inconvenience
Outcome might depend on type of appeal: full or only legal issues
Twist v Randwick (1976)
If legislature adopted specific appeal scheme, court would not vary it, even if not full and complete
Courtney v Peters (1990)
AAT review did not strip Veterans Review Board of duty to provide procedural fairness.
NB: expense and delay involved in AAT appeal
7 factors outlined in Ex parte Miah (2001)
Original decision: preliminary or final?
Made in public or private?
Formalities required for original decision
Urgency of original decision
Appellate bodyjudicial or internal
Breadth of appealde novo or limited?
Nature of interest and subject matter
NB: Kirbys comment on RRT
Political decisions
South Australia v OShea (1987)
Distinction between expert decision of Parole Board, where the Act expressly secured procedural fairness, and political decision made by Governor in Council
Political decisions
South Australia v OShea followed in:
Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] HCA 31 (D&J 473)
Per plurality: A senior official standing at the peak of the administration of a statute is not required to provide PF in every case where the applicant had access to merits review
Note: 9 significant characteristics
Note also: Minister had non-compellable powers to be exercised in public interest
Stewart v Ronalds (2009)
Stewart dismissed at Governors pleasure Constitution Act
Not justiciable
No procedural fairness required
Policy and
rule-making
Conceptual and practical problems arise:
difficulty of ensuring all affected persons can be heard
(b) rule or policy might be overturned on basis of individual concerns
Minister for Arts v Peko-Wallsend (1987)
Cabinet decision to include Kakadu National Park on World Heritage List was complex and sensitive, involving competing interests
Queensland Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988)
Power to determine pathology services tables affected a broad range of medical practitioners and patients
Secrecy, urgency and necessity
Some powers urgent, e.g.
destroy dangerous animals
quarantine infectious diseases
forcibly enter premises in fire or
natural disaster
Council of Civil Service Unions (1985)
No obligation to provide hearing, if enough evidence for reasonable decision-maker to conclude it would prejudice national security
Doctrine of necessity
Explored in Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990)
Judge who has some interest in case can sit when no judge without such interest is available
CONTENT OF
HEARING RULE
Range from court-style hearing to just written submission
Factors that point to duty to provide PF will also affect substance of hearing
May also be affected by individual traits (e.g., how articulate or educated)
Right to be notified of hearing?Graham v Baptist Union of NSW (2006)
Church not obliged to tell minister time and date of disciplinary hearing
Young CJ : Justice in this sort of case is not to be meted out in coffee spoons.
Written submissions suffice?
May be:
Barratt v Howard
But perhaps not if credibility is issue:
Chen and Li Shi Ping [Head p. 238]
Right to know matters to be considered
Must be told of prejudicial material and be given opportunity to respond: Kioa v West
See also VEAL
However, Bond v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2): Bond lost bid to be informed of all matters to be considered
Must decision-maker warn applicant of possible adverse finding? Sometimes yes: Somaghi v MILGEA
Right to know change in procedural context
MIBP v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3 (court unanimous on breach of PF but divided 3-2 on JE)
[29] procedural fairness ordinarily requires that an applicant be apprised of an event which results in an alteration to the procedural context in which an opportunity to present evidence and make submissions is routinely afforded (citing WZARH)
[72] But breach only marginal not material
so no JE (VEAL distinguished at [62])
Nettle and Gordon dissented on JE:
[94] For any claim of denial of procedural fairness, an applicant must demonstrate that the impugned procedure deprived them of a fair opportunity to be heard: either valid or not!
Rights arising from administrative norms
Acts and undertakings may also affect the way hearing must be conducted
In some contexts, this may mean equal treatment:
Hamilton v Minister for Immigration
Applicant denied PF when not provided with explanatory notes normally given to people
Right to representation?
Cains v Jenkins:
No absolute right
Depends on traits of applicant and complexity of legal and factual issues
Krstic v Australian Telecommunications Commission:
No right to legal representation before lay body
Right to cross-examine?
Even before a tribunal, no necessary right: National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation
ORourke v Miller: probationary constable, dismissed terminated on evidence of informants, no right to cross-examine
Right to have all members consider evidence?
Re Macquarie University; Ex parte Ong
Not necessary for University Council members to personally consider material
Effect of minor breach
Remedy may be withheld if breach would have made no difference
Stead v Government Insurance Commission
Court should be wary of such finding
Test = could not possibly have produced different result
Similar approach in Aala and NAFF
Exercising appeal rights
or waiving PF
Calvin v Carr: Exercising right of appeal will not necessarily waive PF at earlier level
Ackroyd v Whitehouse: By exercising right to appeal, plaintiff not disqualified from relief
But Vakauta v Kelly: Failure to object to alleged bias amounted to waiver
Actual bias
Rare because success requires proof that decision-maker was actually partial and not amenable to persuasion by any evidence:
Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration
Perceived bias
Kirby J in Jia Legeng: imputed bias
does not require the complainant to
establish anything about the subjective motives, attitudes, predilections or purposes of the decision-maker. It is enough to show that in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that [the decision-maker] might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it.
BIAS RULE
Actual and perceived bias
Two axioms:
1. No one should be judge in own cause
2. Justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done
An troubling judicial split
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng
Minister attacked AAT for not accepting
earlier character test rulings
Full Federal Court ruled actual bias
High Court, by 4 to 1, rejected even imputed bias
Ministerial bias difficult to prove in political environment
Reasonable apprehension of bias
Test is a so-called reasonable person
Bird v Volker
Student alleged that Keifel J was biased as a woman, lawyer, recent government appointment and possibly Jewish!
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal
Test = reasonable and fair-minded observer, with some knowledge of actual circumstances and normal considerations applying to legal actions
Context?
Trade union royal commissioner Heydon cited Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ in Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 89 ALJR 609 at 614 [22]: the application of the principle to decision-makers other than judges must necessarily recognise and accommodate differences between court proceedings and other kinds of decision-making.
Context
in Isbester v Knox City Council at [20], Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ said:
The question whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend a lack of impartiality with respect to the decision to be made is largely a factual one, albeit one which it is necessary to consider in the legal, statutory and factual contexts in which the decision is made.
Varying standards
1. Courts
2. Quasi-judicial bodies (e.g., industrial commissions)
3. Domestic or consensual bodies
4. Ministers and political decision-makers
Hot Holdings v Creasy
Ministers not expected to abide by same standards of impartiality
Century Metals and Mining NL v Yeomans
Undertaking by Minister that decision would be made by impartial assessor
Keating v Morris
Inquiry commissioner has more robust role but went too far
McGovern v Ku-Ring-Gai Council
Institutional setting different from court
Fair-minded observer will expect:
Absence of personal interest
Willingness to give genuine consideration
Institutional bias
Difficulty to prove:
Mok Gek Bouy
Where alleged bias also individual, higher prospect of success:
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H
Judges with known beliefs
R v Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss
Judges entitled to express prior views
Greater leeway for bodies that are expected to make policy assessments
Judges who express provisional views
Judges or tribunal members given considerable freedom to express such views, particularly where it might be necessary or helpful
Vakauta v Kelly
Kaycliff Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal
Prosecutors acting as judges: Stollery principle
Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board
Smiths mere physical presence during Boards deliberations was sufficient to produce reasonable apprehension bias, even if had no actual bearing
Biased members who participate in collective decision
Re Macquarie University; Ex parte Ong
Stollery principle applied Vice Chancellor, who wrote to Council members
Stollery principle applied in Isbesterv Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20
Ms Hughes' role in this matter did not
involve her at quite the same personal
level as the manager inStollery
Nevertheless, her interest was that of a prosecutor, accuser or other moving party. An interest of that kind points to possibility of deviation from true course of decision-making. A personal interest in this context is not the kind of interest by which a person will receive some material or other benefit.
Domestic tribunals
Maloney v NSW National Coursing Association
No bias where committee included two members who gave evidence
Members of association impliedly consent to be governed by a body with factional strife
Cains v Jenkins
Only bias if committee members were invincibly biased: not open to reason or argument
Week 12 Estoppel, ouster clauses and jurisdictional error